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Abstract
Recent literature on peace and state-building highlights the need for women’s participation
in post-conflict reconstruction to move from war and displacement, towards stability and
future independence. This thesis analyses this ‘gender mainstreaming’ approach to statebuilding using the example of the Saharawi Popular Liberation Front (Polisario) and its
long term struggle for independence, focussing specifically on gender representation in
Polisario representatives abroad. Both the National Union of Saharawi Women and the
Polisario liberation movement have been praised by academics and institutions alike for
their achievements in gender mainstreaming. Despite living as refugees in Algeria, Saharawi
women have led the camps’ administration for more than thirty years, and today constitute
more than 35% of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic’s parliament. I argue that while
women’s participation in refugee camp administration has always been a feature, a
substantial female representation in high-level political office and in the state-in-waiting’s
foreign relations is relatively new to the Polisario. Gender mainstreaming can thus be tested
against the historical practice of the Polisario and the broader campaign to win
international acceptance and support for independence for Western Sahara.
In a situation of political stalemate, where UN sponsored diplomatic discussions between
the Polisario and Morocco on a peaceful solution for Western Sahara have been so-far
inconclusive, the job done by Saharawi representatives abroad in lobbying host countries to
their cause is invaluable. Yet exactly how has the presence of women as foreign
representatives assisted the political cause of Western Sahara? This study draws on the
work of Third World and Islamic feminist theorists in order to interpret gender relations in
state-building with the Muslim Saharawi refugees, arguing that Saharawi were implementing
gender mainstreaming approaches to social, political and administrative life in exile long
before the international community began to promote a discourse of gender and statebuilding. A critical ethnographic approach is used in a bid to understand the interplay
between gender and power, and analyse the relationship between Saharawi political
representatives abroad and their supporters.
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Chapter One: Introduction to the case study and methodology
1.1

Outlining the approach to the case study

State-building is the product of conflict. In a world that has seen so many modern day
conflicts, much of the current international debate focuses on state-building — the
discussion of the societal and political aftermath of conflict, and the creation of stable
governments, social compacts and institutions. In 2000 the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) stressed the importance of implementing equal and full participation of
women both in peace processes and state-building, as active agents. Full participation of
women in all efforts for the prevention and resolution of conflicts, awareness of genderspecific human rights abuses, and the importance of a visible policy of mainstreaming a
gender perspective in policies and programmes while addressing armed or other conflicts,
became the basis for the approval of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and
Security. From then on, all UN member states were required to incorporate in their policies
gender equality provisions in the establishment of a democratic system (2000: 5).
Despite its good intentions, in 2009 the UN Security Council recognized the slow progress
of implementing Resolution 1325 and passed Resolution 1889, requesting states to submit
reports addressing women’s participation and inclusion in peace-building and in planning
for the aftermath of conflict. In October 2010, the Security Council admitted that in a
decade more progress was made in addressing the protection of women in post-conflict
situations than in promoting their participation. In the Report, the Security Council also
mentioned that in the last ten years it has never included language on women, peace and
security in its resolutions on Western Sahara and ‘in the 13 missions undertaken prior to
the adoption of resolution 1325 the Council met with women’s groups specifically in only
one mission (to Western Sahara [...])’ (UNSC, 2010: para 9).
The case of the self-proclaimed Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) has been
largely praised by scholars and international bodies for its good practice of gender
mainstreaming and the full inclusion of women in the social and political life of the refugee
community (Baines, 2001; UNHCR, 2007b). Studies from Spain (Tortajada, 2004) England
(New Internationalist, 1998; Fiddian-Mendez, 2002), Australia (Armstrong, 2008; Rossetti,
2008), America (Lippert, 1992), Italy (Melotti, 1999; Contessini, 2007) and France (Caratini,
2003), have examined the Saharawi women’s involvement in both the Saharawi liberation
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movement and camp administration. In December 2007, thirty five percent of the
parliament of the exiled Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) had female
representatives (Sahara Press Service, 2008a) three of whom had Ministerial level
responsibilities. The literature shows how Saharawi people have worked in the last thirty
years to implement gender mainstreaming at all levels of governments, and women today
are both active in the refugee camps and in the international arena. I argue that this
sensibility did not develop simply because women are still the majority in the camps (while
the men serve military conscription), but because Saharawi people share a strong religious
and traditional sense of equality which derives from their nomadic origins and their Islamic
beliefs. Palestinian Randa Farah, in an article for the refugee study centre ‘Forced
Migration’, mentions how Saharawi women have traditionally possessed great autonomy
despite being Muslim:
[…] Islam, as practiced by the Saharawis, is tolerant and liberal. One of several examples of how
SADR [Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic] has been able to draw upon local traditions is its
institutionalization of women’s rights. Traditionally, women have total autonomy in managing the
daily activities in and around the tent. Any form of violence against women, verbal or physical, is
condemned and the man is usually ostracized by society. Consequently, these incidents are so rare
that the issue of domestic violence against women or children is almost non-existent (2003).

1.1.1

Gender Mainstreaming

Gender mainstreaming, as identified by the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for
Action, is a strategy used to achieve the goal of gender equality. The process of gender
mainstreaming is used to assess the implication for women and men of any planned action,
including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels (Bargon, 2008).
Part of the recent feminist literature has criticized this concept for its vagueness and lack of
clarity (Beveridge and Nott, 2002; Charlesworth, 2005a):
The goal of equality should engage issues of ending disadvantage rather than merely reconciling the
differences and similarities between women and men [...] Achieving sexual equality for refugee
women is a long-term goal, which will still be at work long after they cease to be refugees but
continue to be women (Edwards, 2010: 45).

Resolution 1325 mentions a preference for the application of indigenous processes (2000:
point 8(b)) especially where traditional systems have

institutionalised women’s rights

within their religion and culture. Considering that Saharawi people share a strong Islamic
and nomadic culture and tradition, this study uses the general concept of gender
mainstreaming and integrates it with Third World and Islamic feminist discourses. In this
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respect Tanya Lyons, Jayne Curnow, and Glenda Mather (2004) have argued that Third
World women are often “silenced” by Western imposed voices:
It was stressed that Fiji needed to move forward slowly and carefully with the aims of gender
equality, to ensure that existing positive cultural norms and practices were not threatened. To these
workshop participants it was important to distinguish between ‘gender equality’ as a Western
construct and ‘gender respect’ as a more appropriate Fijian modification of the concept (Lyons,
Curnow et al., 2004: 64).

The gender analysis of Saharawi foreign representatives abroad was done in this study
strictly considering their traditional and religious beliefs and their current institutions. For
instance, organisations like the National Union of Sahrawi Women (NUSW) have always
worked together with the Saharawi National liberation front (Polisario) to promote
women’s participation in the government and in their struggle for independence. Moma
Sidi Abdehadi, former President of the Saharawi Union of Women, was in the past the only
female member of the Polisario’s National Secretariat. In an interview with the New
Internationalist magazine she says:
We formed the Union of Women in 1974 to help liberate the country from Spanish colonization.
Yes, we were interested in the rights of women but national liberation was the key. We organized
ourselves in secret cells. But really women didn’t come into their own until after we had been forced
into exile. It was women who had to take primary responsibility for building the camps: in a sense
we were at the front, but just a different front from the men and we had to take responsibility for
health, education, water, sanitation, everything (New Internationalist, 1998; Abdehadi, no date).

The Saharawi case represents a unique example of an Islamic government-in-exile, striving
to include women in peace/state-building processes. A report published by the
WomenWarPeace website of United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM),
notes: ‘The National Union of Sahrawi Women (NUSW) is a powerful force that has
successfully brought together thousands of Sahrawi women to advocate for their
involvement in

political

and economic

processes in

the

search for peace’

(WomenWarPeace website, 2010). There are certainly limits to achieving gender equality,
even though this is the expressed wish of the Polisario. Recent claims of slavery in the
camps (particularly limiting women’s ability to marry)(Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2010a), the
practice of ‘enforced imprisonment’ of women who have become pregnant outside the
marriage (Allan, 2008), and claims of exclusion and marginalisation of a certain sphere of
society (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2010c), have come to question the genuine progress on gender
mainstreaming within refugee camps. While a short account of these claims is presented in
Chapter Three, a full treatment of their veracity is beyond the scope of this thesis. The
SADR and its constitution clearly state their rejection of slavery and the promotion of
freedom and equality. More investigation is required both by scholars and Saharawi
3

institutions to assess these serious claims. This focus of this thesis is specifically the role of
Polisario political representatives abroad, and in particular the different aspects of gender
mainstreaming within this unique refugee group.
1.1.2

The role of political representatives abroad

At present, the literature on the role of political representatives abroad from “states-in-waiting” is
very limited. The job of a political representative abroad is strategically important for

governments-in-exile like the SADR since their role is to develop political, economic and
solidarity revenues with the hosting country. Researcher Amanda Wise for example, looked
at Jose Ramos Horta and the East Timorese community in Sydney and at their wellestablished transnational connections cultivated over twenty-five years of presence in
Australia. The East Timorese’s government’s outreach to the global society helped them
build a mass popular movement and attain significant international support towards
obtaining their independence (2004: 171). Despite many differences in the prospect of selfdetermination of the two countries (Zunes, 2007), I argue that in the last thirty years of
exile, Saharawi representatives abroad have built strong alliances with local governments
(through twin-towns agreements), NGOs, and citizens which have then played a major role
in challenging their governments’ acquiescence on the faith of the Western Sahara territory.
This area lends itself to many interesting questions related to gender mainstreaming and
women’s role in foreign relations: To what extent are Saharawi women involved in
international activities with respect to post-conflict reconstruction and with what
consequences? Does women’s activism differ from men’s activism in representing the
Saharawi government abroad (to engage more productively)? Do men feel threatened or
disempowered by the presence of women? What is the overall result in the Saharawi
experience of the participation of men and women in the international debate? My
impression is that the presence of women in representing the Saharawi cause for
independence, through a variety of international diplomatic activities, has been essential to
demonstrate the genuine intention of the SADR to promote internal gender balance and to
engage in successful state-building practices. This work contributes to that part of the
literature that looks at gender mainstreaming in high political roles, particularly in
international representation, using the case of Saharawi foreign representatives.
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1.2

Methodology

This study draws from empirical material, further explored by secondary literature on Third
World and Western Feminism, women and governance, women and conflict, and women
in state-building. Most of the written material on Saharawi people was retrieved using
internet databases, collections in Australia through the University of Wollongong library
and the Amilcar Cabral library in Bologna, Italy. The material selected and used in this study
was in English, Italian, Spanish and French, and all translations into English were done by
the author. Official Polisario documents, such as legislative bills, are hard to find since the
SADR’s government does not run a website. The channel often used by the Polisario to
spread information is the ARSO.org website, run by the Association for the Support of a Free
and Lawful Referendum in Western Sahara. This study was also informed by EUCOCO’s
Conferences websites [European Conference of Coordination and Support to the Sahrawian People],
the Mujeres Saharawi blogspot [Saharawi Women], Sahara Press Service website, Sermujeres
website, and the Western Sahara Info blogspot. United Nations documents, such as UNSC
Resolutions and press releases were also used, along with personal field notes, photos and
documents from the refugee camps, Italy, Europe and Australia, collected since 2000
during my association with the Saharawi campaign.
Fieldwork was conducted in Italy and Australia between February and March 2008. The
Faculty of Arts at the University of Wollongong sponsored flights and expenses to Italy
where I collected most of my ethnographic material doing interviews (O'Reilly, 2009). Due
to time and funding constraints, I focused on a small number of interviews with key
Saharawi political representatives who normally live outside the refugee camps. Secondary
data from other in-field studies have been used to bridge the gap, especially information
relevant to describe the life of Saharawi refugees in the desert camps. Representatives of
solidarity associations were also interviewed using almost the same sequence of questions
asked to the Saharawi representatives (Appendix II). This was done with the aim to
compare views and understandings on gender between the two groups. Overall there were
ten participants who have informed this work. The first three interviews were done in
Australia; two with activists of the Australian Western Sahara Association (AWSA) and one
with the Saharawi political representative. The rest were conducted in Italy, where I spent
one month travelling between Rome, Bologna and Ancona: three interviews were
conducted with representatives of pro-Saharawi associations working in Italy, two with
Saharawi formal political representatives, and two with young Saharawi living in Italy, who
5

I described as “informal” political representatives. I used the adjective “informal” for these
young representatives since their name was not officially listed by the Saharawi Foreign
Ministry, as SADR representatives abroad. Nonetheless, they were suggested for the
interview by Saharawi official representatives, and their contribution to the Saharawi
government is recognised by the Polisario’s representatives in Italy as relevant as their own
(see Table 1). 1
Table 1: Interviewees table
Interview n. (Nationality)

Place

Pseudonyms

Language spoken

Interview 1 (Australian)

Sydney, Australia

Emily F.

English

Interview 2 (Australian)

Sydney, Australia

Jack F.

English

Interview 3 (Saharawi)

Sydney, Australia

Mohammed A.

English

Interview 4 (Saharawi)

Rome, Italy

Mariam B.

Italian

Interview 5 (Saharawi)

Rome, Italy

Hasan C.

Italian

Interview 6 (Saharawi)

Rome, Italy

Jamila D.

Italian

Interview 7 (Italian)

Bologna, Italy

Luca G.

Italian

Interview 8 (Italian)

Ancona, Italy

Rita L.

Italian

Interview 9 (Saharawi)

Bologna, Italy

Labib E.

Italian

Interview 10 (Italian)

Bologna, Italy

Anna M.

Italian

Despite the short length of time spent in collecting interviews for this study (collected
between February and March 2008), I had previously made contact with most of the
interviewees. Thanks to my own engagement, over a number of years, as an activist for the
Saharawi cause, I could contact most of the participants via personal emails. In December
2000, I visited for the first time the Saharawi refugee camps in Algeria. This trip was
organised by the Polisario representatives in Rome, after I showed an interest in knowing
more about the life of Saharawi children in the camps. In 2000, I was involved in the first
hosting programs for Saharawi children, Vacaciones en paz (Holidays in peace) held in the
Marche region. 2 Subsequently, I held the role of vice-president of the newly established
Jamila D., a young Saharawi who has lived and studied in Rome since the age of ten, did not consider herself
as a Polisario “political representative”. I explained to her that in my view she was a representative simply for
the fact that the Polisario suggested for me to contact her for my study. Also, as she admitted in the
interview that on a number of occasions she had spoken at public events and run informative seminars about
Saharawi people in various high schools in Rome (Jamila D., 2008).

1

In Spain, the yearly programme Vacaciones en Paz (Holidays in Peace) transports up to 10,000 Sahrawi
children for the summer months, thereby allowing them to avoid the hottest periods in the camps (when
temperatures regularly reach 50OC): ‘Charter planes are organized at least twice a year to allow ‘solidary’
Spaniards to travel to the refugee camps, including the Spanish host families for the Vacaciones en Paz
2

6

regional association called Rio De Oro. I travelled again to the Algerian city of Tindouf,
gateway to the camps, in December 2001 and for two more years I was in charge of the
Saharawi children holiday programme in my town, Senigallia. In 2002, I travelled to Austria
with a group of Saharawi children to be their interpreter (see Figure 1). Once in Australia, I
continued to be involved with the Australian Western Sahara Association (AWSA)
participating at their events.

Figure 1: Photo of Saharawi children in Austria during an exchange for their ‘Vacaciones en Paz’ in
Italy (Sonia Rossetti, 26 August 2002)

In order to conduct interviews with refugee people, this study was reviewed by the Human
Research Ethics Committee of the University of Wollongong (Appendix I). I assured
confidentiality, written consent of all my informants, and proofed transcripts of their
interviews. In order to ensure privacy and safety to my informants, I covered their
programme who visit ‘their’ children in the camps, with several thousand Spaniards arriving en masse in the
camps during the Spanish Easter and Christmas vacations. During these visits, and those completed on
regular flights (via Algiers with Air Algerie), Spanish visitors bring commodities and cash to ‘their’ Sahrawi
families, in addition to having the opportunity to see living conditions in situ’ (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2009: 337).
While visiting these European destinations: ‘The children receive medical examinations and treatment, as well
as gifts of clothes, toys, and money which they take back with them to the camps. The relationships
established during the program often endure beyond the summer months, as strong proto-familial
relationships form between the children and their Spanish host families, and return trips reinforce such crossborder bonds’ (Forced Migration Organization, 2010).
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identities using culturally appropriate pseudonyms. The interview technique employed was
semi-structured questions, with space and time for diversions in various directions,
essentially a “snowballing” model. Questions were formulated on the basis of the material
already retrieved and combined with personal experience in the refugee camps of Algeria
prior this study. Subjects within associations were chosen for their outstanding work in
their organisations and because of their good relations with the Polisario representatives’
abroad. All the participants in this study spoke fluent English or Italian and no translator
was needed. All the interviews were conducted in a private and safe environment, and had
a friendly and comfortable spirit. Interviewees were provided with a transcript and asked
for their corrections, although none chose to alter anything they had said. The transcripts
of the interviews have kept the colloquial form and no grammatical changes have been
made to the proof-read version.

1.3

Thesis structure

There is a good deal of analysis in English, French, Spanish and Italian on the Western
Sahara conflict: its origins (Hodges, 1983), its current organisation within refugee
(Tortajada, 2004), the situation in the “occupied territories”, the geopolitics of the conflict
(Arts and Leite, 2006; Zoubir, 2006), and the international focus on negotiation tables
between Polisario and Morocco (Shelley, 2004; Laschi, no date). Previous published and
un-published work looked at the emergence of the Saharawi identity (Rubbi, 2005;
Campari, 2007; Caratini, 2003), which grew into a self-conscious nationalism (San Martin,
2005; Hodges, 1983) with a vision of a possible new Saharawi state (Chamberlain, 2005).
Saharawi refugees’ planning towards gender mainstreaming has been widely discussed in
the international literature (Lippert, 1992; Olmi, 1998; Baines, 2001; Fiddian-Mendez, 2002;
Armstrong, 2008) as will be discussed later. Many agree that Saharawi women have been in
control of the refugee camps since their foundation, but some argue that these actions
were just used by the Polisario to secure international approval (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2009;
San Martin, 2009). In my view, there is no doubt surrounding the large amount of evidence
that Saharawi women have worked hard towards the goal of gender equality, not only in
the refugee camps but in all aspects of Saharawi politics. However there are still areas
which require further investigation. Fiddian for instance points out at the dissatisfaction of
those Saharawi women who are not directly involved with the NUSW, and those others
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who feel disadvantaged for having spent most of their life studying in Cuba and other
‘third countries’ (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2010c).
In order to demonstrate the active participation and the building role of Saharawi women
as political representative of the SADR’s government, I will analyse the interplay between
Saharawi political representatives abroad and with their counter parts in the host countries
(the support association’s representatives). The job of a foreign representative generally
requires reportage, negotiation and representation (Nash, 2002: 9), but it all reaches a new
dimension if we add that the country Saharawi diplomats represents is in fact a state-inwaiting, refugee, and Muslim. The specific job of a Saharawi representative living abroad is
to prompt international discussions on the situation of Western Sahara and gather aid and
resources for the refugee camps. In such a controversial position, the role of a woman
becomes even more relevant in our analysis of the Polisario’s implementation of gender
mainstreaming within high level political roles. With respect to women in high political
office Philip Nash (2002) has written of Frances E. Willis, the first woman who held a top
Foreign Affairs position as U.S. ambassador in mid 1930s. According to his account, Willis
still had to suffer discrimination because of her sex despite reaching a highly regarded
international position. She decided not to get married because she felt inappropriate
‘having a husband to trail around [her]’, but on the flip side she did not have anyone
helping with the unscheduled important business of ‘stay home all day and address the
invitations, arrange the flowers and see to the menu’ (Nash, 2002: 8). In her career she
impressed colleagues wherever she went and moreover ‘by all accounts she enjoyed
immense popularity in her host countries’(Nash, 2002). Similar questions may be asked
with respect to Saharawi women. Have they gained popularity but not equality as political
representatives abroad? Is the advancement of the Saharawi-Morocco political impasse
more important than the focus on gender roles? Is the promotion of Saharawi women’s
interest seen as part of the job a woman representative?
In terms of thesis structure, after this brief introduction and description on the
methodology, chapter Two will give a detailed background of the Saharawi people’s history
and political organization. This overview is essential to understand the substantial
differences between Saharawi and Moroccans, the reasons for the conflict, and the ideology
behind the Polisario movement. Throughout this work, the spelling of Saharawi names is
taken from the Polisario report to the African Commission on Humans and Peoples’
Rights (Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, 2003).
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Chapter Three offers an introduction to Third World and Islamic feminist literature. The
idea of promoting gender equality while looking at religious beliefs and different social and
cultural traditions has recently expanded in the non-Western feminist literature. As
previously mentioned, indicators to measure women’s empowerment in post-conflict
situations, as described by the UN, do not properly take into consideration the positive
sense of agency that women express in their affiliation with tradition and religion. The
specific case of the Saharawi women shows how tradition, culture and religion are a
fundamental base for a stable construction of “Good Governance” and can be seen as an
expression of gender mainstreaming.
The themes of state-building and the participation of Saharawi women in the process of
nation-building are developed in chapter Four. While UNSC Resolution 1325 welcomes
women’s participation in the monitoring of post-conflict states, the UN approach in the
implementation of gender roles and relations with respect to state/nation-building has been
highly criticized. Erin Baines, consultant for the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, in a study on the performance of UNHCR’s gender equality policies, was in fact
very critical of the UN approach of integrating women into already existing humanitarian
policies, programmes and agendas without committing for any real change (2004: 3).
Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, in their Independent Expert Assessment on the impact
of armed conflict on women, and women’s role in peace-building, commissioned by the United Nation
Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)(2002), presented numerous cases in which
women’s needs and requests were discarded, particularly in decision-making, political space
and resources (Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and East Timor) (Rehn and Sirleaf,
2002: 124-125). After a brief discussion of why the SADR can be considered a state-inwaiting, this chapter explores the current transitions undergone by the SADR’s government
to build a system of “Good Governance” and promote gender mainstreaming.
Finally, a critical ethnographic approach is used in chapter Five to reveal what type of
gender relations within foreign political representation are understood by Saharawi
representatives abroad, and how these match with the idea that donors, NGOs and host
governments have towards them. Essentially, I develop an insider’s view of the Saharawi
representatives understanding of the gender mainstreaming idea in foreign relations. I argue
that the role of women as political representatives abroad can enhance the results gained in
foreign relations and state-building process, especially where governments have an Islamic
system in place.
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Chapter Two: Background to Saharawi history and politics
This chapter provides an insight to the case study and introduces a brief historical account
of the Western Sahara struggle. The focus is on three key stages of Saharawi history:
nomadic life; Spanish colonization; and the Moroccan occupation, with the consequent
exodus of Saharawi refugees to Algeria. It concludes with a brief overview of the Saharawi
refugee camps and system of governance that highlights contemporary Saharawi political
structures and policies on gender. Considering the past and analysing today’s complex
political organization of the Saharawi refugees’ camps can help to inform later discussions
on the fundamental role played by Saharawi women within refugee camps as advocates for
their cause.

2.1

Nomadic origins

2.1.1

The Sahara Region

The word “Saharawi” derives from “Sahara”, which local tribes used to identify the desertic
area of Trab Ahel el-Sahel (The land of people on the coast) (Melotti, 1999: Part 1, Section
2.0). The Western Sahara region was defined in the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) by the
European powers’ division of the African continent and its people. It is situated in
northwest Africa, at the edge of the great Sahara desert, facing the Atlantic Ocean. It is
bordered to the North by Morocco, South by Mauritania, and East by Algeria.
The original Western Sahara territory, as it existed before the first European invasions in
the fifteenth century, did include the mountain chain of oued draa to the North, and the tiris
and adrar mountains to the South (Barbier, 1985: 18). It was divided in three major
Regions: saguia el hamra, the red river, now the site of the world’s largest phosphate mine
(Forced Migration Organization, 2009a), the central mountain region of zemur, and the
southern plateau area called Rio de Oro (river of gold) which is more than 400m above sea
level (Frente Polisario, 2002: 3; Tortajada, : 43-44; Rubbi, 2005: 6).
Western Sahara is considered rich in mineral resources; in fact, in addition to its extensive
phosphate deposits and rich fishing waters off the long coastline, it is believed to harbour
substantial iron ore. Numerous oil-exploration studies have also pointed out to the
potential of large offshore oil reserves.
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2.1.2

Saharawi Tribes

By the end of the thirteenth century, the region was ruled in the North by the trab el bidan
(white nomads 3, hassaniya - speaking tribes) (San Martin, 2005: 589, note 20) and
neighboured by the people of the Sultan (Morocco). Tindouf was the Eastern land of the
Tuareg while the nearest city South, Timbuktu, was itself shifting between the white el bidan
and the black people from Mali. The Saharawi people were originally organised in forty
tribes, grouped in a set of alliances (qabila), which all claimed to descend from the founder
Beni Hassan and the Prophet Mohammed himself. These tribes were a product of the
mixture between sanhadja tribes from north-Africa, and the tribal group of the maquil
(Barbier, 1985: 18; Rubbi, 2005: ch. 1.1.1; Zunes and Mundy, 2010: 96; Laschi, no date: 12)
originally from Yemen, but despite their traditional differences, they shared the same
religion and the same language: hassaniya. Inside, they were socially divided in three major
groups. In order of importance there were the warriors (or zwaya), the religious (chorfa, or
descendents of the Prophet), and the tributary (or znaga). At the societal margins were the
freed slaves from black Africa (or harratin) (Tortajada, 2004: 72), and the abid (slaves). 4 The
society was organized around the ait arbain, Council of Forty, with one representative from
each tribe, whereas each qabila had its own assembly called yemaa, with legislative, executive
and judiciary power (Rubbi, 2005: ch.1.1.1). Berbers used to travel south, to Senegal and
Sudan, looking for water and to trade their herds; but this nomadic activity was restricted
between the seventh and eighth century, after the Arab invasion. The discovery of gold
mines in Sudan turned the Mediterranean territory into a popular slave market. Spain made
her first move towards Western Sahara in 1497, prohibiting slave shipping towards the
nearby Canary Islands (Hodges, 1983). Her tactic was to peacefully improve exchanges
with locals, in order to slowly gain their resources and subjugate them. But when Spain
tried to gain more territory in the interior, moving towards the Rio de Oro region, the
Saharawi tribes rejected the Catholic invader, calling for jihad (Hodges, 1983: 43). It was
For an extensive reading on Saharawi nomadic origins see: in English, Tony Hodges (1983), John Damis
(1983) Toby Shelley (2004) and Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy (2010). French: Sophie Caratini, La
Republique du Sable (2003) and Sayed Ismail, Les Sahraouis (2001). In Italian: Luciano Ardesi, Sahara occidentale
(2004); Stefano Alemanno & Rodolfo Chiostrini, Saharawi… viaggio attraverso una nazione (2006).
3

In May 2009 a controversial documentary was first shown in Australia alleging the perpetuation of slavery in
the Saharawi refugee camps (Fadel). According to Tortajada, the harratin were black people coming from the
South. While their status has no direct equivalent in Western society, they were regarded as part of the family
that ‘owned’ them, but apparently they were not treated badly: ‘Quando si spartivano bottini o guadagni, avevano la
loro parte, e se volevano festeggiare qualcosa potevano sacrificare un animale del gregge, come gli altri figli’ [When they were
splitting up the loot or earnings, they received their part, and if they wanted to celebrate something, they
could sacrifice an animal from the herd, like the other sons] (Tortajada, 2004: 73).

4
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only in 1885, under the General Act of the Berlin’s Congress (article 35), that Spain’s claim
of a protectorate over Western Sahara was recognised.
2.1.3

Spanish Invasion

Generally speaking, Spain was neglectful towards the autochthonous tribes of the Western
Sahara area, whereas the neighbouring French were always looking at ways to extend their
borders. In 1934, after several attacks against the Mehari (French police on camels), Spain
signed an accord with France to keep a more formal occupation over its land, introducing
military posts and a more restricted form of administration (Rubbi, 2005: ch. 1.2.2). In
1958 the whole region was called Rio De Oro and became the fifty-first Spanish province
(Melotti, 1999: Part 1, Section 2.3); three years later, al-Ayoun was established as the
territory’s capital. This formal incorporation into the motherland provoked more
restrictions on the nomadic life of the Saharawi people, forcing them to settle and become
more cohesive. These restrictions not only influenced the de-tribalization process but
arguably interfered with and diminished Saharawi women’s rights, which were closely
guarded in the nomadic traditions. (Tortajada, 2004: 74; Rubbi, 2005: ch.1.2.2).
In 1964, the UN Decolonization Committee, and two years later the Organisation of Africa
Unity (OAU, today’s African Union), urged Spain to initiate a process of decolonization
over Western Sahara (Frente Polisario, 2002: 12). These resolutions came after the
discovery of phosphate mines in the bou craa region, therefore Madrid at first resisted the
process of handing over the territory; thereafter she engaged in a double-sided politics,
showing on the one hand support for the self-determination process, and on the other
hand working in secret to maintain power over the territory. To keep control over the
tribes and contribute to “a new sense of supra-tribal identity” Spain introduced a new
administrative body called djemaa (or yemaa), in which only Saharawi people were
represented:
However closely supervised it was, by institutionalising the djemaa, introducing an element of voting
into selection of members, and by themselves saying it represented the Saharawi as an entity, the
Spanish encouraged a supra-tribal concept of self (Shelley, 2006: 33).

This committee was supposed to exercise a consultative power within the Spanish
administration, but in reality had restricted activities and was very conservative. In 1974,
just prior to withdrawal from the colony, Spain conducted a census over the Western
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Sahara population. Results showed that most of the 73,497 people 5 surveyed in the census
were urbanized, had overcome tribal differences, and had become more politically cohesive
(Barbier, 1985: 22-23). Older people were still shepherds (5.9% of which were women, see
Figure 2 below), but a growing number of youths worked in the cities as police officers,
merchants and drivers.

Even recently, the urbanized and educated Saharawi never

accepted the Spanish regime and in the 1970s began demonstrating against the invader.
The first Sahara Liberation Movement of Saguia el Hamra wa Oued ed-Dahab was created by
journalist Mohamed Sidi Ibrahim Basiri (Shelley, 2006; Forced Migration Organization,
2009b: 5). Under Basiri’s leadership, young Saharawi rebels joined together, and planned
attacks against the Spanish colonizer. On the 17 of June 1970 the attack at the Spanish post
in the suburb of zamila was brutally stopped by the military, and Basiri became the first
desaparecido (disappeared person) in the Saharawi’s history (Barbier, 1985: 25).

Figure 2: Photo of a nomad Saharawi woman with her herd of goats (Sonia Rossetti, December 2001)

5 According to the “Frente Polisario” report to the African Commission of human and peoples’ rights, the
population of Western Sahara in the Spanish census was 74,963, but in January 2000, the United Nation Mission
for the Organization of the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) published a new electorate list with those
who will be authorized to vote in the referendum, counting 86,412 people (Frente Polisario, 2002: 4).
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2.2

The birth of the Polisario Front

On 10 May 1973, a group of Saharawi students from Rabat, guided by El Ouali Mustapha
Sayed, united with the old Basiri fighters, met in a secret congress to form the Frente Popular
para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Río de Oro, better internationally known by its acronym
POLISARIO (Polisario, or Frente Polisario, hereinafter). Almost a year later, in August
1974, Spain agreed to hold a referendum on the self-determination of Western Sahara. In
October 1975, during the ain bentili Congress, representatives of all the old Saharawi tribes
proclaimed national unity against the colonizer, and stood under the manifesto of ‘total
liberty and sovereignty’ (Hodges, 1983: 163) 6. Even the United Nations recognized the
Frente Polisario as the only official representative of the Saharawi people, and started to
pressure the Spanish government to draft an internal autonomy plan for the Rio de Oro.
2.2.1

Morocco’s claim over Western Sahara

While the UN was acknowledging the Saharawi liberation front, the King of Morocco,
Hassan II, was on his quest to have the territory of Western Sahara recognised under
Moroccan sovereignty, evoking old expansionist desires to build the “Greater Morocco”
(Hodges, 1983: 42). King Hassan, interested in controlling the territory’s phosphate wealth,
and extensive fishing resources, first attempted a diplomatic mission around the world
looking for supporters; then, he decided to submit the Western Sahara’s territory dispute to
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague, hoping to persuade the United
Nations to postpone the Referendum launched by General Franco (Hodges, 1983: 183).
Denying Moroccan and Mauritanian claims, the ICJ gave the Saharawi people the right for
self-determination (1975: 12) under Resolution 1514 (XV) on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960). 7 The king ignored the ICJ decision and went on to
occupy Western Sahara. In November 1975, almost three hundred and fifty thousand
Moroccans reached the Northern border of the former Spanish colony, in the so-called
Green March, and invaded the territory. Simultaneously, Mauritanian forces were attacking
from the South (Laschi, no date: 23-24) . A secret “declaration of principles” on Western
El Ouali strongly supported the rejection of tribalism which he saw as a strategy of the European colonizers
to divide the Saharawi people. He was also interested in the participation of Mauritania in a Saharawi political
federation, but this was made impossible later when they joined the Madrid Accords (San Martin, 2005: 589,
note 20).
6

7

A Saharawi’s analysis on the Hague’s declaration can be found in Es-Sweyih (1998: 19-22).
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Sahara, between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania (Madrid Agreement), was signed in Madrid
on the 14 November 1975, just a week before General Franco’s death. Under the Madrid
Agreement the powers and responsibilities of Spain, as the administering power of the
Western Sahara territory, were transferred to a temporary tripartite administration with
Morocco, Mauritania and Spain, with significant economic concessions on the exploitation
of minerals and fisheries resources of Western Sahara (Hodges, 1983: 223). 8
2.2.2

Morocco & Western Sahara

On 27 February 1976, one day after Spain completed her withdrawal from Western Sahara,
the Polisario Front, from its exiled post in the Algerian city of Tindouf, proclaimed the birth
of a new State, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). While Moroccan Air
Forces were dropping napalm bombs over civilians in Western Sahara, the majority of the
Saharawi population started a journey through the desert to reach the Algerian borders
(Norwegian Refugee Council, 2008: 6). Since January 1976, the Polisario has arranged
transport and support to the thousands of people fleeing to the refugee camps, with the
help of the Algerian government and the Red Cross. According to Hodges: ‘administered
by the Polisario, rather than the Algerian authorities, the camps were acknowledged by
foreign charities and relief organizations to be superbly organized’ (1983: 234).
Mauritania withdrew from Western Sahara in 1979, because of severe military attacks and
for its own internal instability (Zunes and Mundy, 2010: 10), but the war between Morocco
and the Polisario Front continued. Between 1981 and 1987, in order to prevent the
Saharawi population from leaving the Western Sahara territory and to stop Polisario attacks
from the Algerian borders, Morocco built the berms, six sand walls across Western Sahara,
and more than two thousands kilometres long. According to the testimony of Saharawi
journalist Malainin Lakhal in his tour to Australia:
The Moroccan military wall (or the wall of shame) is another inhumane outcome of the occupation.
It is a 2700km long sand wall that divides the territory of Western Sahara and its people in two from
north to south. It is guarded by more than 120,000 Moroccan soldiers, barbed wire and landmines.
We walked for three days and three nights in the desert, heading south, thinking about all the
probabilities but resolute to die rather than be arrested by the military soldiers. The third day we
reached the wall, and managed to cross it unnoticed. After another night walk we reached the
territory of Mauritania and managed to get to the nearest city in the north-west of Mauritania,
“The Madrid Agreement did not transfer sovereignty over the Territory, nor did it confer upon any of the
signatories the status of an administering Power, a status which Spain alone could not have unilaterally
transferred. The transfer of administrative authority over the Territory to Morocco and Mauritania in 1975
did not affect the international status of Western Sahara as a Non-Self-Governing Territory” (United Nations
Security Council, 2002a: 2, para 6).
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Nouadhibou, where we could contact representatives of the Saharawi liberation movement and join
the Saharawi camps in August 2000 (2007, September).

This account is supported by the Polisario and the Norwegian Refugee Council. Moroccan
Air Force (Frente Polisario, 2002: 14; Rubbi, 2005: ch.1.3; Norwegian Refugee Council,
2008: 9). Morocco continues to occupy Western Sahara west of the berms.
2.2.3

UN Peace Treaty

In 1991, under the recommendation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the
United Nations, the king of Morocco Hassan II and SADR president Mohamed Abdelaziz,
signed a cease-fire. The settlement plan provided a transitional period in which the UN
would have to organize and conduct a referendum to decide on the independence of
Western Sahara from Morocco. Since the peace treaty, the Polisario has freely administered
the Western Sahara territory east and south of the berm, commonly known as the Free Zone.
Tifariti, the principal city of the Free Zone, is forty miles away from the wall, and nine hours’
drive from the Algerian city of Tindouf, but Pederson (2007) notes:
In the past few years, a number of Spanish organizations have provided financial and material support to
build two hospitals in preparation for an eventual referendum, but apart from that, there is very little else.
The area is known to be of great archaeological interest, with many cave paintings and Neolithic sites.
Between 10,000 and 30,000 Saharawis continue practising a nomadic pastoral life in the area despite the
constant danger presented by landmines (Forced Migration Organization, 2010)

The UN Mission for the Referendum – Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Organisation d'un
Référendum au Sahara Occidental - (MINURSO) has worked since 1991 from its outposts in
Western Sahara, with no great results, and allegedly causing serious damage to the lajuad
archaeological sites in the Saharawi liberated territories (see Figure 3). Spray paint graffiti
attributed to MINURSO peacekeepers damaged invaluable prehistoric drawings in local
caves (Sahara Press Service, 2008a).
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Figure 3: Map of the MINURSO's team sites in Western Sahara (United Nations, 2010)
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In this Saharawi-governed area of Western Sahara, which comprise of about one fifth of
the total territory, are based the Saharawi Popular Liberation Army (SPLA) and various
MINURSO’s team sites (see Figure 3). A lack of infrastructure and resources (principally
water), and the risk of renewed conflict still prevents Saharawi refugees from settling in this
area (Brooks, 2005: 414). Despite the hypothetical danger, delegations of Saharawi
supporters from all over the world are daily taken by Saharawi officials to visit the liberated
area of Western Sahara. Emily F., one of Australian Western Sahara Association’s
representatives interviewed in this study, visited the Free Zone in 2004:
We visited…an army camp in which the young soldiers were... No..., the young boys who do their
compulsory service, were having their period of training. And…we travelled a lot. We went to
Tifariti, so we actually went into the territory, the real Western Saharan territory and we also, on that
trip, looked at archaeological sites, and in that location we had people to talk about that. We went
through the desert and met people who've been living there in the unoccupied zone. […] We drove
as close as we could to the Wall and could see Moroccan soldiers, as well as evidence of landmines
and shelling (Emily F., 2008).

It is however almost impossible for Saharawi supporters to freely enter the Moroccan
occupied territory of Western Sahara without being stopped and interrogated by Moroccan
police.
2.2.4

Brief summary of the last ten years of impasse

In September 1997, Morocco and Polisario signed the so called Houston Accords under
the mediation of UN Secretary General’s Personal Envoy to the Western Sahara, James
Baker. This clarified the criteria and the process in defining eligibility to vote and
practicalities in order to organise the self-determination referendum. In 2000, MINURSO
published the definitive list of persons eligible to vote but Morocco in response lodged
more than twelve thousand appeals against it. Subsequently, in June 2001, Baker presented
his first settlement plan to the parties, the Framework Agreement, in which the referendum
for self-determination would have been replaced by a vote on limited autonomy. Under
this plan, Morocco would have had control over the territory while Saharawi would only
have exclusive competence over local issues. The framework was accepted by Morocco,
but rejected by the Polisario (Security Council Report Website). A year later, the UN
Security Council rejected again Baker’s suggestion of four options for the resolution of the
conflict, which have not been agreed by the parties, and forced him to produce a new plan,
Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the people of Western Sahara (Plan II), which was adopted in
July 2003 by the Security Council with UNSC Resolution 1495. It suggested a transitional
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period of autonomy of four to five years under Moroccan administration, followed by a
referendum for self-determination. Surprisingly, the Polisario accepted the plan, whereas
Morocco rejected it because of the inclusion of a ballot at the end of the five years.
According to Zoubir and San Martin, Morocco worried about the growing dissidence of
the Moroccan settlers in Western Sahara (Zoubir, 2006: 286). After this latest defeat, James
Baker resigned as UN Secretary General Personal Envoy, and people in Western Sahara,
frustrated by the situation, began un uprising in the occupied Western Sahara and in
Moroccan Universities, the Saharawi Intifada (Copete, 2006). The widely recorded and
reported repressions by Morocco of protests in Western Sahara, had massive repercussions
in “the formal colonial power” (Spain), as San Martin reports (2005: 585). Delegations for
human rights from all over the world attempted to reach the occupied territories, or invite
the Moroccan government to explain its actions. Following these insurrections, in July 2005
Kofi Annan nominated Peter van Walsum as his personal envoy. The Dutch envoy
immediately suggested the UN take a step back in order to favour direct negotiations
between the parties. Put under pressure, a month later the Polisario announced the release
of the last four hundred Moroccan prisoners-of-war from its camps.
In June 2007, Morocco and Polisario held talks in Manhasset, outside New York. This was
the first direct meeting between the parties since the year 2000. The Polisario stated its
readiness to consider the newly introduced Moroccan autonomy plan, 9 but insisted on
keeping the referendum on self-determination as the option for independence; Morocco,
on the other hand, seemed ready only to offer autonomy and not self-determination
(Security Council Report Website). After the meeting, Van Walsum submitted a report on
the status and progress of the first round of negotiations. He noted that the two parties
remained far apart on the definition of self-determination, despite having accepted
Resolution 1754 (September 2007). A year later, after four rounds of talks in Manhasset,
Van Walsum suggested moving away from the two proposals presented by the parties, and
instead to go forward on the temporary assumption that there would be no referendum
that included independence as an option. His conclusions were controversial and
threatened to divide the UN Security Council. They were not reflected in the SecretaryGeneral’s report in April, and were not taken up by the Security Council (Security Council
Report Website). His contract expired and it was not renewed. In January 2009, the new
Carlos Ruiz Miguel, gives an in-depth analysis of the Moroccan Autonomy plan under international law
(Miguel, 2007a)

9
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UN Secretary General (UNSG), Ban Ki Moon, appointed Christopher Ross as his Personal
Envoy for Western Sahara, an experienced Arabic-speaking former US diplomat, a choice
greatly welcomed by the Saharawi refugees. Later that year MINURSO was extended for a
further year, and extended again in May 2010, after talks in February in New York between
Morocco and the Polisario had again stalled.
Table 2: Chronology of the most recent Saharawi history
Date

Event

1997

James Baker appointed Personal Envoy to the Western Sahara.

September 1997

Huston Accords.

2000

MINURSO definitive list of persons eligible to vote.

June 2001

The Framework Agreement, Baker’s Plan I.

2002

UN Security Council rejected James Baker’s.

July 2003

The Peace Plan for the Self-Determination, Baker’s Plan II.

June 2004

James Baker resigned.

May 2005

Start of the ‘Saharawi Intifada’

July 2005

Peter van Walsum, appointed as UNSG’s Personal Envoy to the Western Sahara.

August 2005

Polisario released all Moroccan prisoners-of-war

June 2007

First talks in Manhasset (NY)

August 2008

Van Walsum’s contract expired and it was not renewed.

January 2009

Christopher Ross, appointed as UNSG’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara

April 2009

MINURSO mission extended for one more year.

November 2009

Four weeks hanger strike of Saharawi activist Aminatou Haidar, in the Canary Island

February 2010

Informal talks between Morocco and Polisario in New York

May 2010

MINURSO mission extended for one more year.

2.3

Saharawi refugee camps

Today’s reality for Saharawi people is life in the desert. The refugees fled from their
bombarded country to settle in refugee camps in Algeria, wholly dependent on assistance
provided by the Algerian government, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR), the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the World Food
Programme (WFP) and various European Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).
These agencies provide the camps with the necessary food supplies, and living goods such
as kitchens, tents, schools, furniture, and hygiene materials (Fiddian, 2002: 3-4).

21

Although the UN has a definition of who can be considered a refugee (UNHCR, 2007a),
not every case of mass exodus can be given a refugee connotation. The condition of
refugee groups can change depending on the evolution of the causes of displacement, on
changes made by the hosting country, or on decisions made by international organizations.
The reality of single refugees is even more difficult to predict. Some flee away from refugee
camps temporarily or permanently, others may decide to return to their home countries,
others stay refugees for an indefinite period of time. International refugee law makes no
specific reference to the size of camps and settlements in which refugees should be
accommodated (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 28). According to the UNHCR, an established
refugee settlement should be self-supportive in its land settlement and, should build its
infrastructure, promote a sense of community, and integrate into the larger social, political
and economic life of the host country (Black, 1998). Saharawi refugee camps cannot be
considered self-supportive settlements since they are extremely dependent on international
aid:
The Western Sahara conflict is still treated as an “emergency” situation because a solution has not
been found. This designation means that UNHCR is limited in the activities it can carry out in the
camps, especially long-term development projects [...] Algeria, as the host county, is not willing to
resettle the refugees formally on its soil barring a solution to the conflict, nor have the refugees
expressed a willingness to return to Western Sahara while it is still under Moroccan occupation.
Thus they remain in a thirty-year-old state of emergency (Zunes and Mundy, 2010: 128-129).

Despite their refugee condition, the Sahara desert represents for the Saharawi people an
ideological space for the development of their cultural “revolution”

10

(or Saharawi

Perestroika as per Shelley, 2004: 179), it “provide the (temporal) and spatial fix of where to
develop a social revolution and build a new state, based on the new revolutionary principles
of the Saharawi nationalism launched by Bassiri and Louali” (San Martin, 2005: 569). Pablo
San Martin (2005: 570) along with Saharawi author Fadel Ismail Sayed (2001) believes that
since the very early days of exile the Polisario has worked to create an “ordered society”
which could sustain a future Saharawi state in the occupied Western Sahara territory. For
these reasons, the Sahara desert cannot be considered a “non-place” 11 as suggested by
Rubbi (2005). The normalisation of life in the refugee camps, which occurred after the
ceasefire with Morocco in 1991, contributed and strengthened the building of the SADR
political and administrative structure. Symbols became essential in developing a new
“Saharawi refugees recall the first years in which the camps took shape as the time of the ‘Social Revolution
or ‘Saharawi Revolution’ (San Martin, 2005: 569)

10

More extensive reading on the anthropological concept of refugee camps as a ‘non-place’ can be found in
Barbara Harrel-Bond’s extensive production and Michel Agier, On the Margins of the World: The Refugee
Experience Today (2008).
11
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Saharawi national identity (San Martin, 2005) and a concept of citizenship (Campari, 2007:
31). The introduction of a national currency, 12 the presence of official buildings (schools,
medical dispensaries, councils, food distribution centres, a national war museum, and
Rabuni’s “Protocol”) and the developing of some form of economic activity (Shelley, 2004:
175, note 28). 13
The refugee camps’ structure has been more or less the same during the exile. Spread over
an area of more than two hundreds kilometres in the hammada desert lie four major camps.
The UNHCR and WFP estimated that in early 2000 there were approximately 165,000
people living in the desert, but according to Ángeles Sánchez Díez, the total Saharawi
population dispersed between Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania 14 and third countries is around
265,000 people (2007: 8). In order to maintain a link with the original territory, the four
camps (also called wilaya, or provinces) were named after the cities of Western Sahara: el
ayoun (the capital city), smara 15, dakhla and aousar. Each wilaya (province) is divided into six
or seven municipalities called daira, which are then divided into several districts called hays
(neighbourhoods, or barrios in Spanish) (Frente Polisario, 1999: Art. 16). Spread between
the four major camps there are smaller satellite camps, such as those built for the three
major boarding schools: the 12th of October , the 9th of June which was destroyed by flood in
2006, and the 27th of February, a women’s vocational school. 16

The Saharawi people use the Algerian Dinars currency in the refugee camps. This physical currency is used
in an exchange value which corresponds to the ancient Saharawi Dinar, officially called Saharawi Peseta. San
Martin explains that the value of the Saharawi Peseta is based on the old Spanish Peseta which is estimated to
be approximately twenty times less than the current Algerian Dinar (2005: 573). I personally had problems
when buying Saharawi traditional goods in the camps and I was informed by Saharawi officials of the
difference in value exchange.
12

13 For an in-depth analysis of the constitutive elements of the Sahrawi Republic (territory, population and
government) please refer to Es-Sweyih (1998)
14

According to Shelley there are twenty to thirty thousand Saharawi in Mauritania (Shelley, 2004).

In San Martin can be seen a very detailed drawing of the Smara camp, made by a Saharawi boy who
participated in the study (San Martin, 2005: 578).

15

All names evoke a significant date in Saharawi history. For more details on recent demographic data see
Fiddian (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2009-28).
16
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Figure 4: Map of the Saharawi refugee camps (Crivello, Fiddian et al., 2005)

Almost 20km South-East of the Algerian city of Tindouf is the first Saharawi outpost,
Rabouni, commonly called the “Protocol”. This area of the old Hassi Robinet, linked to the
airport by a straight paved road:
[…] is home to the largest state facilities. It houses the central hospital, the pharmaceutical
manufacturing facility, the broadcast tower for the ministry of information, the presidential offices,
and open-air military museum and the reception point for foreign visitors to the camps
(Chamberlain, 2005: 22).

The Protocol (see Figure 5) is also the place where one can find central offices of nongovernmental organisations and associations such as the Saharawi Families of Prisoners
and Disappeared association (AFAPREDESA), the Saharawi Red Crescent (SRC) depots,
and various Saharawi Unions, as well as humanitarian NGOs and international solidarity
associations (San Martin, 2009: 259).
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Figure 5: The entrance to Rabuni’s Protocol (Sonia Rossetti, December 2001)

2.3.1

Understanding the Saharawi system of governance

There were twenty-five dairas at the time of writing in the Saharawi refugee camps. Each
daira (municipality), for purposes of political guidance, is internally organized into cells of
eleven/fifteen people (al-khaliyah) headed by the arifat.

Figure 6: Diagram of the daira ’s administrative system (Rossetti, 2008)

The cells help to maintain communication with the Polisario. Every two years, the
community is called to meet at a Popular Base Congress to vote for the daira’s Popular
Council which runs the districts (hayy) (Mundy, 2007: 286). Each Council has five
25

Specialized Camp Committees (lajnah): Education, Health, Justice, Food and Art craft.
All the daira’s Popular Council’s Presidents, and all the specialized departments’ directors,
are part of the wilaya’s (provincial) Popular Council, while the Orientation Department
represents the daira’s Popular Council’s Presidents and all the cell’s political commissaries
(Melotti, 1999: Part 1, Section 3.2). Every three years, the representatives of the Popular
Councils are called to the Polisario General Congress to elect their Secretary-General who
is also the President of the Republic (Frente Polisario, 1999: Art.51).

Figure 7: Diagram of the SADR general congress (Rossetti, 2008)

They also elect members of the National Assembly (the legislative branch) (Saharawi Arab
Democratic Republic, 2003: 28) with a eighteen months mandate. After the congress the
President appoints the Prime Minister 17 (Art.53 of Constitution 1999) who chairs the
government’s Council and insures the implementation of programmes, laws and
regulations (Es-Sweyih, 1998; Frente Polisario, 1999: Art. 64). The minister of interior
nominates the wilayas’ governors, called wali (Mundy, 2007: 286) who enjoy a decentralized
management since ‘its units are managed by a wilaya people’s council elected by secret and
direct vote’ (Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, 2003: 29).

The Constitutional changes introduced in 1999 called for multiparty democracy and a free-market
economy, and also the right to the Parliament to give a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister.
17
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Figure 8: Diagram of the wilaya’s Administrative System (Rossetti, 2008)

Though this is a complex and developed government structure, many NGOs’
representatives interviewed in this study were unaware of the full extent of the Saharawi’s
governmental system. For instance, the former president of the Australian Saharawi
Support Association (AWSA) said he did not to have a clear idea of the exact structure of
the Polisario and SADR, despite have worked side by side with the Polisario representative
abroad and visited the Saharawi refugee camps in Algeria:
I am a lawyer and a constitutional and public lawyer, but I haven’t got a clear idea in my head of the
exact structure of the Polisario and the SADR, the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic, which are
two, if you like, separate, on one perception, organizations, but in fact very closely aligned because it
is the Polisario leadership that effectively is the political leadership of the Republic which runs the
camps and…is, as we continue to tell people a significant government in exile, it runs a government
in the camps, which has a form of parliament which is elected, and to which women are elected, and
there are some women ministers I understand. My understanding is that the various camps, and
there are at least four, arguably five of them, have governors and we met the governor of one of
those camps: Smara, I think it was. And those governors are effectively the elected heads, who run
the camps with large numbers of people (Jack F., 2008).

On the other hand, Mohammed A., the Saharawi political representative in Australia, who
gave a very detailed description of the Saharawi National Council’s election when asked in
this study:
The National Council, the Saharawi National Council. It is elected, direct election, secret ballot by
the population, the Saharawi population every three, four years. It is constitute of 53 members and
it...has a president, deputy president and committees in different fields: defence, foreign affairs,
economy committee and its main task is to monitor, supervise the work of the government and the
Saharawi institution in general and it adopts, discusses the program that is presented by the
government, suggest changes to it and adopts it. And after adoption it continues to monitor the
progress of that program of the government. It has the right to pass the motion of no confidence in
the government and it has done that in the past. It has the right, in the constitution, to ask members
of the government to come for the National Council, the Parliament, and ask questions. The
members, individually, have the right of oral and written questions to the government. In its works
also it can set up enquiries, and it can ask any executive in the refugee camps to come and answer
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questions and talk about its work to the members of the Parliament. It has the right also to initiate
laws and adopt them in different fields. I think there are many article in the constitution, which
outline clearly and in detail the role of the National, Sahara National Council or Parliament, and how
it is elected, the committee it has, how it works and all its function. (Mohammed A., 2008).

Generally, people who have become acquainted with the Saharawi situation from their
home countries wish to visit the refugee camps in the desert in order to develop a better
understanding of the Saharawi complex system of living. Every year, especially during the
desert’s winter, delegations of supporters from all over the world fly to Tindouf in Algeria
to reach the Saharawi camps in the desert. In Jack F.’s case a visit to the camps did not
result in a better understanding of the full extent of the SADR’s political structure. This is
not unusual. It is in fact easy to imagine a government-in-exile which operates in an
unpleasant area and with limited resources to be somehow “backwards” or unorganised.
Other times, the lack of knowledge on the Saharawi political structure is simply the result
of a genuine lack of interest, time, or language resources from these visitors to the camps.
Luca G. from the Italian association El Ouali per la libertà del Sahara Occidentale, when asked
about his understanding of the Saharawi political structure said:
Conosco il Fronte Polisario che è l’organo politico che gestisce la causa Saharawi. Non seguo direttamente io
nell’associazione gli aspetti politici in quanto ci sono associati più competenti di me. E quindi non sono la persona più
adatta per rispondere a questa domanda (Luca G., 2008).
[I know the Polisario Front which is the political body that deals with the Saharawi cause.
Personally, in the association, I don’t follow the political aspect since there are other associates more
competent than me. Therefore I am not the best person to answer this question.]

The relatively complex political organisation, coupled with misinformation can trigger
misconceptions in the real value of the Saharawi political structure, even in those people
who are committed to helping the Saharawi reach a solution. Again, Jack F. noted that
during a formal lunch in the Saharawi camps, where the Australian delegation was invited
to dine with the Saharawi President Mohammed Abdelaziz: ‘there was no Saharawi woman
present at the lunch’ (Jack F., 2008) despite their delegation being represented by a large
number of women (one of whom was Meredith Burgmann, former president of the New
South Wales Legislative Council of Australia) as if Saharawi women were not welcomed at
official lunches. In this instance Jack F. probably overlooked the Saharawi/Islamic etiquette
of eating, in which guests are served family-style and there is usually little conversation
during meals so that diners may relish the food. Jack F. also did not notice, as had Emily F.,
that Saharawi women are so important in the camps that they do no waste time on being
“window dressing”:
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[...] I think women have every opportunity to participate and they do. And they're active at all level
of the society, and that's obvious just looking around the camps […] I think the position of women
I didn't know about, because I read but I didn't appreciate, until I saw them in action, that the
women were so … formidable, they were…elegant, eloquent and strong, and you didn't have a
sense of them just being 'window dressing', you know, just there just because they were women.
They were feisty, and they were…extremely well informed (Emily F., 2008).

This is only an example to show how informed participation is essential in the creation of
relations between Saharawi foreign representative abroad and international associations.
2.3.2

Examples of women’s political representation in the camps

The complex structure of the local government has created multiple opportunities for
women to be represented in the democratic process (Melotti, 1999: Part 1, section 3.0). In
1987, Lippert noted that women represented between seventy and eighty percent of the
daira’s 18 Popular Councils, forty-five to seventy percent of the wilaya’s Popular Councils,
and over fifty percent in the National Popular Congress (1992: 645). Due to this high
representational base, many of the local and national policies were influenced by women,
including those regarding the institution of military training for women, the establishment
of women’s boarding schools, and the approval for the participation of the women to be a
cadi (judge) on a judicial committee to settle family differences (Lippert, 1992: 645) 19.
Association representatives visiting the camps also noted the highly representational base
of women in camp administration:
I formed the impression that there were significant roles being played by women not only, you
know, through formal election and that, but also in the day to day. In the camps themselves, the
women were very central, and in education, in the medical services that were available, in the
communication services that were been developed. Their role there struck me as at least as
significant as women in our own country running schools, hospitals and organizations in our own
country. But of course they are not being paid wages for any of this, and so you needed people who
had a lot of personal strength and personal resources to do that (Jack F., 2008).

In December 2007, during the twelfth Polisario Congress, three women were given
Ministerial status: Jadiya Hamdi, Minister of Culture (already responsible for Information
and Culture in the NUSW); Mariam Salek Hamada, Minister for Education and Teaching;
and Baida Embarec Rahal (Mahfudha Rahal), as Secretary of State for Welfare and
Women’s Advancement (Mujeresaharauis blogspot, 2008). In 2008, Saharawi women
represented thirty-five percent of the SADR government (Sahara Press Service, 2008b), the
same as Belgium (35%), Norway and Spain (36%), a great success considering that today’s
Each of the four main camps, called wilaya, is divided into six or seven daira’s (districts), which are further
broken down in to four hays (neighbourhoods).

18

For in-depth reading on Saharawi political system please refer to Mohamed-Fadel Ismail Es-Sweyih (1998:
44-53).

19
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Hong Kong legislative government has fifteen percent female representation (2008) and
Australia is up to twenty percent (New Zealand Ministry of Social Development, 2009).

2.4

Conclusions

International bodies (UNHCR, 2007b) and academic scholars (Lippert, 1992; San Martin,
2005: 568) have praised Saharawi people for their social and political organization since the
very early years of exile. The restricted life-space, and the reduction of freedom
experienced in refugee camps has pushed Saharawi women to generate networking and to
initiate activities. Since the early nomadic origins, throughout the Moroccan occupation,
Saharawi women have worked side by side with the Polisario, fought to gain a high level of
literacy in the refugee camps, create infrastructures and services for the elderly, disabled
and children. They are today responsible for running local and regional government
structures, neighbourhood committees, schools, medical centres and food distribution. In
the next chapter I will explore theories of Women of the Third World and Islamic
feminism in order to frame the advancement towards gender mainstreaming achieved so
far by Saharawi women by keeping in consideration their traditional and religious culture.
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Chapter Three: The influence of Third World and Islamic
Feminism issues on Saharawi women
3.1

Women in war-torn societies

Post-conflict societies have many different features which have been investigated by
political scientists. A large portion of the Western argument focuses on the idea that these
new entities must be analysed as “failing or fragile” states. 20 Others, such as Charles Call
and Elizabeth Cousens (2007: 8), have argued that in places of long term displacement,
local authorities can help re-establish post-war stability, introduce changes in traditional
roles, and give new responsibilities to women (see also Behera, 2006: 47). In fact, the
international urge to establish security and the broader political order in post-conflict
situations may result in obscuring the role of informal or traditional institutions. According
to the authors of the International Peace Academy Publication, Ending wars and building
peace: coping with crisis, traditional institutions: ‘may be key channels for public service
delivery as well as critical actors in re-establishing post-war stability and social
reconciliation’ (Call and Cousens, 2007: 9). For instance, Hilary Charlesworth, director of
the Centre for International Governance and Justice at the Australian National University,
in a presentation for the international conference on Civil Society, Religion & Global
Governance, focused on several limitations carried on by the project of gender mainstreaming
initiated by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
because of a lack of affinity with the East Timorese culture:
The sense that equality for women is a type of luxury and inappropriate in societies in transition is a
common one, although it ignores the well-established link between empowerment of women and
the well-being of a society. Whenever arguments of ‘culture’ or ‘tradition’ are invoked to argue
against women’s rights, I think we need to ask whose culture is being invoked and what political uses
are being made of that culture (Charlesworth, 2005b: 4).

The Fourth Arab Human Development Report – UNDP (2006: 6), clearly states that Western
imposed agendas to reform internal country dynamics, specifically in Arab Countries, has
provoked a reaction against westernised views of women’s empowerment goals. According
to the report, some segments of these Arab societies now consider strategies suggested by
the Millennium Development Goals’ declaration (MDG) as: ‘a simultaneous violation of
The Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index (FSI) proposes as the solution for all failed states the
strengthening of five “core” institutions, three of which—the military, the police and the justice system—
directly reflect a concern for order and stability (Foundforpeace.org, 2009).
20
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Arab culture and national independence’. Traditional social conditions are very important
in Arab societies, but to fully understand the complexity of changes in gender relations and
women’s rights in Muslim societies we must look beyond the binary of tradition and
modernity. The traditional role of women as leaders of the frig (group of families) has been
successfully used by Saharawi people to enable a relatively quick transition to
mainstreaming of gender roles in the SADR’s political leadership. This chapter will explore
the literature of Third World and Islamic feminists to better understand these issues in the
broader context of Saharawi nationalism and government’s organisation. After a brief
introduction to Third World and Islamic feminist perspectives, I will analyse in depth the
Saharawi’s moderate Islamic tradition and culture. Recent studies (Allan, 2008; FiddianQasmiyeh, 2010a) have highlighted contrapositions to this ideal model of gender
mainstreaming, but the main focus of this work is on demonstrating the high level of
participation of Saharawi women in political roles and grassroots movements.

3.2

A ‘Third World’ feminist perspective

An assumption that characterized much of the radical feminist discourse that evolved in
the 1980s was that women, as a category of analysis, were somehow socially constituted as
a “homogeneous group” (Bulbeck, 1998: 9; Mohanty, 2003). This idea of a “universal
sisterhood” was introduced by Western feminist Robin Morgan, to overcome early
criticisms by “women of color” of race-based oppression against women (Johnson-Odim,
1991; Bhavnani and Coulson, 2003: 74). Morgan in her Sisterhood is global: the international
women’s movement anthology (1984) assumed the existence of an “ahistorical” universal
sisterhood based on the shared opposition to andro-centrism. On the contrary, the postmodern/post-colonial feminist discourse, 21 which developed in the early 1990s, moved
away from this unifying concept and underlined the claim that women should be situated in
a specific social, economic, cultural, historical, political and religious context for analysis,
and not just presented as “the oppressed or the powerless”. This new feminist context,
presented as “Third World feminism”, introduced a shift from a global perspective of
women’s unity across cultures, to women: ‘networking across local specificities toward
universal objectives’ (Mohanty, 2003: 120, emphasis added). This meant that women were
able to find more common ground across regions, politics, religions and issues. The
expression “Third World”, despite being inexact due to its many different meanings
For an extensive reading in the Third World Feminism see Uma Narayan (1997), Leila Ahmed (Ahmed,
1997) , Valentine Moghadam (2002b) and Chilla Bulbeck (1998).
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(Bulbeck, 1998), was largely used by the feminist literature which studied the after-effects
of colonisation (Rai, 1996; Waylen, 1996). According to post-colonial theorist Gayatri
Spivak, the term Third World was coined after the Second World War for those countries
that were: ‘neither with the Eastern nor within the Western bloc’ (Spivak, 1990: 270).
Others, preferred to define Third World geographically; Bhavnani refers to countries like
Africa and Asia (excluding Japan), Latin America and the Middle East (2003: 78); while
Mohanty, with a more extensive view, adds Latin America, the Caribbean, South Africa,
China and Oceania, and black and indigenous people (1991). Cheryl Johnson-Odim used
the term “Third World” to refer to:
Underdeveloped’/overexploited geopolitical entities, i.e. countries, regions, even continents; and to
refer to oppressed nationalities from these world areas who are now resident in ‘developed’ First
World countries (Johnson-Odim, 1991: 314-315; see also Narayan, 1997: 4).

It is not the aim of this study to deepen the debate on “Third Worldism”, especially with
regard to economic terms, but simply to use a renewed Third World feminist approach to
better explain how gender, race and class have become: ‘inseparable determinants of
inequalities’ (Chow, 1996: xix). Africanist scholar Oyèrónké Oyěwùmí, says that Western
Feminism failed to recognise that ‘African societies, and Third world societies in general,
could live under different gender relations from the ones “white women” were battling for’
(Oyewumi, 2003a: 28). Oyěwùmí continues saying that Western writing on Africa has
given:
[...] The projection of a powerful myth of Africa as a homogeneous, unitary state of primitivism.
The characterization of a vast continent of diverse nations and peoples as if it were one village can
be termed the “villagization of Africa.” The “Othering” of this homogenized collectivity is done in
binary opposition to the West. Because Africa has been projected as that which the West is not, it
becomes absolutely necessary to impose an appropriate identity on the homogenized mass. To be
sure there are commonalities among Africa’s cultures, nations, states, and peoples; however, sources
of diversity are so many that scholars should be cautious, if not wary, of making overly generalize
statements’ (Oyewumi, 2003b: 39-40).

Western scholars’ dominant assumptions on the Third World have influenced most gender
mainstreaming studies, therefore today’s Third World feminism calls international scholars
to look at inter-gender and intra-gender relations, under the light of race, regional origins
and religion.

3.3

Islam in the “common struggle”

Western feminism has recently accepted the need to look at religious identity under the
framework of “common struggle”, but it still maintains a widely-held attitude against
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Muslim women. Generally Western feminism takes the view that Muslim women are
oppressed because of their religion, without making further distinction of country, region,
class or community (Mahmood, 2005; Hilsdon and Rozario, 2006: 332). In response to this
relaxed attitude that: ‘neither accounts for the diversity of women’s global experiences, nor
integrates many elements of the more local and/or indigenous cultures’ (Marcotte, 2006:
148), Islamic feminism arrived as a pan-Islamic response to the West, and became a global
phenomenon 22 since late 1980s. The Islamic feminist movement, inspired by Third World
feminist writings and collective actions (Moghadam, 2002a: 1164), was firstly framed by
Kumari Jayawardena, in Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World as a: ‘local national
liberation and religious reform movements’ (Badran, 2002). Today’s Islamic literature is still
divided on the actual definition of the term “Islamic feminism”: some consider it an
oxymoron (Moghissi, 1999: 134), others believe it to be an innovative and indigenous
response to the problem of women’s status (Badran, 2005). The majority of scholars who
support Islamic feminism (Tohidi, 1991; Badran, 2005; Mahmood, 2005) say that its
arguments are grounded in Islam and its teachings, particularly in the investigation of
religious sources and interpretation of the Qu’ran. Generally, the scope of the Islamic
feminist discourse is to give women an Islamic way to understand gender equality, social
opportunity and their own potential (Badran, 2002; Badran, 2006). The current debate
within Islamic feminist movements shows how women, through their own interpretation
of religion, culture and modernity, have begun to use Islamic sacred scripture to inform
their own subjectivity (Badran, 2005):
Examples of local forms of Islamic feminist activism include demands for women to hold the
positions of judge, mufti (officials who issues religious rulings), and ma`dhun (an official who
register marriages) in Egypt. Another example is the demand by both men and women in South
Africa that women be permitted to share the main mosque space in parallel groups rather than being
relegated to the back or an upper floor during congregational prayer. As the intellectual discourse of
Islamic Feminism spreads, so too will these localized forms of activism (Badran, 2000).

3.3.1

Islamic feminism and the Iranian debate

We may gain a better understanding of the strong connection between gender, political
affiliation, class and Muslim belief from examining the way the Iranian internal debate on
Islamic feminism developed in the late 1990s. Left wing scholars, who supported the 1979
Khomeini revolution against the Shah’s “Westernized” model of monarchy, took a very
In Iran, Islamic Feminism was first introduced by scholars’ writing in a Teheran women’s journal called
Zanan (see Afsaneh Najmabadeh and Ziba Mir-Hosseini in Badran, 2002); to follow were Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, and South Africa post-apartheid.
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prominent position on the later debate about the achievement and definition of Islamic
feminism in Iran (Moghadam, 2002b). This group of intellectuals did support low/middle
class profile women (traders, merchant, shopkeepers and artisans), who felt ‘excluded,
isolated, and put down by the Western dominant culture which disrespected their Muslim
principles and traditions’ (Tohidi, 1991: 257). But soon after the revolution, it became clear
that that Khomeini was not simply going to be a spiritual leader. His severe theocratic
government pushed those who originally supported a more moderate Islamic Iran into
exile, to escape torture and incarceration. Only in early 1990s, after Khomeini’s death,
reforms were introduced to support women’s participation in both public areas and the
legal system, and by 1997 a ‘broad-based social movement for the reform of the Islamic
Republic’ pressed for the election of a liberal cleric president: Mohammad Khatami
(Moghadam, 2002a: 1141). Nayareh Tohidi was one of those expatriate leftist scholars
(along with Afsaneh Najmabadi and Ziba Mir-Hosseini) educated in the West, who lately
converted to a renewed gender discourse. During her fieldwork in Iran, Tohidi experienced
consequences of Khomeini’s radical Islamic state. She saw how reforms had made the
country slide backwards, not only under human rights but also economically with the
increase on women’s unemployment. In her studies, looking at Kandiyoti’s concept of
“bargaining with patriarchy” (1988), Tohidi argues that despite the situation, postrevolution Iranian women were able to re-negotiate gender roles and codes in order to find
‘a path of compromise and creative synthesis’ (as cited in Moghadam, 2002b: 27).
Not all Iranian scholars were supportive of this new feminist approach. So called ‘Muslim
secular feminists’, such as Fatima Mernissi, Leila Ahmed (Ahmed, 1997) , Hale Afshar
(1996) and Haideh Moghissi (1999), prefer to use arguments outside of faith to counter
gender inequality, such as international conventions and global discourses, and are strongly
opposed to what they consider to be an Islamist’s regressive and patriarchal definition of
religion. Rachel Woodlock, in her study about the issue of women's veiling as an important
part of “the woman question” in late twentieth century in Muslim feminists, says that:
‘Mernissi and Ahmed took historical approaches to the issue of women's equality in Islam
that relied heavily on western feminist-inspired readings (in particular, for Mernissi) and
orientalist scholarship (in particular, for Ahmed)’ (2000).
Despite these criticisms Islamic feminism is described by insiders as a: ‘movement of
women who have maintained their religious beliefs while trying to promote egalitarian
ethics of Islam by using female-supportive verses of the Qur’an in their fight for women’s
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rights’ (Moghadam, 2002a: 1147). The re-introduction of Islamic values, and the option for
reinterpreting both the Qur’an and hadith, 23 has allowed women to acquire legitimacy
(Hilsdon and Rozario, 2006: 332) and has gained them significant improvements in access
to public spaces and roles which were previously denied (Mahmood, 2005). 24
3.3.2

Today’s Islamic feminism in a globalised context

The Islamic feminist discourse has recently risen in the Arab world due to the increased
number of well educated and socially active Muslim women who choose to adopt Islamic
values and practices, and to promote religiosity as a significant component of their identity
(Tohidi, 2003: 136). Shirin Edwin in her study on the representation of the hijab (the veil) in
three African novels argues that:
Not only do African 25 Muslim women choose to practice Islam by consciously and voluntarily
situating themselves as agents of Islamic practice, but, in so doing, they, in fact, embody leadership,
education, independence and consequently a re-affirmation of their religious identity (Edwin, 2008).

Anthropologist Saba Mahmood, in her study of female representation in Egyptian
Mosques, argues that religious Muslim women seek something different than the secular
idea of agency, which is then built on liberal ideas of resistance, autonomy, and selffulfilment. The habitus which informs the agency of her participants is interpreted as the
relationship between the individual and the community, and being part of a community
becomes an aspect of the personal agency (Mahmood as in Jamal, 2008: 124). In her view,
Bourdieu’s habitus, comprises: ‘cultural structures or social predispositions that condition an
individual’s mind and body, and thus her subjectivity’ (Mahmood as in Jamal, 2008: 123).
This example shows that assertions of autonomy in the Third World do not always reflect
the struggle as the fight for Westernised liberal ideas. Islamic feminists for instance,
challenge the secular-liberal idea that: ‘all human beings have an innate desire for freedom,

Jurisprudential sentences ‘Gender bias in juristic interpretations is not built on sacred texts of indisputable
authority, but, rather, on differing interpretations of the content, substance, forms and views of multiple
writings and sayings in the collective memory of society. It is also based on customs and traditions that have
been consolidated to preserve a specific order for the family and society. General principles of interpretation
enable us to infer the broad outlines of a social system that responds to the objectives accepted by the Islamic
community in order to live a life of interdependence and consensus, while recognising the equality of all
human beings, males and females’(UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2006: 13).
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In this instance the role of Saharawi women as judges would not be supportable without the context of an
Islamic legal framework
24

Edwin in this article talks about some East African countries such as Senegal, Mali, Nigeria, Ivory Coast
and Cameroon.
25
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that we all somehow seek to assert our autonomy when allowed to do so, that human
agency primarily consists of acts that challenge social norms and not those that uphold
them’ (Mahmood, 2005: 5). Therefore, an analysis on gender mainstreaming which did not
take into consideration the origins and beliefs of the society in which the process is applied,
will not produce effective results. It is common to presume that Islam is practiced in the
same way in all different Muslim countries, but the reality is that Muslim practices are also
influenced by their specific cultural, religious and “indigenous” grounds. This requires a
theoretical approach which does not simply attempt to treat Islamic women as an extension
of the Western feminist discourse. I argue that Saharawi women’s agency should be
intended with respect to the local manifestation of a globalised theme of “common
struggle” that, in this case, is best represented by Third World and Islamic feminist authors.
It is more so considering that recently a delegation of four Saharawi women participated at
the fourth International Congress on Islamic Feminism held in Madrid (Saharawi Women
Blogspot, 2010).

3.4

Saharawi women and Moderate Islam

Saharawi people follow a traditional, moderate interpretation of Islam, the Sunnite Malekite
doctrine, which tends to make religion a very personal issue (Sermujeres Website) :
This is a moderate form of Islam, free from any sectarianism or dogmatism. Owing to its tolerance,
it encourages solidarity, fosters unity, disdains violence and hatred and combats arbitrariness and
oppression. It has been the true unifying agent of the national character (United Nation
International Human Rights Instrument, 2001).

The Malikiya is one of the four schools of Sunni Islamic law, dating from the ninth century.
Adherents to this rite are primarily people from North Africa living in the Maghreb portion
of the Ottoman Empire (Morocco was not under Ottoman control). This rite developed
around the concept that is more important to depend on the traditions of the Companions of
Mohammed than on the Prophet himself. This individual approach to religion has favoured
Saharawi women in their bottom-up process of transforming gender power relation. It has
put them in the condition of being free to analyse, develop and voice their own needs and
interests without having to follow pre-existing models. This has occurred despite the legal
framework of the state and “laws and order” aspects of community life being mediated by
Islamic law and Saharawi Islamic tradition.
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In their approach to religion, Saharawi women follow examples of powerful heroines from
the Qu’ran, such as Aisha, Fatiman and Zainab: ‘in order to encourage and religiously justify
an active and important role for women in the public sphere’ (Allan, 2008). From the
Saharawi women’s website Sermujeres, this article, originally written in Spanish, highlights
what changes have occurred in Saharawi’s current attitude to tradition and religion:
The traditional teaching [on women] based on the Qu’ran, was opened up by modern studies. […]
There are radical differences [about religion] in comparison to other societies that profess the same
religion: for example, Saharawi women are not forced to get married (obligada a llevar velo), and being
a single mother is not an impediment to a later wedding. Polygamy, common in the Isalmic world, is
exceptional and divorce is celebrated (2007: translated by the author)

Expressions of this unusual emancipation were noticed not only during colonial
occupation, but also more recently under the imposed Moroccan regime. This is partly
because Saharawi and Moroccans come from different Islamic religious traditions. In 2004
Morocco’s King, Hassan VI, introduced a progressive change in family law. He recognized
women's rights by making repudiation of marriage conditional upon the court's prior
authorization; he also introduced divorce by mutual consent, and extended women's right
to divorce. UNIFEM reported that Moroccan women’s organisations ‘described the reform
as a historic asset that rehabilitates women's rights, particularly the right to dignity, equality
and protection, preserves children's rights and guarantees the coherence, balance and
stability of family and of the whole of Moroccan society’ (Touimi-Benjelloun, 2003). For
Saharawi women living under Moroccan control this was not good news. For decades
Saharawi women had already been free to embrace divorce and celebrate a woman
becoming available for marriage again. Naima Chikhaoui, anthropologist at the National
Moroccan Institute of Archaeology, in an interview for the BBC said ‘[…] Divorce is not a
problem for a Saharawi woman because she enjoys a very important social place. Men
respect her not only for herself but for her family too’ (Harter, 2004). With the
introduction of this new family law, Saharawi women who want a divorce will be obliged to
go to court rather than obtain a letter of repudiation from an Islamic official. Thus,
Saharawi women were better off under the previous system, whereas for Moroccan women
this legal change enhanced their rights. A recent study on social change in the Saharawi
refugee camps gives examples of how Saharawi people practice liberal forms of Islam
together with traditional nomadic interpretation of “harmonious” society:
They do not have many mosques and as a result they pray outside. In family situations it is possible
that the men and women may pray together, which is unheard of in many Muslim societies. While
most Muslims tend to stress the importance of the Islamic community, ‘the Saharawis believe that
religion is a very personal issue,’ says Mouloud Said, the POLISARIO's representative in the United
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States. ‘It's a personal relationship between the human being and his Creator. This is the mentality
of the nomadic society.’ Mosques are conspicuously absent from the camps, in large part because
the Saharawis ‘don't believe that to speak to God, you need a fancy place’, explains Mr. Said.
Saharawis seldom pray in groups except on important Muslim holidays, and view even these
ceremonies as purely optional. […]Their religious attitudes are significant as they reflect their social
attitudes to marriage, divorce and violence. The mutual respect shown for both genders fosters a
culture of equality for all and it reflects the freedoms and rights of Muslim women in Saharawi
society. This mutual respect is firstly reflected in the choice that Saharawi women have in choosing
their partners. Saharawi women have the freedom to marry men of their own choice and the
freedom to divorce. ‘In the Sahara marriage is built on love, it's not a traditional structure of
marriage where a man shows up and says: “I want to marry your daughter” and she has no say in it’,
said Fatima in an interview with journalist Pascale Harter (Armstrong, 2008: 62).

The Saharawi woman and the matriarchal tradition

3.4.1

The Bedouin traits of the original Saharawi tribes made the society strongly matriarchal:
In traditional Sahrawi society Sahrawi women could inherit property and could subsist independently of
fathers, brothers, and husbands. Women were valued by Sahrawi tribes-among which monogamy was the
rule for their importance in establishing alliances through marriage, within and across tribes. The
traditional nomadic Sahrawi woman ruled the tent and played a major role in the tribal education of her
children. She also wore no face veil and had great personal freedom within the tribal encampment,
whose open tents were conducive to easy converse among men and women. Women had full
responsibility for the camp during the frequent absences of the men for warring or trading. They were
responsible for making, repairing, and moving the tents; for milking goats and camels; and for
participating in major tribal decisions, including those concerning Koranic schooling for male and female
children. Names of women Koranic teachers, marabouts (mystic holy leaders), traditional healers, and
scholars are part of the Sahrawi oral heritage (Lippert, 1992: 637-638).

The haima (tent) is still today the most important symbol of the nuclear society, the family,
and it is the woman’s responsibility. Family is still at the top of Saharawi values; it is the
place where the woman expresses her nurturing role and seals moral codes and Saharawi
traditions into future generations. Even if today Saharawi have more freedom in choosing
their future husband or wife, the family is still determinant in concluding a possible
marriage (Melotti, 1999: part 3.2). In the past, marriage ceremonies are remembered to
have been week-long affairs with the sacrifice of many camels, whereas today they are
about a day long but still occurs at the bride’s mother’s house (Figure 9): “There are more
than just chronological changes to the ceremony – the institution of arranged marriage has
also fallen by the wayside, in accordance with the Polisario’s gender-equality program”
(Chamberlain, 2005: 26). The payment of a “bride price” (mehr) seems to have been
reintroduced despite the disappointment of Saharawi delegates present at the Social Affairs’
Workshop in one of the Women’s Congress as reported by Fiddian-Mendez (2002: 40), but
even in this case, the reintroduction of traditional habits can be introduced independently
from government policies.
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Figure 9: Photo of Saharawi men playing at a wedding. The men wear a head scarf called darrah . It
is common for both men and women to cover their whole head (Sonia Rossetti, December 2001)

According to Ann Lippert, women’s education and their engagement in major
responsibilities in the refugees camps has been one of the Polisario’s greatest success (1992:
640, note 13). Education is in fact considered the first step to liberate women (Contessini,
2007). Children, from two years of age can now be sent to childcare centres called tarbia
(Frente Polisario, 2002: 44), while mothers work at community places (tuiza), which serve
the needs of the elderly, orphans, and the disabled. Primary schools are set in each daira,
and today there is only one secondary boarding school functioning, the “12th of October”,
since the “9th of June” lower secondary school was destroyed in 2006 by major floods. A
young Saharawi male, who was interviewed in Italy in this study as an informal
representative, says that the best contribution given by Saharawi women was in fact
“everything”:
Il maggior contributo è veramente...che le donne Saharawi hanno fatto quasi tutto. Io per esempio ho studiato lì nei
campi, tutte le mie maestre erano tutte donne, ed ecco che io sono arrivato a questo livello. Scuola materna e scuola
elementare è tutto loro quello che mi hanno insegnato (Labib E., 2008).
[The biggest contribution is really…that Saharawi women have done almost everything. For
example, I studied there in the camps, all my teachers were women, and now I have reached this
level. Pre-school and Primary school, I learned everything from them.]

Schools in the camps run under a co-educational principle, where boys and girls attend
together, except for the women’s boarding school which can assist up to eight hundred
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girls. The aim of this school is to:
Develop professional skills for community purposes and showing women’s work as an instrument
to break down patriarchal schemes which characterize Muslim communities at all social levels as
well as within the marriage (Sermujeres Website, 2007: translation mine).

There are forty vocational schools spread throughout the camps for training women in the
field of education, management, computer techniques, solar energy, languages, weaving and
tailoring and agriculture. There are also thirty national institutes for men’s vocational
training as mechanics, electrical mechanics, joinery, plumbing and turnery, management
and computer techniques (Frente Polisario, 2002: 44; Tortajada, 2004: 105). To obtain
tertiary level education, boys and girls are sent to universities in Cuba, Algeria and Libya,
under scholarships offered to high-performing students. Despite the efficiency of the
system, there are conflicting feelings with regard these programs, particularly the one in
Cuba. While the UNHCR spokesman in Havana, in 2008 said that: ‘the education that they
[Saharawi] receive in Cuba will put them in a good position to build new lives once a
durable solution has been found’ (Aragon, 2008), Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh in her recent
publications seemed very critical (2009; 2010b). In contrast with her previous work
Promoting sustainable transformations in gender roles during exile: a critical analysis with reference to the
Sahrawi refugee camps, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh claims that Saharawi women and children have:
‘been mobilized by powerful actors as key political symbols to obtain support from their
respective audiences’. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh argues that Saharawi youth’s “educational
displacement” to Cuba, has served the Polisario to obtain international support in its
political activities, boost visits to the refugee camps from non-Saharawi aid providers, and
support its claim of investing in female education. According to Fiddian-Qasmiyeh these
women now feel rejected by the people in the camps, being regarded as ‘foreigners’. The
challenges that they all face are not unique within the Saharawi’s attempt to build a modern
state from traditional nomadic moderate Islamic values. Tradition has already evolved, in
fact the melhfa, the woman’s traditional dress, was originally black with a white skirt worn
underneath; today, the melhfa is only a colourful accessory used to ‘dress up’, western
clothes, which are worn underneath (Tortajada, 2004: 211).
Contrapositions

3.4.2

As previously mentioned, some scholars do not expect this moderate interpretation of
Islam within Saharawi people to continue. Joanna Allan, writing for the Women Living Under
Muslim Laws’ website, claims that more rigorous interpretation of Islam have: ‘infiltrated
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SADR laws in such a way that women are left vulnerable in the face of gender-based
injustices’ (2008). Allan specifically refers to the right of Saharawi men to “repudiate” a
wife and to practice polygamy, and also mention the custom of “incarceration” of women
who become pregnant before marriage:
[…] Any women who become pregnant before marriage are judged before a court and sent to a
“centre”, allegedly to protect them from their families, until the child is born and a husband can be
found. This illustrates the double standards that punish women but not men for “infringing” sexual
codes and social norms, perhaps deriving from the Islamic concept of fitna [italics added], which
refers to the moral and social disorder caused by the pernicious sexuality of women when left
“unrestrained” (Allan, 2008).

The practice of ‘enforced imprisonment’ of women who have become pregnant outside of
marriage, was also discussed by Fiddian (2010a: 101), along with Tortajada and Caratini,
and recently questioned in a Human Rights Watch’s report (2008a). The Saharawi Minister of
Justice, Hamada Selba, described the detention centre near the old National Hospital,
outside the Smara camp, as a ‘facility for housing women who have had children out-ofwedlock’ (2008a: 137): the Centre for Maternity Assistance. Generally, Saharawi authorities
justify this arbitrarily detention as a solution to protect women against ‘possible revenge
attacks’ by the family; accordingly, the inmate will be released if ‘she resolved her problem
with her family, got married, or relocated to a different camp’ (2008a: 140). Far from the
UNHCR’s Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, this custom resembles the well
documented practice of arbitrary detention for women suspected to transgress moral codes
well established in Libya (Human Rights Watch, 2006). Rather than incarceration, the
system should provide community workers trained “to identify and provide remedies [and]
emergency relocation, if necessary, for refugee women who may be particularly exposed to
abuse” (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1991: para 49). To
this day, the topic of violence against women in the Saharawi refugee camps has not yet
been substantially explored. Fiddian suggests that there have been recent cases of rape in
the refugee camps and women were told not to walk alone in the dark. In 2007, two men
were convicted of rape in the 27 February Camp State Court and ‘were ordered to pay large
fines to compensate the young woman’ (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2010a: 103). The recording of
this kind of incidents is relevant to improve further investigations on the matter by both
the NUSW and the Polisario, in order to take preventive actions against future assaults.
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3.5

The Saharawi women’s movement

Third World women’s writing has mostly been linked to political liberation movements
which acted in order to contest norms, institutions and traditions considered detrimental
for women’s well being. As Narayan well summarises, there has been a consistent focus on
the need to rewrite history, considering women as an ‘integral part of the political debates
and disputes within [Third World] nations’ (1997: preface, ix). Sociologists of the early
Twenty-First century have argued that Third World women’s movement are shaped by
women’s interests and identities which are: ‘formed within structural, political, and cultural
contexts, and their mobilization occurs in reaction to and is facilitated by these
(pre)conditions’ (Ray and Korteweg, 1999). Possible outcomes of these political processes
are subjected to considerable variations depending on the particular forms of mobilization.
In this context, the Saharawi women’s political movement can be identified as an
“oppositional movement” (Waylen, 1996: 18; Allan, 2008). Since the early days of Spanish
colonisation, Saharawi women were “united by the struggle”. This was a major driver for
their actions, and gender mainstreaming came as a result of the communal engagement of
all, men and women, boys and girls, towards the fight for liberation.
Historically, in Saharawi nomadic life women have been involved in many leadership
positions within the tribal society. There are accounts of women participating in the ait
arbeen meetings, the highest political and social institution in Saharawi tribal society (Zeina
blogspot, 2007; see also Abderahman, 2008; Zunes and Mundy, 2010: 133). Since most
men spent a lot of time away from the frig (a group of families or a camp), trading or at war,
women ruled the tents. Marriages were used to establish alliances between tribes, and
monogamy was the rule. All this freedom was curtailed under Spanish occupation; women
were then not allowed to study (Zeina blogspot, 2007). This immediately changed when
they engaged with men in the liberation struggle:
Women not only sustained Saharawi culture, but they actively […] provided financial and in-kind
support to [the resistance and] participated in […] movements against the Spanish during the 1900s,
from 1957 to 1958, and in the late 1960s (Lippert, 1992: 638).

Saharawi women’s intervention was first done by recruiting husbands and sons to join the
front, providing shelters for the Saharawi Popular Liberation Army (SPLA) members, and
contributing materially to organizing supplies and protection for the refugees (Lippert,
1992, 642; Abderahman, 2008). Many young women took up arms and served in the
camps’ militias receiving military training as radio operators, drivers, medics and light arms
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(Mundy, 2007: 290). Furthermore, they guarded prisoners captured during war and took
charge of people fleeing major towns of Western Sahara to find refuge in the Algerian
desert. These actions were similar to those experienced by other post-colonial nations, such
as Eritrea (Hale, 2001). In Mebrahtu’s description of the Eritrean experience in political
participation, presented in the Arab Quota Report of the International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, women where highly visible both before and after
independence:
Eritrean women have participated in the country’s political life through various types of resistance
to colonialism in the 1950s, followed by clandestine action against Ethiopian colonialism, and
continuing in this role until the armed struggle broke out in 1961 to liberate the Eritrean people and
the land from the grip of imperialism. Women joined the ranks of the forces fighting for liberation;
they bore arms in various military positions on forward defence lines; and they served as doctors,
teachers and cadres in order to boost awareness among other members of society, particularly
women, who suffered from injustice at the hands of colonialism as well as society’s backward view
of their status (2007: 51).

Despite these similarities, the nature of traditional Eritrean society and their approach to
religion led to a complete absence of female political participation prior to independence:
‘the entire country was in the grip of colonialism: decision making was done by people
other than Eritreans’ (2007: 52). Saharawi women, on the other hand, have held the right to
vote and to be represented in official roles from the very beginning, and are also
responsible for dealing with donors and are in charge of most vital sectors of refugee life
such as water, education and health, agriculture, computers, sewing and solar energy. This
is a product of their successful gender mainstreaming campaign, undertaken even in the
midst of a post-conflict/refugee scenario, and because of their historical place at the centre
of the political and social life of the Saharawi community. As Zunes and Mundy well
describe, female Saharawi refugee activists have taken on the national duty to work for
liberation “as a model that prefigures the social arrangements of an independent state”
(2010: 134).
3.5.1

National Union of Saharawi Women

Since its inception the Polisario movement has advocated for the promotion of gender
equality. Article four of the SADR constitution, states the importance of women’s
development: ‘the state will aim to defend the political, economic, and social rights of
Sahrawi women and will guarantee their participation in the improvement of society and in
the development of the country’ (Frente Polisario, 1999). In 1974, at the Polisario’s Second
Congress attended by twenty-two men and women leaders, the Political Bureau established
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the long-term goal to improve women’s rights (Lippert, 1992: 639). In the same year,
during the National Conference of Saharawi Women held by the Polisario’s first Secretary
General, El Ouali Mustafa Sayed, the SADR established the National Union of Saharawi
Women (NUSW) (Lippert, 1992: 642; Contessini, 2007; Sermujeres Website). 26 This
organisation, alongside with the students and workers’ union, was created to make the
participation of women within the Frente Polisario more visible both militarily and
politically. Today this union’s crucial role is on the promotion of ‘the role of women, their
training, the development of their efforts and their participation in the struggle for national
liberation’ (Frente Polisario, 2002: 48).
In 2007, the NUSW’s National Committee contained fifty-seven members, elected every
five years by the Women’s Congress (ARSO, 2007a). There are approximately twelve
thousand women members of the NUSW coming from the occupied and liberated areas of
Western Sahara, and some from abroad, but the majority live in the refugee camps
(Contessini, 2007). The Union, according to the SADR constitution, deals with national
and international concerns: internally it looks at the Saharawi women’s development and to
improve the situation of children, elderly and those with special needs (Frente Polisario,
1999: Art.38) and it also advocates for those suffering in the occupied territories under
Moroccan occupation. Externally, the women’s union is involved in international
organizations for women’s rights and development, 27 and strives for the reinforcement of
human rights and democracy (Fiddian-Mendez, 2002: 36).
The NUSW’s Secretary General is elected by the Women’s Congress and, according to the
constitution, is automatically a member of the Polisario’s National Secretariat:
[…] which is the Polisario highest authority, leadership. That is different from Parliament. That is an
executive branch. […] The Polisario as a movement, as a party, has its own system, and the highest
authority after the Congress is the National Secretariat of the Polisario, which is the leadership, the
highest leadership of the movement, of the independence movement. (Mohammed A., 2008)

The NUSW board of directors works in four different areas: foreign relations, culture and
information, occupied territories and emigration, public affairs. In each wilaya (province)
regional officers who meet with the NUSW National Secretariat every six months (see
26

Some consider 1979 to be the year of NUSW’s foundation (ARSO, 2007a)

27 The National Union of Saharawi women has been active in the General Union of Arab Women and the
World Federation of Democratic Women since 1977; The Pan-African Women’s Organisation since 1980
and has also participated between many others to the World Conference of Women in Beijing in 1995
(ARSO, 2007a).

45

Figure 10).

Figure 10: Photo of a council’s meeting at a daira (Sonia Rossetti, December 2001)

The Union is always well informed of each camp’s events since there is a direct
transmission of information from the daira secretaries to those of the wilaya, and finally to
the Secretary of the NUSW. The Union has worked since 1985, to promote a high level of
education in the camps, and particularly to improve literacy, arguing that the social and
political involvement of women will only come through self-awareness as opposed to
gender quotas:
We have not yet achieved our full rights and there is a lot of work to do – rights will never be given,
they have to be taken – but we have come a long way […] However we were illiterate not long ago
and we still have a mindset that derives from that to some extent. It seems quite normal to me,
given this that women tend to vote for men rather than for other women. We do have outstanding
women figures. But it’s perfectly true that we have to fight against the old mentality (New
Internationalist, 1998)

According to the 1974 Spanish census (Barbier, 1985: 24), almost seventy percent of the
Western Sahara population were illiterate, and of these almost eighty-four percent were
women. In contrast today, ninety percent of the refugee population is at least capable of
reading and writing (Sermujeres Website).
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Saharawi and Palestinian women’s movements

3.5.2

Ellen Fleishmann in The Nation and its “New” women: The Palestinian Women’s Movement 19201948 (2003), describes the early days of the Palestinian Women’s Movement, under British
colonial administration, as a small minority of elite women criticizing the internal
patriarchal structure of Palestinian Arab Society (2003: 4-5). The fundamental basis for
developing this process was founded on the introduction of women’s education and
employment which brought in ‘a “new aristocracy” in Palestine (Fleischmann, 2003: 43).
After only ten years from its creation, in 1939 the Palestinian Women’s Movement
experienced an internal fracture that split the movement in two separate organisations: the
Arab Women’s Association and the Arab Women Union. Later, in 1967 the General Union
of Palestinian Women was founded. Its job was to work with the Palestinian National
leadership in a bid to initiate a process of democratisation of the national movement, and
‘to mobilize and organize people of different social categories’ (Kuttab, 2008: 103). This
resurgence on Palestinian women’s social and political activity provided ‘the backbone’ of
the first Intifada. According to Kuttab, they ‘raised political consciousness of women
through mobilization, organization, and participation in the struggle’ (2008: 104). Their
actions were directed towards a boycott of Israeli products, creating alternative spaces to
replace regular schools, and providing community services to sustain the Intifada. Women’s
committees started to multiply, dividing those who were more sensitive to the national
struggle from those who first wanted to reform women’s role.
While women have played important roles both in Palestine and in among the Saharawi,
there are some key differences in the refugee populations. For one the Saharawi camps are
located in the desert, whereas Palestinian camps are either urban or very close to urban
areas. Politically the cause of the Polisario is easier for the West to support, having
renounced the armed struggle, while organisations such as Hamas and Hezbollah continue
to engage in violence against Israel. Legally Western Sahara is clearly regarded as an
occupied territory and the Saharawi camps are regarded by Algeria as a self-governing
region within its territory. The Palestinian territories of Gaza and the West Bank are
governed to varying degrees by the Palestinian Authority but they are also occasionally
subject to Israeli Civil authority and military intervention. While both are populations
exiled from their homelands the Saharawi are following the international norms on nonviolent negotiation in a more obvious way and have widespread international support for
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their cause. The issue of Palestine and the right to return is far older in historical terms,
affects many more people, and is seemingly far more complex to resolve due to entrenched
positions on both sides.
Both, the Saharawi women’s movement and the early Palestinian feminist agenda, must be
located within a nationalist framework. Women in fact were primarily called to fight for the
making of the nation-state. One of the differences though is that Palestinian women did
not want to push a gender agenda before ‘a legislative council was elected by the people [in
fact] for the women in the movement, this concept of rights had a narrow, political
connotation linked to suffrage and nationhood’ (Fleischmann, 2003: 138). In contrast, the
Saharawi women’s union has always worked for the double aim of reaching the Western
Sahara independence and gaining gender equality (Contessini, 2007).
In 1993, the signing of the Oslo Peace Accord with Israel introduced new limitation on the
involvement of the Palestinian women’s movement in the national liberation struggle. This
was largely reduced and replaced with a women’s “empowerment” discourse that targeted
‘individual women rather than the collective’ (Kuttab, 2008: 104). Under the impression of
obtaining liberation and independence, Palestinian women moved from national issues to
focus more on women’s issues:
The nascent ‘state’ has thus transformed the terrain of politics and resistance, diminishing the
avenues of popular participation and particularly women’s participation, as informal grass-roots
network resistance collapsed and was replaced by formal politics, while the ‘inside leadership’ of the
West Bank and Gaza was marginalized by ‘outside’ leadership from Tunis (Kuttab, 2008: 105).

Saharawi women instead, used their National Union to work together, from the exiled
camps and the occupied territories of Western Sahara, to promote their cause for national
independence to the international community, and to look after their communities.
Today, Palestinian women mostly suffer exclusion from the male-dominated political
decision-making. According to Moghadam, Palestinian women in refugee camps and
villages do suffer the inability of ‘the Palestine Authority to implement a women’s rights
agenda’ (2005: 63). The Palestinian women’s movement has now shifted from political
involvement to a proliferation of NGOs, which caused the erosion of women’s political
representation and women’s rights. Kuttab, argues that: ‘the most serious internal challenge
of all those which have faced the women’s movement over the past fifteen years has been
the movement’s transformation from a grass-roots struggle to an elite movement’ (2008:
106).
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NUSW today

3.5.3

Today, even after the ceasefire, Saharawi women continue to be highly responsible in camp
administration, and the Women’s Union continues: ‘to raise awareness amongst other
women of their civil and political rights such as voting and nomination to political
structures’ (Baines, 2001). The Charter of Feminist Principles for African Feminists adopted by
the African Feminist Forum in Ghana, is what the Saharawi women’s union stands for. In
this framework, African feminists point out the need for a ‘full citizenship, free from
patriarchal oppression, with rights to access, ownership and control over resources and our
own bodies and utilizing positive aspects of our culture in liberating and nurturing ways’
(Mugadza, Mukasa et al., 2006).
During the NUSW Fifth Congress, Saharawi women developed their latest achievement in
gender mainstreaming approving the Global Plan 2007-2012 framework. As they held the
Women and Gender Equity Workshop during the 34th European Conference of Coordination
Support to the Sahrawian People (EUCOCO), Saharawi women presented to the
international community their achievements of: ‘building Women’s Houses as a strategy in
order to boost individual and collective empowerment processes and as a framework of
reference for the NUSW’, and also in realising training courses on Education for Women’s
Empowerment (EUCOCO, 2008). The EUCOCO has certainly been the most important
international arena in which Saharawi could present their goals and issues. In previous
EUCOCO conferences, women have openly requested to strengthen women’s political
participation (El Medi, 2004): ‘an equal representation between men and women in the
delegation of Frente Polisario in the Spanish Government’ (Contessini, 2007). In 2008, the
NUSW drew attention to: ‘the practically nonexistent women’s representation in the
opening ceremony as general reflection of the Conference development [which stressed]
women’s absence in the regional and local governments, as well as in the diplomacy and the
delegations’ (EUCOCO, 2008). These open discussions at the EUCOCO conferences
show how Saharawi women are not afraid of confronting both the Polisario and
international actors, in order to gain a more visible place in the political, social and
humanitarian debate. They are not political pawns; they are addressing all of the matters
that they are concerned with in an exhibition of gender mainstreaming that goes all the way
from the daira to the international arena.
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Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, in a recent paper in Refugee Survey Quarterly, argues that the
progressive practice of gender mainstreaming that Saharawi refugees and their political
representative promote in the camps, ‘may facilitate and solidify processes of exclusion and
marginalization’ (2010c: 64). Under scrutiny is the practice adopted by UNHCR and NGOs
of a ‘female-centred aid industry’(2010c: 65) implemented in the camps only through
existing Saharawi institutions such as the NUSW. According to the paper, Saharawi women
who cannot participate at NUSW events or cannot attend their political meetings find
themselves marginalised. These are usually young girls, young women with children, or
families who would like to avoid spaces in the camps which are ‘associated with female
activism and participation’ (2010c: 79). Fiddian-Quasmiyeh’s critique suggests that gender
mainstreaming action, which is today occurring in the Saharawi refugee camps, may be
primarily conditioned ‘by the recognition that resisting NGOs’ priorities [on femalecentred aid] may lead to the withdrawal of projects’. This analysis tends to diminish the
obvious results on gender mainstreaming that were obtained in the last thirty years with
policies implemented by Saharawi and non-Saharawi actors in the camps. The role of the
NUSW has always been to mediate between Saharawi needs and culture, and ‘pre-designed
projects’ of the last-minute solidarity organisation which have been prepared outside the
Saharawi camps. Despite the feeling of exclusion and limits in participating at NUSW
meetings, Saharawi women have still the power to vote for their representatives and to be
voted. This fight to implement their right has to come from those same women that today
feel excluded. The same happens in modern democratic first world countries were the
representation of women in politics is nowhere near the Millennium Development Goals
declaration and the number of people participating in electoral vote is still at minimum.
Relevant in this argument, is the account of Mariam B., a Polisario representative in Italy,
who illustrates a metaphor of the Saharawi harmonious society:
Le donne Saharawi non amano la violenza, in assoluto. E ti dico, ti racconto degli episodi. Se due bambini litigano è
molto facile che tutt’e due vengono menati da tutt’e due le mamme. Raramente capita che una mamma Saharawi va
dall’altra e dice: ‘è stato tuo figlio a menare il mio figlio, eccetera, tu non devi fare...no! Per esemp...ad esempio non
amano i litigi, non amano le cose brutte, non amano la violenza, ma questo è nella natura dei Saharawi per davvero.
Già...sia uomini che donne. E quindi quando uno, di solito, anche in una riunione dice: ‘no, no, adesso siamo stufi,
forse torniamo alla guerra’, tutte le donne dicono : “eh, eh, fuori fuori, lontano, lontano, no, no, vogliamo la pace, il
latte’. Il latte è il simbolo della pace per i Saharawi, no! Simbolo del bene, della stabilità, sai, simbolo anche che ha
piovuto, che i cammelli hanno avuto da mangiare e quindi producono latte. Noi vogliamo solo latte, non vogliamo
guerra, non vogliamo violenza. Infatti quando votano, la maggior parte delle donne quasi mai esce in questo stato
estremo. Ed è una società prettamente pacifica, che non chiude mai le sue porte, le tende hanno quattro porte,
raramente capitano i litigi o cose sgradevoli. Le donne partecipano molto e chiedono molto delle soluzioni dove si trova
il dialogo (2007).

50

[Saharawi women do not like violence, absolutely. I’ll explain, I’ll give you some examples. If two
children fight it is very likely that they both will be beaten by both mothers. It rarely happens that a
Saharawi mum goes to another and says: ‘your kid bashed mine, etc…you don’t have to…no!’ For
example, they do not like fights, they do not like bad things to happen, they don’t like violence, but
this is really in the Saharawi nature. Yes…both men and women. Then, when someone, usually even
in a meeting, says: ‘no, no, now we have had enough, maybe we will go back to war’, all the women
say: ‘eh, eh, out out; go away, away; no, no, we want peace, milk.’ Milk is the symbol for peace for
Saharawi, you know! Is the sign for all good things, for stability, you know, sign that it rained, that
camels had something to eat and therefore they produce the milk. We just want milk, we don’t want
war, we don’t want violence. For instance, when they vote, the majority of women in the [camps]
rarely come out in such extreme position. It is a completely harmonious society that never closes her
doors, tents have four doors, and there are rarely disputes, discord, or unpleasant things. Women
really do get involved and really demand solutions where there is a discussion.]

This account demonstrates the unique opportunity that Saharawi women have in the camps
to engage in political representation and maintain close contact with their family. This is
where gender mainstreaming is most successful in Western Sahara’s politics. But the bigger
picture of historical impact of state-building and international political representation is yet
to be investigated with respect with gender mainstreaming.

3.6

Saharwi women and gender mainstreaming

Feminists of the Third World have introduced the concept of “common struggle” and
pushed international scholars to look at inter-gender and intra-gender relations under the
light of race, regional origins and religion. Islamic feminists have used this concept to
challenge secular ideas of freedom, autonomy and women’s agency. We cannot properly
address a discussion on gender relations and gender mainstreaming in a Muslim population
like the Saharawi, unless we focus in the multidimensional context where women, as
subjects of agency, live and act. Social, traditional, cultural and religious traits must be
considered as an integral part of gender relations analysis. Saharawi women have been
actively involved, since the beginning, in the Saharawi struggle for independence, within
their religious and traditional context, and through the NUSW have attempted to
demonstrate their agency. Those scholars such as Allan (2008) and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh
(2009), who say that there are still areas in which Saharawi women feel isolated or
widespread oppression, fail to recognise the genuine results in gender mainstreaming that
Saharawi women leaders have achieved in the camps and in various international context.
Claims of slavery, forced incarceration of pregnant women outside the marriage and the
sense of not-belonging from some women in the camps constitute the next challenge for
Saharawi institutions With regard to the participation of Saharawi women in high level
political roles, it is important to always bear in mind the specific social, religious and
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cultural contexts in which they operate. For instance, Saharawi political representative in
Australia, Mohammed A., points out:
[…] For many reasons, one it is there is misconception in the West that in a Muslim or Third World
Country, the women rights are not satisfactory. For example that there are not, you know,
opportunities, or abilities for women, that women can, you know, stay at home, don’t have many
rights or opportunities, which is not the case, it is the opposite, I think, in Western Sahara and the
Saharawi refugee camps situation. Women they are very important to all. And there is a desire, by all
the Saharawi to see women play even more active roles and to be in leadership, you know, to be in
Parliament, to be in the National...in the diplomatic service. So, but I think, for Saharawi cause, a
women, you know, being representative or talking to a western audience, could have, maybe, more
effect, or a better effect on that audience than a man. Because the women, you know, can be seen,
you know, as a very important factor in the Saharawi status. For example we have seen women in
similar conditions like Aung Sang Suu Kyi in Burma, for example who has became a leader in the
rally support for the human rights and it’s become very known. And people like her, relate to her,
and...It’s moving. In our case for example there is many active women but are not known
internationally, like Aminatou Haiddar, for example, women who have been imprisoned for many
years, and has been tortured, and she is a very active leader in the occupied period. But, because of
the lack of media, and because, maybe, she does not speak English, she has not came very well
known internationally, but she has got the qualities, for example, to be a figure and a leader for the
Saharawi cause (2008).

3.7

Conclusions

This chapter has explored the influence of issues in Third World and Islamic feminism on
Saharawi women. It has attempted to assess Saharawi women’s agency in terms of their
roles as foreign representatives living abroad and has attempted to address those aspects of
women’s participation in high level political roles, which contributes to a genuine process
of gender mainstreaming. The next two chapters examine the participation of women in
building a Saharawi nation, in particular as political representatives abroad. While the
advanced position of women in the SADR has already been recognised by various scholars,
their participation in the political representation abroad has not to date been a priority for
the Polisario.
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Chapter Four: State-building and Gender Mainstreaming
4.1

The difference between nation and state-building and
its application to gender

State-building is a process used to re-instate and strengthen governance and stability in
post-conflict nations without the application of military force. There is supposedly a clear
distinction between state and nation-building; where the latter requires force, state-building
comes across as a peaceful process. Francis Fukuyama in The Imperative of State-building
(2004), sets out the theoretical distinction between state and nation-building. Once a
society has constituted itself as a political identity (Nation), then it is time to develop a
functional governing apparatus that can actually control its national territory (State). Statebuilding, comes in as the last crucial components of nation-building and its effectiveness is
usually measured by the success obtained in establishing a rule of law, the introduction of
democratic norms and institutions, and by the setting up of a free-market economy
(Caplan, 2004: 53; Call and Cousens, 2007: 7). Yet, the path from nation-building to statebuilding is not always clear. Fukuyama says that Europeans, as opposed to Americans,
believe that in order to build a nation you need: ‘the creation of a community bound
together by shared history and culture’ (Fukuyama, 2004: 134), and therefore reject the use
of force. Based on this difference, Dobbins, Jones and others do not mention the UN
mission MINURSO on Western Sahara when they talk about the UN's role in nationbuilding. The reason is that the MINURSO mandate has a specific pacific aim: ‘to conduct,
during a transitional period, a Referendum in the territory, to enable the people of the
Western Sahara to choose freely without administrative or military constraints, between
independence and integration with Morocco’ (MINURSO, 2007). Since the cease fire in
1991, Morocco and Polisario have chosen a peaceful path for the solution of the Western
Sahara conflict. In this “no-war time” the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic has started
its own internal process of reforms to reinforce stability and promote social reconciliation,
and therefore started its own state-building process.
In this chapter I analyse the concept of state, as set in the Montevideo convention (1933),
to argue that the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic should be considered a governmentin-exile waiting to gain its independence. In order to maintain long-term stability in postconflict reconstruction and state-building, the SADR is now undergoing the four
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fundamental pillars of transitions: establish security, promote justice and reconciliation, set
up democratic practices and political participation, and promote positive social and
economic well-being; in one word they are working towards “Good Governance”
(McGrew, Frieson et al., 2004). This concept was also used recently by the United Nation
Economic and Social Commission for Asia Pacific (UNESCAP), to be:
[...] Participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient,

equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views
of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard
in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future (2010).

Scholars now suggest that the equal participation of men and women in state-building is
fundamental to achieve “Good Governance” (Sørensen, 1998; Nzomo, 2002; McGrew,
Frieson et al., 2004: 13). Since the 1985 Beijing Declaration on the Advancement of Women,
the United Nations established gender mainstreaming as: ‘the major global strategy for
ensuring the incorporation of gender perspectives in all areas of societal development and
the promotion of gender equality’ (United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on
Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, 2001). Relevant contribution of scholars such
as Cynthia Enloe (1989; 2000), Drude Dahlerup, Sandra Whitworth (1997) and Ann
Tickner (1992), reformed the “gender blindness” which permeated International Relations
studies and brought to the international spotlight the impact of war’s violence on women,
and their role as peacekeepers or military activists (Jenkins and Reardon, 2007: 212). From
the Nairobi Conference in 1985, feminist scholars and women’s grassroots organizations
pressured the United Nations to produce more relevant international gender normative,
policies and guidelines. In 1995, at the United Nations’ Fourth World Conference on
Women in Beijing, the assembly adopted by unanimous consensus a Platform of Action under
which UN governments agreed to promote gender mainstreaming in policies and
programmes, as:
[…] A strategy, an approach, a means to achieve the goal of gender equality. Mainstreaming involves
ensuring that gender perspectives and attention to the goal of gender equality are central to all activities policy development, research, advocacy/dialogue, legislation, resource allocation, and planning,
implementation and monitoring of programmes and projects (UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States,
2006).

In 2000, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. This
resolution was welcomed as a “watershed” political framework for: ‘the pursuit of gender
equality relevant to every single Security Council action’ (Rehn and Sirleaf, 2002: 3). It
reaffirmed the importance of female representation in all aspects of conflict prevention,
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conflict resolution and peace-building; it also stressed the importance to increase women’s
participation in all aspects of the conflict prevention and resolution processes (United
Nations Security Council, 2000). According to Deniz Kandiyoti, gender justice and equity
should also be applied in the context of the multiple transitions undergone by Third World
post-conflict states. In this sense, Good Governance should also promote gender
mainstreaming in implementing: ‘security transition (from war to peace), a political transition
(the formation of a legitimate and effective state) and a socioeconomic transition (from a
“conflict” economy to sustainable economic growth)’ (Kandiyoti, 2005: 13). In this
chapter, I will analyse the Saharawi promotion of gender mainstreaming in the making of
the SADR’s Good Governance, compared to the achievements already obtained

by

Cambodian women as reported by the Women Waging Peace: Policy Commission’s report
2004 (McGrew, Frieson et al.). The aim is to look at Saharawi women’s role in the making
of the future Saharawi state, and if this will be sustainable after independence. I will
demonstrate that the gender mainstreaming exhibited in this thesis is evidence of Good
Governance which is a major component of successful state-building.

4.2

A State in transition

The Montevideo Convention On the Rights and Duties of States (1933), sets out the most
widely accepted textual basis of statehood. Article one reads:
The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a
permanent population (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations
with the other states.

The convention itself does not explain the origins of its criteria; concepts of effectiveness
(or government), population, and territoriality, were already largely used at the time of the
Convention, but contemporary legal writers doubt that they could be considered conclusive
as to the nature of today’s statehood (O'Connell, 1970; Denham and Mark Owen
Lombardi, 1996; Duursma, 1996; Crawford, 2006). Prior to Montevideo, sovereignty was
the main focus of statehood and there were two prevalent doctrines. In the eighteenth
century age of monarchy, legitimism prevailed: ‘This system relied on the proposition that a
dynasty enjoyed historic rights to rule a state, and thus, the prince continued to be
sovereign even if in fact displaced from his throne (Grant, 1999: 419) . Subsequently, in the
nineteenth century, the European imperialism shifted its interest towards exercising
sovereignty over adjacent lands not subject to any effective control. According to the
contiguity doctrine:
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Territory not organized under European conception of statehood was thus perhaps at times treated
almost as terra nullius. In this way, the view that state power could be transmitted by mere contiguity
dovetailed with the then-ascending constitutive view of recognition, and together, the two ideas
formed a potent helpmate to imperialism (Grant, 1999: 421) .

Australia for instance, was one of those lands internationally recognized as terra nullius. On
the other hand, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) determined in 1975 that Western
Sahara was not to be considered terra nullius. The Court based its rejection on the fact that
the presence of Saharawi tribal leaders’ authority over the territory was clear evident by the
practice of cadi appointments (local administrators) and various payments of taxes, which
were recorded prior to the Spanish acquisition of the territory in 1884 (1975: 39).
Moreover, Western Sahara was listed in 1963 as a Non-Self-Governing Territory under
Chapter XI of the United Nation Charter (A/5514, annex III) (Frente Polisario, 2002: 12)
and:
[...] In a series of General Assembly resolutions on the question of Spanish/Western Sahara, the
applicability to the Territory of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was reaffirmed’ (United Nations
Security Council, 2002a: 2 para 5).

In 1930s and ‘40s, the idea of territoriality and governmental effectiveness began to expand
the idea of legal sovereignty. Legal philosopher Hans Kelsen introduced the concept of
state as a legal system exercising control over a territory and people, in an attempt to define
statehood in terms of laws:
If a power is established anywhere, in any manner, which is able to ensure permanent obedience to
its coercive order among the individuals whose behavior this order regulates, then the community
constituted by this coercive order is a state in the sense of international law. The sphere in which
this coercive order is permanently effective is the territory of the state; the individuals who live in
the territory are the people of the state in the sense of positive international law (Kelsen, 1941: 6970)

The Montevideo criteria, as prerequisites to statehood, are not universally accepted.
Contemporary International Public Law scholars, as explained in Bagaric, Boyd and others
(2007: 6, note 17), believe there is no requirement for a minimum number of inhabitants in
the population criterion, nor is there a minimum area of land required to form a state
(O'Connell, 1970; Duursma, 1996; Crawford, 2006), nor territorial limits (Grant, 1999: 436;
Epstein, 2009: 120) . Effectiveness also does not appear to be essential; non-governmental
forces in fact, which sometimes control substantial areas of the territory, have previously
been considered as legitimate governments of future independent states, as it happened for
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Shaw, 1997: 142). Lastly, the criterion of capacity is
considered to be the most controversial. It requires the state to be capable of entering into
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“quasi-contractual” arrangements with similar entities: ‘recognition by other states, though
not a formal requirement, is pragmatically essential for statehood’ (Bagaric, Boyd et al.,
2007: 7). Legal writers, such as Crawford and O’Connell, have contested this approach
saying that states are not the only entities with treaty-making competence, this also involve
international organizations.
Pamela Epstein (2009: 121-124), in the Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law
Journal, well summarises that Western Sahara has already a permanent population and
clearly defined territorial boundaries. Not only this, but the SADR already administers
twenty percent of the Western Sahara territory, the so-called Free Zone, and in January
2009 made an official claim to its exclusive rights to oil, gas and fisheries resources
offshore to the territory of Western Sahara, declared as Saharawi offshore exclusive
economic zone:
The 21 January declaration of a 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) confirms the
SADR's jurisdiction over its offshore fisheries and mineral and petroleum seabed resources, as
provided for under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Western Sahara
Resource Watch, 2009).

All this suggests that the Western Sahara territory could rightfully be considered a state-inwaiting and the SADR as the Saharawi government-in-exile.
Thomas Grant suggests that democracy (Crawford, 2006) as well as legality (intending
compliance with international norms), and independence (Kelsen uses the term
“impenetrability”) could be considered as the new criteria for a modern definition of
statehood (1999: 450). Despite its one-party policy, the SADR government representatives
are democratically elected by its people and SADR has built strong administrative and
judicial powers (Article 31 of the Vienna Convention requires for a government to be
sovereign over its territory and its citizens). Robert Chamberlain28 and Pablo San Marin
have shown that Saharawi have already undergone an: ‘early process of nation-building in
the refugee camps’ (San Martin, 2005: 566). This is particularly demonstrated by the fact
that today’s self-administered Saharawi camps share a collective memory (storytelling, war

28 Chamberlain talks about Saharawi traditions such as the baby naming ceremony: ‘The host provided an
abundance of food for the ceremony, including a goat slaughtered for the occasion (an expensive local
delicacy). The men socialized in one room while the women and young children socialized in another. I was
fortunate enough to be allowed to move between both areas, and thus had the opportunity to have a readymade focus group for the evolution of tradition’(Chamberlain, 2005). In my own visits to the Saharawi
refugee camps I had the chance to participate to some of these ceremonies, especially weddings.
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memorial museum, poetry, dance, traditional celebrations, and tea ritual), which is also
essential to the self-construct of their identity (Chamberlain, 2005: 28).
Is there any security transition in the Morocco-Western Sahara conflict?

4.2.1

In 2003 the Polisario Front submitted a report to the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights asserting that the 1999 version of the SADR’s Constitution was fully in
line with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (SADR,
2003: 36). At paragraph five of Article 24 the SADR Constitution says that Saharawi people
shall have a right to peace, security and development within their right to sovereignty:
The Democratic Arab Republic of Western Sahara directs its foreign policy towards […] the establishment of peace
and international security and participation in the economic and social development of the peoples of the world based on
justice and reciprocal equality (Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, 2003: 49).

Saharawi have patiently waited for the Unite Nations to produce a peaceful final resolution
on the referendum for Western Sahara. Unfortunately, after years of numerous
negotiations and aborted plans, there are still no real achievements. Younger generations in
the occupied territories and in the refugee camps are those who suffer most from this
stalemate. Young people’s boredom fuels their will to return to war. The possibility of a
return to an armed struggle was mentioned by Laura Smith:
The Saharawi have nurtured a mild and tolerant form of Islam and have been committed to peaceful struggle since the
ceasefire. Unfortunately, the Saharawi have not been rewarded for adhering to peaceful diplomacy, with the result that
frustrations are running high. The Polisario military units languish idly at the desert front line whilst the conflict is
played out in the UN[…] The talk of a return to armed struggle by Saharawis in the camps is more than a
rhetorical expression of their frustration. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the Polisario government to persuade
its militants to accept another UN delay (2005: 554-555).

This view was confirmed by Labib E., young Saharawi informal representative for the
Polisario in Italy:
[…] I giovani adesso, come me per esempio, sono più arrabbiatti, incazzati, scusami la parola, rispetto per esempio
mio padre o mia madre. Ecco io adesso per esempio come un giovane, veramente io voglio tornare alla guerra, perché
basta con la politica, perché siamo veramente stufi, sono trent’anni che stiamo aspettando. Io sinceramente adesso non
sono daccordo con il Polisario di portare avanti questa politica qui, di trattare in modo pacifico. Io come giovane non
sono daccordo. E quindi secondo me, anche le femmine, cioè le donne della mia età, sono per esempio più arrabbiate
rispetto a quelle dell’età di mia madre (Labib E., 2008).
[Young people, like me for example, are angrier, more pissed off, sorry for the expression, than my
mum or dad for example. Take me for example, as a young person; I really want to go back to war,
because enough is enough with politics, because we are really tired, we have been waiting for thirty
years. To be honest, I do not agree with the Polisario who continues with this type of politics, to
continue with peaceful negotiations. For myself, as a youth, I don’t agree. And here, to me, even the
girls, women of my age, are for example, more outraged than those of my mother’s age].
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In December 2000, while I was visiting the refugee camps, the Polisario threatened to
return to war.

According to Zunes and Mundy “year 2000 held major setbacks for

Polisario, which was angry at the UN for abandoning the long-promised referendum on
independence” (2010: 26). The planned route for the 2001 Paris-Dakar Rally was to cross
the occupied territory of Western Sahara near Smara, without the Polisario’s formal
permission. The rally’s organisers refused to modify the route saying that they were to
report only to Moroccan and Mauritanian governments, but the Polisario asked the UN to
stop the rally threatening a return to war (ARSO, 2000). Eventually the officer for external
relations of TSO (the company which organised the event) met with the Saharawi Minister
of Defence in the Saharawi refugee camps (ARSO, 2000), and the Algerian chief of staff
talked to President Abdelaziz. The rally went ahead.
Brahim Bedileh, Polisario commander of the Second Military Region in Tifariti, said lately
with frustration:
We are currently in a stand-by position, still waiting. Nobody wants to lose time in waiting to resolve
our problem of liberation […] Always we have made a difference between the cease-fire and peace.
There is a big difference. The cease-fire is not a definitive thing, whereas, peace is a definitive thing.
As we are military, we are always prepared for the possibility of war (Bhatia, 2001).

As an Islamic group, in a hot area of the world, and with a record of armed struggle, the
Saharawi government is aware of the need to maintain credibility as a peaceful player in the
negotiations for the making of a referendum which could gain their independence from
Morocco. For these reasons, the Polisario leadership has made clear its will for a peaceful
transition: it embraced the UN mission MINURSO which not only works towards the
referendum, but also acts as a guarantor of this unstable peace process. In the past decades
hundreds of Moroccan war prisoners kept in the Saharawi refugee camps have been
liberated; in 2006 all were freed. But despite this confidence in the peace process, young
Saharawi returning to the camps after years of studies abroad now fail to accept without
questioning the decisions made by older generations to maintain the status quo, and to
continue with the peaceful handling of the conflict. Recently, Saharawi living in the
occupied territories of Western Sahara have started demonstrating against Moroccan’s
violations of human rights using non-violent actions. Unfortunately, this creates more
tensions within the negotiations.
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The Saharawi political transition

4.2.2

Saharawi refugees have been a state-in-waiting for more than three decades, but the
Polisario liberation front, according to Laura Smith, has: ‘nurtured a strong nationalist
sentiment among the population’ (2005: 555). The two key strategies for this fundamental
political makeover were certainly the detribalization of the society, and the important role
assumed by women in politics.
The dismantling of all the tribal and patriarchal traditions gave the Saharawi a unique
opportunity to promote their liberation cause and to forge their common identity. Some
refugees even deny the presence of a tribal past, as reported by Tortajada in her interviews
with Saharawi women: ‘There have never been tribes in the Sahara. This was an invention
of the Spaniards, contrived in order to conduct a census of an unknown population’ (2004:
100 translation mine). On the other hand, women’s participation has been central to the
drafting of the SADR constitution.
The SADR constitution draws from sixteen years experience of combat and exile and it
comprises a bill of rights which ensures personal liberty and privacy, forbidding torture and
imprisonment without charges or trial. A specific section on human rights mentions
women, the elderly, wounded people, the victims of the war for liberation and their fathers,
mothers, children and widows. The document establishes each citizen’s rights to education,
health, housing, privacy, and due process (Lippert, 1992: 644). Laws and institutions
guarantee social equality, including women’s rights (Fiddian-Mendez, 2002: 36), free
education and health services, and the right and duty to work. According to Palestinian
refugee and researcher Randa Farah, the level of democracy within the Saharawi refugee
camps is: ‘unmatched elsewhere in the Arab world’ (Farah, 2003). Saharawi fundamental
principles are: free speech, equal worth, and equal rights to men and women. Although
they envisage a multi-party system after independence, currently the Polisario is the only
party represented in exile. 29 This is done in order to maintain the unity concept that has
always been so important to Saharawi people during the fight for independence and the
rejection of a tribal past. The constitution has been modified several times, most recently in
2007 where the Congress added a fixed quota for women representatives in the four wilayas,
as suggested by Mohammed A., Polisario representative in Australia:

29 Es-Sweyih justifies the Saharawi approach to democracy despite the ‘temporary’ presence of a one-party
system (1998: 66 - 67)
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The Parliament has also increase in trying to get more women speaking in Parliament. In the last
Parliament, there was 4% membership of women in the Parliament and, as we speak now there is an
election campaign taking place in the Saharawi refugee camps and for the Parliament which it should
be constituted by the 27th of February this year. And, I am aware that preparatory committee has
suggested that in every constituency it has to be two women on the list, of every constituency,
otherwise would it be unacceptable or illegal if there are no women on that list (Mohammed A.,
2008).

Most of the analyses done by scholars and international organizations on the Saharawi
political system are based on the 1991 and 1999 translated version of the SADR
constitution.
The Western Sahara Democratic Republic represents today a unique example of moderate
Islamic democracy, which escaped ethnic conflicts from a tribal past, and promoted
women’s empowerment. A sense for this long-lasting achievement was well captured by
Emily F., AWSA representative, who passionately said:
[…] They [Saharawi women] have a much stronger sense of politics than Australian women; … they
are very much more politically involved than Australia women, they have a cause which is a
common cause and therefore different. They are not pretty much distracted by consuming […] They
don't have to have their hair set every week, so, you know, they're much more focused on the basics
of life which is survive or… And that's what they do. I think we can learn a lot from them, I'm sure
[of] it (Emily F., 2008).

The struggle for independence for Western Sahara has spread over generations. Younger
Saharawi women are today still deeply involved in the independence movement. In
October 2007, Senia Bachir Abderahman, former president of the Saharawi Women
Union, was invited to speak at the UN Fourth Committee (Special Political and
Decolonization). In her blog she says:
As a representative of the Saharawi women, I try to talk about our struggle in the small scale with
my friend at the lunch table and on the big scale when speaking before the UN Fourth Committee.
In addition, I got the opportunity to give presentations both in Norway and now in the USA about
the current situation of the conflict in general and women in particular. Moreover, it is – I believe –
the new generation that would make a difference for this on-going struggle (Zeina blogspot, 2007).

Along with other scholars, Zunes and Mundy have clearly stated that the “Polisario’s elites
are able to rule because they serve the people, not vice versa” (2010: 250).
4.2.3

Socio-economic transitions in the refugee camps

At a concrete level, economic reconstruction of post-conflict states involves the
rehabilitation and the development of infrastructures, production of facilities and
development of human resources (Sørensen, 1998). The economic perspective in the
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Saharawi refugee camps is still mostly expressed in a survival mode, based on humanitarian
aid, as previously mentioned in chapter one. Infrastructure is kept to the minimum, and
floods have worsened the situation (Díez, 2007). Agriculture and farming are not possible
due to the harsh conditions of the desert and scarcity of water. Despite this, in the
province of dakhla and at the Rabouni Protocol there are community gardens run by
Saharawi gardeners which provide for hospitals and schools (Díez, 2007: 9).

Figure 11: Vegetable garden in the Saharawi refugee camps (Sonia Rossetti, December 2001)

Since 1999 a large quantity of cash coming to the camps has boosted the creation of
markets and small-scale businesses. This new form of “income” primarily comes from
children who have been in overseas summer-holidays programs called “Vacaciones en Paz”
(Holidays in Peace); Spanish pensions granted to Saharawi who served in the colonial
security service (Mundy, 2007: 288); remittances from family members living abroad.
Personally owned cars, and expansion of trading routes to Senegal, Mali, Mauritania,
Algeria and Spain (Bhatia, 2001) have also pushed the beginning of a local trade. Saharawi
women’s economic activity has also increased ranging from manual work, as carpet makers
(Tortajada, 2004: 182), to the delivering of traditional medicine and managing all aspects of
education (Melotti, 1999: 4 of ch 2, part 2). The problem with these new privately-own
businesses has been the creation of disparities in a society which used to be egalitarian, not
remunerated, and based on solidarity and volunteers. Moreover, there is now the issue of
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keeping operational businesses in the middle of the desert, for obvious lack of resources
and hiccups in international agencies’ projects:
I mezzi elettronici hanno una durata di vita molto ridotta a causa della sabbia, delle temperature alte. I pezzi di
ricambio sono introvabili negli accampamenti dei rifugiati. L’unica cosa, sulla quale potevi contare al 100% è la
disponibilità delle persone. A qualsiasi ora, a qualsiasi momento (Mariam B., 2007).
[The electronic media has a very short life due to the sand and the hot temperatures. The pieces
cannot be found in the refugee camps. The only thing that you can rely hundred percent is people’s
engagement. At any hour, at any time.]

The Polisario’s first priority in constructing the refugee camps was to create a system of
social services and social integration where women had to be key participants. Women are
today present in all principal mass organisations: Union of Youth Saharawi (UJSARIO),
Union of Saharawi Workers (UGSTARIO), Union of Journalists and Writers (UPES),
Union of Saharawi Jurists (UJS), the Saharawi Red Crescent and obviously the Union of
Saharawi women (NUSW) (Mundy, 2007: 280). Women generally work in neighbouring
committees called tuiza, which are organised in each daira. In these centres their job is to
look after the elderly, orphans, and the disabled. They are also responsible for running
medical centres, dispensaries, sanitation programs based on prevention and vaccination,
food distribution, and education (Baines, 2001: 28; Tortajada, 2004: 184-185). Health care
is one of the key jobs, especially for those overseas-trained Saharawi doctors. Recently, the
Italian NGO ‘Rio de Oro’ has finalised a census of the disabled population living in the
camps and connected them with Italian families willing to participate in distance-adoption
programs. Committees are also forming to face the growing problem of depression,
especially in young people, because of the lack of employment (Díez, 2007: 19). There is no
record of prostitution within the Saharawi refugee camps, but the presence of a sex trade in
the Algerian city of Tindouf is well known to those who visit the region.

4.3

Promoting gender in governance

In a new social and physical context created after the conflict, women may feel free to
explore different ways to be politically active. During the reconstruction, women may gain
more opportunities to express representation and leadership thanks to the loss of
traditional roles/leaders during the conflict (Sørensen, 1998; Mazurana, Raven-Roberts et
al., 2005); in fact, while men have to reconstitute their role within the society from soldiers
to citizens, women often organise themselves in grassroots associations. A study conducted
by the UN’s Women Waging Peace Policy Commission, shows how Cambodian women
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have worked from the ground up to promote Good Governance Cambodia’s ten years
democracy. Despite the fact that in accordance with Buddhist philosophy women are
presumed to be the “weaker sex” and denied equal access (McGrew, Frieson et al., 2004:
13), today Cambodian women constitute the majority of civil society; for this reason they
play a vital role in project implementation and as “watchdogs”. According to the study,
excluded from the powerful, male-dominated patronage networks that regulate entry into
the public domain of politics, religion, private sector and financial institutions, military,
government, and media, Cambodian women have achieved “their most significant
contributions to governance through civil society” (McGrew, Frieson et al., 2004: 14).
Through local NGOs, Cambodian women have worked to tackle corruption, engage in
non-violent dispute’s resolution (protests) at community level (for violation of lands rights
or disagreements with the authorities over local resources), and promote human rights
advocating for legislation on violence against women. With the help of external donors,
women have been involved in promoting a decentralized democracy at a grassroots level:
The commune council elections of February 2002 marked an important step towards dismantling
authoritarian local-level structures that have been in place since the 1970s and toward providing a
political mechanism for democratization processes to reach deeper into the countryside, where most
Cambodians live and work (McGrew, Frieson et al., 2004: 20)

Eighty percent of women were elected in councils across the country and their importance
grew with their ability to impact social programs and local development.

One of the indicators of the Third Millennium Development Goal declaration, which
monitors progress on gender equality and women’s empowerment in politics, is in fact
related to the number of seats held by women in national parliaments (Kabeer, 2005: 21).
Third World countries and post-conflict societies have been pushed to introduce gender
quotas in their electoral systems in order to boost the proportion of women in electoral
seats. Despite a net increase of women’s political representation in most of the world’s
poorest countries such as Bangladesh and Uganda, many have argued that introducing a
quota system without increasing gender sensitivity will not constitute a real change of
power, but simply will use women as window dressing (Baines, 2004; Mugadza, Mukasa et
al., 2006). The critique of the quota system is that it will not guarantee political participation
to a wider circle; rather it will be transmitted from man to wife or from father to daughter.
Also, when the number of women is used as the only gender discriminator there is no
guarantee that more women in parliament will produce a better response to the needs and
priorities of women.
64

4.3.1

Saharawi women’s political participation

The 2006 African Feminist Forum, gave negative feedback to those post-conflict
governments, especially in Africa, that approached the problem of women’s parliamentary
representation by simply adopting a quota system (Rossetti, 2008). Mohammed A., Polisario
representative in Australia, says that Saharawi women vehemently refused to introduce
gender quotas in their local electoral systems when faced with the opportunity because it
was considered to be an unfair short cut to a proudly owned representation, based on
grassroots participation:
[…] in the last Congress of the Polisario there was also big debate about the role of women and

there was a move towards, you know, adopting a certain type of quota and the result of that is that
for the first time there has been an election of women in the highest leadership of the Polisario, in
addition to the women who automatically become the member of women organisation. There are
two women now in the National Secretariat of the Polisario, and this is the first time. There was a
move, or the hope there will be more, nonetheless I think there are still some obstacles, even lack of
qualification, psychological difficulties for women to elect women. And, it is very hard because most
of the population in the camps, in every, you know, constituency for election of Parliament for
example, most of electors are women, because the men are away, you know. But, they still don’t
vote for women, [they] don’t elect them (2008).

Mariam B, Polisario representative in Rome, agreed with her colleague in Australia:
[...]E le donne non l’hanno voluta, molte donne non l’hanno voluta durante il Congresso. Si voleva mettere una quota.
Le donne hanno detto ‘noi non vogliamo quota che non meritiamo’. Cioè chi vuole coprire un ruolo politico deve avere
la capacità, il coraggio e l’ambizione politica, per correre, per costruire quel lavoro. Una cosa è ovviamente, cioè voglio
dire, questo credo io nella mia opinione personale, vale per quei posti in cui uno va votato per coprire un ruolo. E’
giusto che venga scelto dalla gente, secondo la sua capacità e la capacità di convincere la gente. Penso invece che sia
giusto anche che certe donne che hanno certe competenze, per esempio per il ruolo che copro io, vengano nominate.
Perchè poi i rappresentanti vengono di fatto nominati dal governo. Non mi dispiacerebbe che ci fossero più donne nella
rappresentanza all’estero (Mariam B., 2007).
[And women did not want it [a quota for women], many women didn’t want it at the Congress.
They wanted to have a quota [but] women said ‘we do not want a quota that we do not deserve’.
That means that those who want to hold a political position must show the skills, the courage and
the political ambition to run, to build that capacity. Something is obviously, I mean, that is what I
think, in my personal opinion, that is, for those position where someone has to be voted in to fill a
role. It is fair that he/she must be chosen by the people, because of his/her skills, the skill of
convincing people. On the other hand, I think it is fair that certain women have specific skills, for
example in a role like mine, and that they will be nominated. Because then, representatives are in
fact nominated by the government. I would not mind more women within the foreign
representatives abroad.]

Both interviewees also recognised that one of the gruelling obstacles to gender
mainstreaming in Saharawi political participation was that women were hesitant to vote for
other women:
C’è una grande insistenza sulla elezione delle donne, ma si sà, no, il dramma delle donne è sempre quello, cioè che le
donne non votano, le donne, purtroppo cioè devo dire c’è ancora, ci sono tabù, ma non dovuti ad una politica che
esclude le donne, piuttosto a proprio retaggi culturali. Ma questo non capita solo hai Saharawi, capita in quasi tutte le
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società, ecco. In parlamento vengono elette, fanno le loro campagne elettorali, se vengono elette, sono membre del
parlamento. Infatti questo nuovo parlamento c’è un alta partecipazione, non so se l’hai visto in internet, ma c’è un alta
percentuale di donne (Mariam B., 2007).
[There is a real push for women’s election, but you know, women’s dilemma is always the same,
that women do not vote women. Unfortunately I have to say, there are still taboos, which are not
due to politics that excludes women, but it is more linked to cultural legacies. This doesn’t happen
just to Saharawi, happen in almost all societies, in fact. In parliament they are being elected, they
have their electoral campaigns; if elected they become members of the parliament. For instance, in
this new parliament there is a high level of participation, I don’t know if you saw it in internet, but
there is a high percentage of women].

As Tortajada well pointed out Saharawi women do not feel still confident in their role as
political representatives and leaders (2004: 190). The reticence was in presenting themselves
as candidates and also in voting for other women. Insecurity is mostly fed by the
requirement of total engagement in these highly political roles, and women feel this will
take them away from their families (Tortajada, 2004: 190). Anna M., Italian representative
of the International Bureau for the Respect of Human Rights in Western Sahara
(BIRDHSO), mentioned the attempt of the Saharawi government to address the ongoing
problem of being disadvantaged simply for being a woman:
Magari la donna è qualche volta meno avvantaggiata, esclusivamente per il fatto di essere donna a causa delle
tradizione che resistano ancora in certe famiglie o per il fatto della maternità, (che limita la sua independenza
intellettuale), ma il governo Sahraui sta facendo tutto il possibile perché questo cambi al più presto (2008).
[Maybe a woman is less favoured in some cases, simply because she is a woman, because of
traditions which are still strong in some households, or because of motherhood (which limits her
intellectual independence), but the Saharawi government is doing what it can to make this change as
soon as possible].

On the other hand, there are Saharawi women who believe having a family is what
strengthens their sense of justice and their desire to engage within the political process.
Mariam B. explains how the everyday expectations of a family life prepare women for life in
politics:
Le donne hanno la capacità di farlo visto che poi la convivenza nasce in famiglia e le donne sono quelle che tengono la
famiglia, l’unità familiare eccetera, è più naturale (Mariam B., 2007).
[Women have the capacity to do it since they learn to live together in the family, and women are
those who hold the family together; it just comes natural.]

According to the Islamic feminist literature previously examined, for Saharawi women
being a mother and nurturing a family is a life priority, linked also to religious and cultural
beliefs. Once children enter a woman’s life there is less time to support the cause, but there
is no need to stop supporting it. Mariam B., Polisario representative in Italy, when asked if
Saharawi women have the same agency as men in the Saharawi constitution and political
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system, replied:
Sì, avrebbero le stesse opportunità! Dico avrebbero perchè le donne siamo sempre quelle che vogliamo mettere
ovviamente...la nostra priorità è la famiglia, no? Rimane sempre questa cosa che di fatto è inevitabile, soprattutto in
quelle condizioni, c’è la donna è quella che si occupa della famiglia. Questo limita molte donne a presentarsi e anche ad
impegnarsi nel lavoro politico. Io adesso li capisco. Prima della nascita di mia figlia, quasi al limite della nascita di
mia figlia ho continuato a viaggiare, a coprire delle missioni fino all’ottavo mese di gravidanza all’estero, eccetera, e così
via. Una volta nato un bambino in una famiglia è tutto più limitato. La tua libertà di movimento come mamma. cioè
naturalmente la tua priorità sono i bambini, è la famiglia eccetera. Quindi credo che questo sia uno dei più grandi
problemi che si presentano, soprattutto per le donne saharawi. Rifugiate, avere una famiglia eccetera, e dover anche
coprire un ruolo politico diventa, diventa difficile (Mariam B., 2007).
[Yes, they would have the same opportunities! I would say that because us women, we are always
the ones that obviously…want to prioritize family, true? There is always this in fact inevitable thing,
especially in those situations; the woman is the one in charge of the family. This really stops women
from being forthcoming and for getting involved in the political work. Now I can understand it
myself. Before my daughter was born, almost up to the point of giving birth to my daughter, I kept
travelling; to be sent for overseas missions up to the eight month of pregnancy, and so on. Once a
child is born into a family everything becomes very restricted: your freedom to travel as a mother;
well, obviously your priorities are your children, the family etc. Therefore, I believe that this is one
of the biggest challenges to face, especially for Saharawi women. They are refugees, they have a
family, and to hold political roles becomes hard, very hard].

A dichotomy exists between older Saharawi women, who have experienced the hardship of
war, exile and refugee status, so now do not want to engage with politics because they just
worry about their families; and younger women, who have been well educated, have
travelled overseas, know how to use technologies, and speak many languages. This latest
group is the one that pushes for more representation and a quick solution of the stalemate,
with a hint at returning to war. In 1998, the New Internationalist magazine, reported an
interview with a young Saharawi girl, who spoke English and spent time in Sweden, Greece
and Spain. Describing today’s Saharawi women she said: ‘there is certainly no going back to
the old ways’ (1998). In the same magazine, Moma Sidi Abdehadi, one of the first Saharawi
women to become a member of the Polisario’s National Secretariat, ex-President of the
Women’s union, and one of the first women to enter the refugee camps in Algeria, proudly
said:
“[…] We were illiterate no[t] long ago and we still have a mindset that derives from that to some
extent. It seems quite natural to me, given this, that women tend to vote for men rather than for
other women. We do have outstanding women figures. But it’s perfectly true that we have to fight
against the old mentality” (1998).

According to African scholar Maria Nzomo, African women: ‘must seek to organize and
become active players at all levels of decision making in their societies, including in the
management of conflict’ (2002: 18). Sheila Meintjes and others, in The aftermath: women in
post-conflict transformation said that the Polisario’s refugee camps have been an example of
‘providing women with opportunities of innovation’ (2002: 16). Life in the refugee camps

67

did provide Saharawi women with a model of leadership to make them become “agents of
change”.
4.3.2

The meaning of being in politics

When asked what the sentence “women in politics” meant to them, most of the
respondents agreed that this sentence can have the same meaning, if not stronger, in
Saharawi’s culture as it has it in the West. Saharawi women have as many chances as men
to be political representatives for the SADR. Jack F. for example, had the impression that
(compared to the Australian) the recent development of Saharawi women’s participation
outside the family will not suffer a setback once the situation in the occupied territories is
resolved:
I would say that in Australia the women’s right to play a full political life is further advanced, but we
starting looking at it in the early 21st century. It has to be realised that Australia has had full, in the
Commonwealth, full female suffrage for more than a hundred years, whilst in the Saharawi culture
that is something that with the external, meaning the outside the family role of women, is relatively
recent development, but I will say to you there is no going back and my impression is that they, you
know, as I have been saying, there would be an insistence by the women (2008).

The same feelings were expressed by Emily F. who said that Saharawi women have: ‘a
much stronger sense of politics than Australian women [...] they have a cause which is a
common cause’. Labib E., a male Saharawi informal political representative in Italy, echoed
this statement on the centrality of the role of women in the Saharawi culture:
Io mi sento fiero di essere un Saharawi perché è una delle politiche dove veramente c’è il ruolo della
donna che in questo...e soprattutto essendo un paese islamico, è un vantaggio molto importante il
ruolo della donna (2008).
[I feel proud to be a Saharawi since it is one of the political causes where there really is a role for
women, that is… especially being an Islamic country, the role of women is a very important
advantage.]

Mohammed A., Polisario representative in Australia, also expressed his wish for a broader
representation of women not only on the Saharawi government, but also abroad:
I think the opportunity is the same for men and women. But, because of the conditions of
individuals, of the situations, the women tend not to be available sometimes, through, you know,
their own personal conditions, you know: they have family, they have children or, you know, their
family needs them to be around. We would have liked to see more women, you know,
representatives in different parts of the world and play a role in the international service, in
diplomacy (2008).

As the Saharawi community continues to modernise there will be more and more
prominent women in diplomatic roles of negotiations and international relations. This
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process is in fact becoming an important aspect of the forty-year struggle for postcolonial
independence of a Western Sahara state.

4.4

Conclusions

State-building can consolidate peace in a number of ways such as enhancing security at a
national level and providing the necessary infrastructure for diminish the role of external
actors (Paris, 2004; Call and Cousens, 2007). Saharawi people have started their process of
constructing a national identity and a state democracy while living in refugee camps. The
good outcomes of the SADR system of government, going from a post-conflict stage, to
possibly gain independence over the Western Sahara territory, will be enhanced by the
participation of women in politics.
This chapter has looked at the progress already made by Saharawi people to maintain longterm stability in post-conflict reconstruction. Twenty years of negotiations with Morocco,
the renunciation of armed struggle, the liberation of all Moroccan war prisoners from their
jails in the Tindouf desert, the setting up of a democratic government which promotes the
participation of women and the training towards future economic independence are all
examples of the SADR’s development of a “Good Governance” system. Moreover, the
participation of women in political roles is valued by the Saharawi government not only for
its deep meaning towards the goal of gender equality, but especially for the dedication of
those families that are supporting those women in political roles. What still needs to be
explored is the role of Saharawi women as representatives abroad and their impact on the
local mediators.
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Chapter Five: Gendered participation in the representation of
Western Sahara
5.1

Establishing foreign representatives abroad

International relations literature on the foreign policy behaviour of small states reached its
peak in the 1970s (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2004: 20), after the UN promoted the right to
self-determination of the ex-colonies (East, 1973; Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006; McGowan
and Gottwald, Dec.,1975). There is no agreement on the definition of “small states”. Some
use this term to identify microstates, such as the former British colonies in the Pacific or
the Caribbean; others use it for countries in the developed world such as New Zealand,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway and Switzerland (Hey, 2003: 2), but mostly it is in the
Third World, and countries such as East-Timor, Lesotho, Togo, and Bhutan, that are
defined as “small states”, and some of these appear to operate in a manner of some
concern to larger states when creating revenue. Some are in short::
Modern day pirates, bent on distorting international financial rules or operating on the margins of
the financial system by creating offshore financial centers and attracting “unscrupulous” sources of
funds, and having to live with the forecasted statement of being an ‘inevitable catastrophe”
(UNIRSD, 2010).

The experience of the newly constituted East Timorese state fits perfectly into this picture:
In this globalized millennium, it takes more than a referendum to achieve independence. TimorLeste has been governed by the United Nations. Its National Development Plan was largely written
and enforced by the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. [...] The police and military
structures that have caused so much trouble recently were mostly created and trained by
international advisors. Ninety percent of the economy depends on foreign oil companies. The new
nation, sandwiched between two self-absorbed neighbors, has had to surrender petroleum reserves
to Australia and abandon justice to Indonesia [...] (Scheiner, 2007: 135).

Leaving others to argue about the negative role of “small states” in the strategic balance
between international powers, in this chapter I will focus on the importance of establishing
good foreign policy relations while in the process of state-building. The East Timorese
government for instance, while in exile, invested most of its diplomatic skills to create ties
with neighbouring countries, and increased external support eventually brought Australia to
support an international call for the referendum on autonomy:
East Timorese diaspora successfully garnered significant international support for their cause
through well-established transnational connections cultivated over 25 years. This has meant that
East Timorese long distance nationalism was shaped by a focus on international diplomatic efforts,
and their success at building strong alliances with church and solidarity groups. So although refugee
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diasporas such as the East Timorese have a specific homeland-oriented imagined community, the
East Timorese imagined community is aided very much by transnational flows between the diaspora
and their homeland, and between the diaspora and sympathetic outsiders (Wise, 2004: 171).

Anthony Smith, in his study of East Timor’s foreign policy shows how this new postcolonial “small-state” managed: ‘to exercise its independent judgement as a foreign policy
actor’ (June, 2005: 36) tightening diplomatic relations with its larger neighbours Indonesia
(its former occupier) and Australia. Similar behaviour can be seen in others “small states”
emerging from post-conflict/post-colonial status; Croatian foreign policy for example: ‘has
considerably helped to cross the road from fighting for an independent state to the
situation where Croatia is nowadays being considered as a regional power in South-Eastern
Europe’ (Vukadinovic, 1996: 150).
In their recent book on Western Sahara, Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy argued that ‘the
greatest pressure in support of East Timor’s right to self-determination came from
nongovernmental actors’ (2010: 262). Even in the case of Western Sahara, the work done
by transnational activists and supportive foreign governments has started to pressure EU
nations and private companies not to sign illegal deals with the government of Morocco,
highlighting the unjust occupation of the Western Sahara territories. The Polisario worked
since its constitution to establish effective foreign relations not only with African and
European neighbours, but with countries all over the world: ‘one of Polisario’s main
diplomatic strategies at the international level has been the pursuit of bilateral recognition
from other states’ (Zunes and Mundy, 2010: 123). The SADR is at present recognized as
the legitimate government of the Saharawi people by almost fifty countries 30 (ARSO,
2009a). Data from the Saharawi Department of Foreign Affairs 31 shows that in 2009 there
were thirty-two official Saharawi political representatives in Europe (including Russia) and
Spain itself had twenty-one. There were twenty-two Saharawi political representatives in
Africa, and seven more were cited as part of the Pan-African Parliament 32 established in
March 2004 (Article 17 of The Constitutive Act of the African Union). Australia only has
one representative, North America has four, and South America ten. Saharawi embassies
are established in eighteen of these nations, with the recent addition of the SADR Embassy
in East Timor (Sahara Press Service, 2009). Those who for years held back on finalising the
In 2006, there were up to 81 countries that recognize the SADR. An up-to-date un-official list was
published on the Saharawi website arso.org in 2009.

30

31

Internal document delivered confidentially.

In 1984 SADR was recognized by most African countries, therefore invited to join the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), today Africa Union.
32
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referendum, and who supported war and occupation were principally the French and
American governments, which have always feared a solution of the conflict might have
brought instability to their ally, the Moroccan monarchy.
In this chapter, after a brief introduction on the geopolitical support or rejection of the
Saharawi’s right for independence, I will examine the role of Polisario representatives in
Italy and Australia; was gender mainstreaming implemented? If yes, was this made tangible
to their local supporters? Did Saharawi men and women use different diplomatic
approaches in different countries? Finally, was their role substantial in reaching the ultimate
goal of supporting the Saharawi cause for independence? As it will be demonstrated later,
the work done by Saharawi political representatives abroad, both male and female, did
enhance the creation of grassroots networks which has been strongly opposed to the noninterventionist agenda of nation-states. This has become more evident with Morocco’s
growing fear of the outspoken international Saharawi civil rights movement, which has
forced the kingdom to introduce new “media” techniques to divert listeners from finding
out about the Western Sahara conflict. In my personal experience, while in Italy conducting
interviews for this study, I had to confront a Moroccan representative during a public
lecture on the role of Saharawi women in the SADR’s government. I was invited by the
Bologna’s Women’s Centre to a talk about gender quotas and the experience of Saharawi
women in government. There were two other female participants in the panel, an informal
Saharawi representative who studied medicine in Italy, and an experienced European
activist on Saharawi’s civil rights. The audience was mostly represented by women from
various backgrounds, all interested in hearing about Saharawi’s civil rights abuses
perpetrated by Morocco, and to know more about the role of Saharawi women in the
SADR’s government. A woman among the others seemed very passionate in defending the
Moroccan government. She verbally attacked the civil rights speaker, accusing her of lying,
then pointed to the Saharawi representative, calling her a terrorist. The discussion became
so passionate that the chair person could not manage the discussion, nor handle the
confrontation, and left in tears. Yet, afterwards, many of the Moroccan women present in
the audience came and thanked us saying they appreciated hearing about a situation that is
not openly discussed in Morocco. The European activist for Saharawi civil rights also
confirmed that it is not unusual for the Moroccan government to send representatives to
these public talks, which may have explained the outspoken Moroccan woman who
attempted to sabotage the conference. This experience helped me further appreciated the
strategic importance of women’s involvement in the civil support of the Saharawi cause,
72

and the general significance of introducing informal representatives abroad to help spread
the Saharawi claim for independence:
The most important advantage of nonviolent resistance is that it has the potential to overcome the
major hurdle facing Western Sahara nationalism: the Franco-American consensus that supports
Morocco. When handled strategically and with some media savvy, nonviolent resistance can
highlight the moral differences between a people claiming their rights and the government that
denies them (Zunes and Mundy, 2010: 163)

5.2

The international scenario on support or rejection of
independence for Western Sahara

Despite the clear illegality of Moroccan’s occupation of Western Sahara, geopolitical
considerations surrounding the region have for years overridden the quest for international
legality. The question of what the future holds for Western Sahara matters not only to
those involved in the conflict; it creates tensions within neighbouring countries, the
European Union’s agenda, and even the United States and United Nations’ interests. To
better understand the complicated network of alliances both for and against the Moroccan
government’s occupation, I will briefly introduce UN and EU policies over Western Sahara
and subsequently analyse some of the interests of individual nation-states (France, Spain,
and United States). To conclude, I will discuss the role played by transnational civil society
in search for a pacific solution to the Western Sahara conflict.
5.2.1

UN long term engagement on Western Sahara

Christine Chinkin of the London School of Economics, published a book chapter for the
International Platform of Jurists for East Timor (IPJET) in which she analyses the
enduring engagement of the UN with Western Sahara (2006). The picture she frames is of
a continuous presence of the United Nations in Western Sahara. Since 1976, a considerable
number of different UN bodies have been directly involved in the conflict (the
Decolonization Committee, the Security Council, MINURSO, the Secretary General’s
various personal envoys and special representatives, International Court of Justice), and in
the refugee camps (the UNHCR, the Commission on Human Rights, UN Legal Council,
UNIFEM and many others). However, the Western Sahara issue has never been a priority
in the agenda of the “veto nations” (the permanent five - P5: UK, USA, Russia, PRC, and
France). In the language used by the UN:
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The Council has not adopted the normative, regulatory or administrative role that it has in other
conflict situations, for example by placing the territory under UN administration as it did with both
Kosovo and East Timor (Chinkin, 2006: 335).

The question of Western Sahara has been dealt as a question of decolonization by the UN
General Assembly and as a question of peace and security by the UN Security Council
(UNSC). In 2002, the UN Legal Counsel was questioned on the right of multinational
companies, such as the French oil company TotalFinaElf E&P Maroc, to sign agreements
with Morocco in order to initiate oil extractions in Western Sahara (United Nations
Security Council, 2002b). Subsequent to an analysis of the status of the occupied territory
and of the principles of international law governing mineral resource activities in non-selfgoverning territories, the UNSC concluded, as it did in the Case Concerning East Timor
(Crawford, 2006: 616-17, and ICJ Rep 1995, p.90, 105-6), that anything but drilling was
legally admitted:
[…] the contracts for oil reconnaissance and evaluation do not entail exploitation or the physical
removal of the mineral resources, and no benefits have as of yet accrued. The conclusion is,
therefore, that, while the specific contracts which are the subject of the Security Council’s request
are not in themselves illegal, if further exploration and exploitation activities were to proceed in
disregard of the interests and wishes of the people of Western Sahara, they would be in violation of
the principles of international law applicable to mineral resource activities in Non-Self-Governing
Territories (United Nations Security Council, 2002b).

This is just an example that shows how, despite good intentions, the efforts of the United
Nations to resolve the dispute over Western Sahara, and protect the spoiling of this rich
territory, have failed continually. The real problem has always been the unwillingness for
the UN’s states to find a final solution for conflict in Western Sahara: “the UN secretariat
and the Security Council’s Group of Friends for Western Sahara were never comfortable
with a winner-take-all vote. The referendum had only functional value, as an empty threat
designed to extract a final political solution out of Morocco” (Zunes and Mundy, 2010:
217).
5.2.2

The European position on Western Sahara

The European Union (EU) has always adopted a low profile over the question of Western
Sahara’s self-determination process. Its political inaction was influenced by the lack of an
effective foreign policy framework that could go beyond member states’ interests
(Benabdallah, 2009:418; Zunes and Mundy, 2010: 86). There are two reasons. Firstly,
Morocco 33 is perceived as a strategic ally in the critical Islamic area of the Mediterranean
33 ‘Morocco has usually enjoyed good relations with the EU. It also benefits from a special status within the
framework of the EU’s relations with the countries participating in the 1995 Barcelona Process [...] On 13
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Sea; secondly, significant bilateral economic agreements have already been signed with
Morocco for the exploitation of the Western Sahara territory’s phosphate resources and
fishery coast. Scholars from all over Europe have condemned this illegal use of bilateral
agreements which totally ignore the rights of Saharawi people (Brus, 2007; Chapaux, 2007;
Koury, 2007). While France has always maintained its open support for the kingdom of
Morocco, Spain has recently turned its face to the Polisario and improved its relationship
with its supporters. Fortunately for the Polisario, new countries such as Sweden (Wrange,
2007) and Norway 34 have recently shown great support for Western Sahara’s right to selfdetermination, despite maintaining good relationships with Morocco.
SPAIN
Spain is still legally considered the de jure administering power of the Western Sahara’s
territory. According to Carlos Luiz Miguel, the UN General Assembly never endorsed the
Madrid Agreement between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania, and the UN SecretaryGeneral has always referred to Spain as the official administering power of Western Sahara
(2007b: 308). The Spanish government’s position over Western Sahara has recently been
inconsistent (San Martin, 2005; Shelley, 2007; Zoubir, 2007; Balboni, 2008). Since its
victory in 2004, socialist Prime Minister José Luis Zapatero has worked to improve Spain’s
relationships with France and Morocco, supporting the “reformist” government of King
Mohammad VI (Benabdallah, 2009: 428; Zunes and Mundy, 2010: 84). Since Madrid’s
terrorist attacks of March 2004, the Spanish government had no choice but work closely
with both Morocco (a U.S. ally under the George .W. Bush administration), and Algeria on
the “war against terrorism”. On 8 April 2005, the Moroccan weekly Alousbou' published the
news, confirmed by the Spanish press, that Morocco: ‘bought from Spain about twenty
tanks, type M60 A3, at a token price, destined for Western Sahara and the border with
Algeria’ (ARSO, 2005). In March 2007, the two governments met in the capital Rabat and
reached a joint statement on the future of Western Sahara, welcoming the Moroccan plan
for autonomy. Nonetheless, nonpartisan Spanish solidarity groups marked this new
October 2008, at the seventh meeting of the EU–Morocco Association Council, the EU gave its approval to
a package of measures designed to strengthen the partnership with Morocco, especially “cooperation in
political and security matters, the preparation of a comprehensive and deeper free trade agreement, the
gradual integration of Morocco into a number of EU sectoral policies, and the development of people-topeople exchanges”’ (Benabdallah, 2009: 431-432).
In 2009 the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has doubled his economic support to the Saharawi
refugee population and a partially government-owned fish oil company has stopped trading with Morocco
after ethical concerns expressed by Both the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Finances, as well as the Norwegian Support
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Committee for Western Sahara.
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government’s position as “shameful”; the Coordination of Spanish associations in solidarity
with the Sahara (CEAS) warned that: ‘Spanish support for the Moroccan plan will only
bring war and suffering for both Saharawi and Moroccans and the rest of the
region’(ARSO, 2007b). When Saharawi human rights activist Aminatou Haidar was refused
entry to Western Sahara and was sent back to the Spanish Canary Islands, Spain had to take
a stand against Rabat and work with the United Nations and the U.S. to solve the impasse.
This incident proved the strength of a large and very active pro-Saharawi movement within
Spanish society. According to Benabdallah ‘supporting Moroccan claims over Western
Sahara would come at high political costs for any Spanish government, and could also leave
the door open to other claims over the other Spanish possessions’ (2009: 427).
FRANCE
It is no secret that Morocco, on the matter of the Western Sahara disputed territory,
maintains the support of France, Great Britain and the United States. French leaders have
always had a strong relationship with the kingdom of Morocco and clearly pursued a policy
largely in favour of the territory’s annexation. In 2003, President Jacque Chirac threatened
to use his veto power against the UN Security Council’s decision to impose a solution on
Morocco (Zoubir, 2006: 288); again, in 2007, newly elected conservative President Nicolas
Sarkozy stated before Morocco's parliament:
Morocco proposed an autonomy plan, a plan that is serious, a plan that is credible as a basis for
negotiation […] In France's view, what will permit a resolution to this conflict that has gone on too
long is a political solution, negotiated and agreed to by the two parties under UN auspices […]
Morocco's autonomy plan exists; it is on the table and constitutes a new proposal after years of
deadlock. I hope to see Morocco's autonomy plan serve as the basis of negotiation in the search for
a reasonable resolution. France will be at your side (Reuters, 2007, 23 October).

France is Morocco's main investor, with close to seventy percent of total foreign direct
investments (Zoubir, 2007: 169). The French resolution on avoiding instability in the
Maghreb region has pushed other African French-speaking countries, such as Benin,
Bourkina Faso, Chad, Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), and Togo, to withdraw
their diplomatic recognition of the Western Sahara Republic (Zoubir, 2006: 289). More
recently, France, together with Russia, did try to block the UNSC’s proposal to establish
human rights monitoring of Morocco as part of the MINURSO’s mandate (Human Rights
Watch, 2008b).
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5.2.3

The US position on Western Sahara

While France has always been resolute in its opposition to an independent Western Sahara
(Security Council Report Website, 2010), the United States has been ambivalent. According
to Zunes and Mundy: ‘between 1976 and 1984, the U.S. government spent an average of $1
million annually training Moroccan military officers [...] by 1982, there were approximately
130 U.S. military advisors working with the Moroccan armed forces, including members of
the U.S. Army’s Special Forces and U.S. military attachés sighted in Moroccan uniforms in
battle zones’ (2010: 19) During the Cold War, this large economic, military and logistical
support to Morocco was justified by the fear that Saharawi nationalist movement would
emerge as a pro-Soviet state aligned with Cuba and Libya (Zoubir, 2006: 291). In 1993, the
Clinton administration changed the U.S. profile in the referendum using its influence to
keep Morocco-Polisario negotiations going, and to create the Security Council’s “Group of
Friends” for Western Sahara, joined by France, Russia, Great Britain and Spain.
Subsequently, the appointment of former U.S. secretary of state James Baker as UN
secretary-general for Western Sahara proved the efforts of the Clinton’s administration in
finding a peaceful solution for Western Sahara. Unfortunately, the death of King Hassan
II, and the ascension in 1999 of Mohammed VI delayed the organisation of the referendum
under the Houston Accord, signed just two years before. Since 2001, with the introduction
of George W. Bush’s “Global War on Terror”, the U.S. administration has looked at a
stronger alliance with Morocco, which has always been very supportive of U.S. interests in
the Middle East (Zunes and Mundy, 2010: ch 3). Just recently, newly elected U.S. President
Barack Obama has overturned George W. Bush’s support for autonomy as the only
solution for Western Sahara. In June 2009, President Obama talked in Cairo about a “New
Beginning” for U.S. relationship with Islamic Nations in North Africa, and the countries of
the Maghreb region: ‘Obama administration has disassociated itself from a Moroccan plan
for autonomy for the disputed Western Sahara. They said the White House no longer sees
itself as committed to the endorsement by then-President George Bush of Western Sahara
autonomy’ (WorldTribune.org, 2009). Sources though are still contradictory. For Dr. Peter
Pham, Vice President of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy in New
York City, the creation of another “failed state” ‘that is too small, too poor, and too
vulnerable to subversion by terrorists and other extremists’ (2010: 249) cannot be permitted
if the U.S. wants to maintain the contemporary international order.
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5.2.4

European “bottom-up” engagement with the Polisario

In 1986, when Spain entered the European Economic Community, the European
Commission was called for the first time to rule on a bilateral fishery agreement between
Spain and Morocco regarding Western Sahara (Damis, 1998: 62-63). Since then the
European Parliament has adopted resolutions and declarations defining the issue of
Western Sahara as a problem of decolonisation, but not defining the right of the Saharawi
people to self-determination (Balboni, 2008). The Commission has continued to support
the refugees in Tindouf using part of its international solidarity spending for the
“forgotten” crises (Western Sahara, Chechnya, Myanmar and Nepal) (2008: 182), but has
avoided comments on the conflict’s stalemate. The real political stand in support of a
pacific solution over the Western Sahara conflict was taken by those European
representatives who since 1976 have met every year at the European Conference of
Coordination Support to the Sahrawian People (EUCOCO). This major international
conference is held on a yearly basis, each time by a different European city:
This Conference gathers representatives of the Committees and Associations, of local bodies and
twin regions, the diverse NGO’s, trade unions, cooperatives, volunteer organizations and the diverse
European parliamentary inter-groups… working for the just cause of the Sahrawian People’s
freedom, and helping them to survive day by day in this tough wait which has already lasted for
more than 30 years. The highest representatives of the Sahrawian Government will participate in
this Conference, normally the president of the RASD [SADR] himself and several members of his
Government, as well as representatives of the POLISARIO Front. Nowadays, the Conference
reaches beyond the European borders, notably the wide participation of institutional and social
representatives from all the continents, especially the African representatives, and that is why we can
refer to it as an International Conference, rather than an European one (EUCOCO, 2008).

The EUCOCO represents one of the most important gatherings for all those involved in
the Western Sahara cause. European activists and governments representatives get to meet
and discuss with the stakeholders on strategies and ways of interventions for a peaceful
solution of the Western Sahara disputed territory (see Figure 12). The aim is certainly to
place the Saharawi conflict in the foreground of the current European political debate, but
also to give Saharawi representatives a venue to share and compare political ideas with very
influential activists, lawyers and politicians.
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Figure 12: Parade in Pisa (Italy) to celebrate the opening of the 33th EUCOCO Conference and
carrying the SADR flag (Sonia Rossetti, 28 September 2001)

For example, thematic discussions for the 34th EUCOCO 2008 were: Political action,
Humanitarian Aid (Food, Health, Non-Food Aid), Human Rights and Occupied Areas,
Lawyers, Trade Unions, Women, Youth, Culture and Arts. Luca G., a representative from a
Bologna’s Saharawi support group, was present at the 33th EUCOCO conference in Rome:

[…]Beh, per me è stato la prima volta quest’anno, per cui ho potuto incontrare tante persone con esperienze differenti,
dai saharawi che provengono dai territori occupati, a persone che invece vengono da altre parti d’Italia e dell’Europa,
quindi con nuove testimonianze. Ho partecipato ad un incontro dell’EUCOCO quello sui diritti umani, che ci
coinvolge particolarmente in associazione. Ho ascoltato le proposte di nuovi progetti e quello che si intende fare
nell’immediato. Ho potuto confermare l’importanza di osservatori internazionali che seguono i processi ai Saharawi
nei territori occupati, per poter portare una testimonianza a noi, ma sopratutto per vigilare un po’ su quello che accade
continuamente. E’ stato molto interessante ascoltare la testimonianza degli attivisti sui diritti umani Saharawi. I loro
racconti riportano sempre la sofferenze e le violenze subite. Ognuno di loro rappresenta una tragedia. E’ stata un’
esperienza molto forte e toccante (Luca G., 2008: Bologna).
[Well, this year was my first year; therefore I got to meet with lots of people from different
backgrounds, from Saharawi coming from the occupied territories, to other people coming from
various parts of Italy and Europe, all with new stories. I took part in one of the EUCOCO
meetings, the one on human rights, which is of particular concern for our association. I listened to
the suggested new projects and what is intended for the meantime. I could confirm the relevance of
international observers who would follow trials against Saharawi in the occupied territories, report
back to us, and more importantly to witness what is always happening. It was very interesting to
listen to Saharawi human rights activists’ testimonies. Their stories always recount the suffering and
violence endured. Every one of them represents a tragedy. It was a very difficult and emotional
experience.]
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This European event is so significant that Saharawi supporters from outside Europe are
also admitted. The two representatives of the Australian Western Sahara Association
(AWSA) interviewed in this study were at the 2005 EUCOCO’s edition in Belgium:
[…] that would had been three years ago, that gave us another level of understanding and that was
the place where I got an even better appreciation of say, the health, and the food aid question and
the adversity. It's very easy to understand that if 160,000 people live in the desert, they are going to
be dependent on foreign aid but… that process is something that people don't understand that the
World Food Program provides only for basics, but then if there is a political crisis somewhere else,
it can affect the situation of the Saharawi. Now, I came to understand that better by going to the
international conference and in the camps we did have quite a good discussion about that
issue…and we learned more about the proportion of different kinds of food that were provided
(Emily F., 2008).

There are other organizations in Europe which focus more on human rights such as the
International Bureau for the Respect of Human Rights in Western Sahara (BIRDHSO) in
Switzerland; the Spanish based Association of the Families of Saharawi Prisoners and Disappeared
(AFAPREDESA), campaigning against human rights abuses perpetrated by Morocco against
Saharawi in the Moroccan controlled parts of Western Sahara; and lastly the internationally based

Western Sahara Resource Watch Association which researches and campaigns against
companies who support the Moroccan exploitation of Western Sahara’s resources. Anna M.
talked about her experience of working for BIRDHSO and the difficulty of promoting the
respect of human rights due to a lack of funding and commitment:
[...] Frequentando poi gruppi di lavoro in Europa sulla solidarietà per il popolo Sahrawi, sono entrata a far parte del
BIRDHSO (Bureau Internazionale per il Rispetto dei Diritti Umani nel Sahara Occidentale) con sede a Genève.
Durante una nostra assemblea, è stato deciso che avrei fatto parte dell’esecutivo e che ci sarebbe stato un referente per
ogni paese dell’Europa che lavorava per i Sahrawi, sono stata scelta a rappresentare l’Italia. Da questo momento il
mio lavoro è cambiato, ho abbandonato i progetti umanitari e ho iniziato di cercare di sensibilizzare le organizzazioni
italiane che si occupano di violazioni dei diritti umani. Non è facile lavorare in questo settore (perché poi non arriva
un riscontro diretto), quasi nessuno vuole finanziare un progetto del genere, anche se tutti dicono che i diritti umani
sono importanti e che dobbiamo rispettarli. Per fare rispettare i diritti umani è necessario un budget per preparare
determinate cose, e purtroppo siamo praticamente partiti da zero (Anna M., 2008).
[While participating at European workshops on solidarity with the Saharawi people, I became part
of BIRDHSO (International Bureau for the Regard of Human Rights in Western Sahara)
headquartered in Geneva. In one of our meetings it was decided that I was going to be part of the
executive and that there was going to be one representative for each European country working
with the Saharawi; I was chosen to represent Italy. From that moment onwards my job changed, I
gave up the humanitarian projects and started working to increase awareness of the Italian
organizations which work in human rights violations. It is not easy to work in this sector (because
you don’t get direct feedback); almost no one wants to finance such projects, even if everyone talks
up human rights and says that they must be respected. For human rights to be respected you need a
budget in order to organize certain things, unfortunately, we practically started from zero].

Copious is also the participation of Saharawi women at these international gatherings,
despite the difficulty of managing passports and visas to travel in and out the refugee
camps. Their presence, as mentioned by Jack F., is generally noticed and highly regarded:
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[…] at the EUCOCO the prime minister was present and Sidati, Mohamed Sidati, who’s the
Councillor for Europe, and some, you know, of the senior diplomatic representatives from the
European places, and they were all men. There was a very impressive woman who lived in Poitiers,
somewhere like that, who is Saharawi, I think she is qualified as lawyer in France [...] I can’t
remember her name [...] In terms of, of the impression she would make in European and English-speaking

world she would be very impressive in the way, and you know Fatima is like this and... In some ways you see…
what you see in the camps, the women playing major roles, you know, and in the government there, you don’t
see as much externally and I would think that a smart move would involve, more of the women, and
particularly this one. It wasn’t Aminatou Haiddar, but she was very impressive in terms of her personality and
her way of communicating and that was great strength of Fatima as well, she is an excellent communicator in
English and is not just because she speaks good English, she knows how to put the argument, and to put the
issue and draw you in, draw your interest in to them. And of course she speaks, obviously speaks Italian
perfectly, probably she speaks some Swedish, she speaks some French and Spanish as well and maybe some
Russian. (Jack F., 2008)

Every year, since 1976, Polisario’s representatives, both men and women, have come from
the refugee and occupied territories to participate at these international conferences. The
scope has been to promote political participation of western partners in finding a pacific
solution for Western Sahara. Even if at times it was difficult to guarantee mainstreamed
gender participation, the general presence of women at these events has enhanced
discussions in all areas. This is just an example of the groundwork done by Saharawi’s
political representatives abroad to build a robust international social network.

5.3

Western Sahara political representatives in Italy

5.3.1

Roma’s Rappresentanza

In 1978, Hasan C. was the first Saharawi political representative to arrive in Rome. He was
recruited by the Frente Polisario to become a political foreign representative of Western
Sahara when studying at University in Rabat:
Ho lavorato prima in Libia come rappresentante per sei mesi. Dopo la Libia sono andato, sono stato nominato
sempre dal Ministero degli Affari Esteri Saharawi e il dipartimento relazioni internazionali del Polisario come un
membro della rappresentanza del Polisario a Parigi in Francia; questo fu nel ’77. E lì rimasi per altri otto mesi,
lavorando alla rappresentanza Saharawi. Dopodiché, poi sono stato nominato in Svezia, lì anche per un periodo
molto corto, avevo però delle difficoltà, il problema della lingua, l’inglese, io non ero molto bravo in inglese quindi, la
mia lingua originale, apparte l’arabo era lo spagnolo e capivo anche il francese. Dopodiché, poi nel ’78 sono stato
nominato rappresentante del Polisario proprio qui in Italia. Lavorai in Italia per altri tre o quattro anni. Per me le
difficoltà...e non avevo più voglia di rimanere a lavorare fuori, ho chiesto il trasferimento all’interno dei campi. Quindi
a tornare nel Sahara Occidentale a fare altri lavori. [...] Nel ’98 venni richiamato un altra volta dal Ministero degli
Affari Esteri Saharawi, poi nominato di nuovo in Italia (Hasan C., 2008).
[First I worked in Libya as a representative, for six months. From Libya I went, I was again
appointed by the Saharawi Foreign Affair Ministry and by the Polisario International Relations
Department, as a member of the Polisario delegation in Paris, France; this was in 1977. I stayed
there for another eight months, working at the Saharawi’s delegation headquarters. After that, I was
appointed to Sweden, there again, for a very short period, but I also had some problems, a language
problem, English, I wasn’t very good in English, my mother tongue, apart for Arabic, was Spanish,
but I also understood French. Subsequently, in 1978 I was appointed as Polisario’s representative
here in Italy. I worked in Italy for other three or four years. The difficulty for me was…I did not
want to work abroad anymore, I requested to be transferred back to the camps. I went back to
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Western Sahara to do other jobs. […] In 1998 I was called back again by the Saharawi Foreign Affair
Ministry and appointed to Italy again.]

In 1994, Mariam B. was the first woman to join Hasan and other Saharawi men at the
Rappresentanza in Rome. Recruited by the Polisario while she was still studying in Cuba,
Mariam B. was first sent to Italy, and subsequently moved to other locations in Europe:
[…] Io, già durante i tempi dell’università facevo parte delle organizzazioni giovanili saharawi all’interno dei...degli
universitari che studiavano a Cuba e quindi partecipavo insomma, amavo molto partecipare alla vita politica, al
lavoro che si faceva lì nell’organizzazione giovanile. Accadde però un fatto, che nel ’91 arriva il referendum e arrivò
con una richiesta da parte dei giovani di partecipare nel lavoro proprio burocratico, nella preparazione al referendum.
Io finii lavorando nella commissione Saharawi per il Referendum, si chiamava la COSAR che è una specie di
MINURSO Saharawi, diciamo, no, che aveva...rapporti con la MINURSO e ovviamente preparava il referendum.
L’atto di determinazione. C’era una parte che si occupava di censo della popolazione, chi si occupava delle traduzioni,
della raccolta...cioè eravamo una vera e propria commissione che si occupava solo del referendum. E lavoravo giù negli
accampamenti dei rifugiati. Dopodichè nel ’93, il referendum non andava avanti, c’era questo gruppo di giovani più o
meno preparato, diciamo che potevano aiutare a svolgere il lavoro di sensibilizzazione all’estero riguardo la questione
saharawi. Io fui mandata nel ’94 qui in Italia, a dare una mano al rappresentante che stava già qui. Quindi ho
cominciato a lavorare negli uffici del Polisario da allora. [...] In Italia fino al ’99. Poi sono andata in Svizzera, ho
collaborato con la rappresentante che era una donna, [...] poi sono stata nominata per lavorare in Svezia e poi sono
rientrata di nuovo in Italia (Mariam B., 2007).
[You see, even during University I was already part of young Saharawi’s organizations, with those …
university students in Cuba. I was involved then. I really loved being involved in political action, in
the work done there at the Youth association. Something happened though; in 1991 the referendum
came, and it came with a call to the youth to be involved, especially in the bureaucratic jobs of
organizing the referendum. I ended up working for the Saharawi commission for the referendum, it
was called COSAR, something like the Saharawi MINURSO; well, let’s say, it had relations with
MINURSO which was obviously organizing the referendum. The determination act. Some of us
were involved with the population’s census, others in translations, other in collecting…Well, we
were a true commission which was working only on the referendum. I was working down there, at
the refugee camps. Afterwards, in 1993, the referendum was not going ahead; there was this group
of youth more or less prepared, let’s say, to help increase awareness abroad about the Saharawi
problem. I was sent here in Italy first in 1994, to help the representative that was already here […]. [I
stayed] In Italy till ’99. Then I went to Switzerland, to help the representative there who was a
woman […] then I was appointed to work in Sweden, and then I came back to Italy again.]

Today, Rome’s Rappresentanza has four official 35 foreign representatives, but still only one
of these is a woman.
5.3.2

Working with Associations in Italy

Since their arrival in Italy, the Polisario representatives have worked closely with the
community to build knowledge and support for their cause. As Hasan C. explains:
Ovviamente io avevo, qua in Italia il Polisario, il movimento Saharawi era molto presente, ormai dagli anni ’70.
Avevamo una buona relazione con le forze politiche italiane, con il Parlamento, ma soprattutto aveva creato una rete
As explained in the introduction, “official representatives” refers to those listed as such by the Saharawi
Foreign Department. Informal representatives, on the other hand are those who, while living overseas, were
contacted by official Saharawi representatives to help in the Saharawi cause as civil representatives.
35
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di solidarietà molto diffusa a livello di enti locali, di società civili, c’erano... e ci sono ancora oggi centinaia di
associazioni di solidarietà con il popolo Saharawi e questo ovviamente, questo capitale di solidarietà è anche un
supporto morale a chi viene a rappresentare (Hasan C., 2008).
[Obviously I had, here in Italy the Polisario, the Saharawi movement was already very active since
the ‘70s. We had good relationship with the Italian parties, with the Parliament, and above all we
have created a very large solidarity network with local entities, social groups, and there were...still
there are today hundreds of associations of solidarity with the Saharawi people, and this obviously,
this solidarity capital is also a moral help for who come to represent (the Saharawi cause).]

Initially, the life of a representative is filled with frustrations; people do not know who
Saharawi are, therefore it is hard for a representative to explain his/her role, mission, and
the extent of his/her needs:
[...] Prima dovevi sempre spiegare chi sono i Saharawi, da dove vengono ed era molto faticoso [...] adesso si sa chi
siamo e addirittura in un parlamento come quello italiano vengono votate delle risoluzioni a favore del riconoscimento
diplomatico del fronte Polisario (Mariam B., 2007).
[In the past, you had to always explain who the Saharawi are, were they come from, and this was
always very difficult […] now they know who we are, even in a parliament like the Italian
parliament, resolutions were passed which favour the diplomatic recognition of the Polisario Front.]

Difference in language and culture take their toll, especially when the time spent in one
country is never enough to fully adapt:
Forse nel passato le persone non erano preparate a vivere in occidente, uno. Avevano il limite della lingua, il limite di
imparare la cultura del luogo. Questo penso che era uno dei tre fattori più difficili per uno che viene preso da un
accampamento di rifugiati e deve rispondere a un ruolo difficile con dei mezzi molto limitati. [...]Quasi tutti i
rappresentanti Saharawi conoscono bene l’occidente, la cultura occidentale. Hanno convissuto, hanno imparato molto,
parlano quasi tutti varie lingue. E hanno anche imparato a usare meglio, no, il proprio tempo ecco, la questione del
gestire le priorità e così via. Cosa che all’inizio non avevamo perchè venivamo da un mondo completamente diverso,
dove, venivi da un mondo e entravi in un mondo dove dovevi imparare tutto, assolutamente tutto e si perdeva molto
tempo nell’imparare. Come una volta imparato già è arrivato il turno di cambiare posto e andare in un altra cultura
ancora, un altro posto ancora, completamente diverso (Mariam B., 2007).
[Maybe in the past people were not ready to live in Western countries. There were limitations of
language, the limited ability to learn about that place’s culture. I think that that was one of the three
most difficult factors for someone who is taken from a refugee camp and has to fill a very difficult
role with very limited resources. […] Almost all the Saharawi representatives know about the West
and Western culture. They lived together, they have learnt a lot, and almost all of them speak
various languages. They have also learnt, you know, to use their time better, you know, to manage
priorities and so on. Something that at the beginning we did not have because we were coming from
a completely different world; you were coming from a world entering into another where you had to
learn everything, absolutely everything and lots of time was wasted in learning. Once it was learnt, it
was already time to change and move into another different culture, another place again, totally
different.]

After the pioneering job of lobbying, networking and marketing their message done by the
first representatives, Italy is now one of the foremost Saharawi’s supporters in Europe,
promoting political discussion, humanitarian aid, human rights watch, solidarity convoys
etc...
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Oggi la solidarietà, io parlo dell’Italia, è molto estesa, e il problema sono sempre i mezzi, per i Saharawi, non avendo
il controllo sulla propria economia (Mariam B., 2007).
[Solidarity today, and I am talking about Italy, is very vast, but the problem is always the resources,
for the Saharawi, since they do not have control over their economy.]

Italian NGOs, such as the Comitato Internazionale per lo Sviluppo dei Popoli (CISP),
Africa ’70, the Cooperazione per lo Sviluppo di Paesi Emergenti (COSPE) and the Centro di
Educazione Sanitaria e Tecnologie Appropiate Sanitarie (CESTAS), were the first organizations to
realise projects in the refugee camps, and to liaise with Rome’s Rappresentaza:
[...] Qui il lavoro è soprattutto di lobbying, di sensibilizzazioni, prendere contatti [...]. Questo è un lavoro molto
complicato, molto difficile, però è anche un lavoro appassionante. Nei campi il lavoro si sà, lì è anche una
sopravvivenza, perché quello è un deserto (Mariam B., 2007)
[Here the job is primarily to lobby, to make people aware, to get contacts […]. This is a very
complicated job, very difficult, but it is also very appealing. In the refugee camps the job is, you
know, there it is about surviving, because it is a desert].

The two worlds, Catholic and Islamic, could not have been further apart, but the bridge
between them was the constant presence of the Saharawi people in form of their
representatives:
[...]Un tessuto di solidarietà con i Saharawi molto diffuso, e questo è quello che aiuta il rappresentante, avere tante
sensibiltà, tante amicizie, tanti...con tante forze politiche, poi anche di società civili di tutte le forze, di tutti gli
orientamenti politici. Sulla questione Saharawi, qui per esempio in Italia c’è quasi una unanimità. Non si identifica
la solidarietà con i Saharawi con uno schieramento o con un gruppo politico, dalla destra come dalla sinistra sulla
questione Saharawi. (Hasan C., 2008).
[A solidarity network, with the Saharawi, which is spread out, this is what helps the representative,
have lots of support, lots of friendships, lots…with lots of political support, and also strength from
all different social groups, of different political backgrounds. With regard to the Saharawi problem,
here in Italy for example, it is almost unanimous. Solidarity with the Saharawi people it is not
restricted to one political ally, or one political group; from Right to Left for the Saharawi.]

The work done by the Polisario political representatives in Italy made it easier for Italians
to approach the Saharawi cause both politically and materially. Mariam B. showed
satisfaction in talking about the work done by Italian associations in the camps:
Soddisfazione è quando vedi che si realizzano le...i progetti. Il fatto che riesci a trovare le persone che sono disponibili
ad aiutare i Saharawi. Problemi negli accampamenti vengono risolti, in parte. Quando arrivi, vedi negli accampamenti
che in 10 anni gli accampamenti sono completamente cambiati. I Saharawi, dal ’75 ad adesso è il popolo più istruito
dell’Africa, con oltre il 95-93% di istruiti, è pazzesco per un accampamento di rifugiati. E’ una grande soddisfazione
quando i bambini tutte le mattine vanno a scuola, tutti quanti possono andare in un ospedale. Escono all’anno,
all’estero, oltre 9.744 bambini con gli adulti che li accompagnano a cui vengono risolti i propri problemi (Mariam B.,
2007).
[Satisfaction is when you see the realization of... the projects. The fact that you are able to find
people who are willing to help the Saharawi people. The problems in the camps get solved, in part.
When you arrive at the camps you see that in ten years the camps have totally changed. The
Saharawi people, from ’75 till now, are the most literate people in Africa, with more than 95-93%
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literacy; this is crazy for a refugee camp. It is a great satisfaction when children go to school every
morning, anyone can go at the hospital. Every year, there are more than 9,744 children going
overseas with escorting adults, to have their problems solved]

In 2007, the Italian government discussed the possibility of granting: ‘the Polisario Front’s
delegation in Italy diplomatic status, as has been done in the past for other liberation’s
movements recognized by the UN as official mediators in a peace process’ (Camera dei
Deputati, 2007, July 12). After thirty years of lobbying across all political parties, the
Polisario did finally obtain from the Italian lower house a motion in favour of the Saharawi
political cause. This resolution was bipartisan (Communist parties – PCRC and PRC, Lega
Nord - right wing, Italia dei Valori - liberals and Alleanza Nazionale - extreme right wing) and
celebrated as an: ‘important element of foreign policy because it was sympathetic to
numerous UN Resolutions, and because it asked for the recognition of diplomatic status to
those [Saharawi] representatives in Italy’ (RaiNews24 - Stampa, 2007).
Today, the job of a Saharawi political representative in Italy is to liaise with the many Italian
associations created to support the Saharawi fight for independence, denounce Moroccan’s
human rights violations, and provide relief and material goods to the refugee population.
According to the official Saharawi website ARSO.org, there are thirteen official
associations in Italy (ARSO, 2009b). Some started as a small committee and later became
registered associations or NGOs. The Emilia-Romagna Region is one of Italy’s most
supportive regional governments. Since 1999, Emilia-Romagna has given priority to the
Saharawi cause in its budget for solidarity spending. Annual working plans are drafted by
the Saharawi Board of Nations (Tavolo delle Nazioni) in order to select the best projects to
realise in the Saharawi refugee camps (Fresa, 2004). Luca G., who represents the EmiliaRomagna Regional Coordination of all the Saharawi support associations, says that working
together has reduced duplication of resources and increased the quality of service, but has
maintained the associations’ distinctive aims. Generally, the associations’ goals are shaped
by two principal factors: solidarity and political action:
E’ importante cercare di avere un’organizzazione comune per unire le forze e le idee per progettare
in una direzione comune. Per i Diritti Umani abbiamo organizzato negli ultimi anni, incontri e
dibattiti coinvolgendo anche attivisti saharawi come Ali Salem Tamek e Hamineatou Haidar.
Quando riusciamo a portare persone del loro levatura , come Coordinamento Regionale, cerchiamo
di organizzare incontri su tutto il territorio regionale. Sono pochi giorni ma molto intensi per loro,
ma anche per noi. Nel nostro sito c’è un continuo aggiornamento di quello che avviene nei territori
occupati, nei campi profughi, oltre che di tutte le iniziative che vengono organizzate su tutto il
territorio nazionale. Inoltre esiste una mailing list a cui vengono mandati gli aggiornamenti più
importanti. Ogni giorno riceviamo e riportiamo notizie di saharawi che vengono arrestati.
Ultimamente un rappresentante della CGIL che è andato nei territori occupati con una delegazione,
è stato arrestato durante una riunione in casa di un attivista saharawi,. E’ stato fermato per 24 ore,
successivamente liberato. Ci sono stati momenti di tensione (Luca G., 2008).
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[It is important to try to have a common organization to put our strengths and our ideas together, to
plan in a common direction. With regard to Human Rights, in the past we organized seminars and
discussion forums, inviting Saharawi activists such as Ali Salem Tamek and Hamineatou Haidar.
When we get a hold of such important people we try to organize, as a Regional Coordinative
Committee, debates throughout the region. These are just a few days, but very intensive for them,
and for us. On our website we constantly update news about occupied territories, refugee camps,
and all the other initiatives organized at national level. There is also a mailing-list from which we
send out the latest updates. Every day we receive and post news on Saharawi who are arrested.
Recently, a member of the CGIL union, who went to the occupied territory with a delegation, was
arrested while in a meeting at a Saharawi activist’s house. He was held for twenty-four hours and
then released. There have been moments of tension].

Rita L., who represents the Rio de Oro association in the Marche Region, has worked for
the past ten years with disadvantaged Saharawi families in the refugee camps. For her, as
for many others, it all started when Saharawi children arrived in her home town for the
Vacaciones en Paz (Vacations in Peace) programme. Rita L.’s first project for the Saharawi
refugee population was drafted after her first visit to the camps:
[...] specialmente quando [...] mi sono resa conto, di che cosa si voleva fare e per chi. Si è iniziato
quindi un progetto rivolto quindi ai disabili, alla popolazione disabile, iniziando con una scuola di
Smara. Con la scuola di bambini differentemente abili, disabili, di Smara che poi ha portato ad un
censimento di tutta la popolazione disabile di tutti i campi profughi. Questo primo progetto di
adozione a distanza ha unito altri progetti sempre legati alla disabilità e alla malattia e in qualche
modo ha anche unito il primo progetto di accoglienza. Quest’anno facciamo accoglienza ai bambini
disabili in Italia e interventi di chirurgia nei campi profughi (Rita L., 2008).
[…] especially when […] I realized, what we wanted to do and for whom. Yes, we then started a
project for the disabled, the population with disabilities, starting first with the school of Smara. With
the school of the differently-able, the disabled, of Smara, which then led to a census of the whole
refugee camps’ disabled population. This first project of distance-adoption has linked with other
projects, again of disabilities and diseases, and somehow has led by the first project of hospitality.
This year in Italy we will host disabled children, and perform surgery in the refugee camps.]

Another testimony comes from Anna M., who was involved for many years with the
Saharawi National Association which works with Italian political parties to present motions
in favour of a political solution in Western Sahara. In fact, according to Anna M., being
headquartered in the capital city of Rome gives the association more chances to contact
local and international institutions and to coordinate solidarity projects at a national level
(2008). Many of these associations’ representatives stressed the relevance of having direct
Saharawi supervision to help draft their projects:
Con la nostra associazione e con il coordinamento regionale ascoltiamo le indicazioni sui progetti che ci vengono
proposte da lui in quanto siamo consapevoli che sia la persona più accreditata per conoscere le vere esigenze del popolo
saharawi. Ritengo che sia inutile decidere senza un suo consulto (Luca G., 2008)
[Our association and the Regional coordinating committee listen to his suggestions [Polisario
representative from Rome] on projects, since we know that he is the most accredited in knowing the
real needs of the Saharawi people. I believe that it is useless to make decision without consulting
him.]
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5.3.3

The

introduction

of

the

Polisario’s

informal

political

representatives
Italy’s social and political movements that support the Saharawi cause are today so many
and complex that the few Saharawi representatives based at the Rome’s Rappresentanza
cannot satisfy the requests of participation at events or the coordination of solidarity
projects. In order to satisfy everyone’s needs, a new form of representation has emerged
within the Saharawi delegation in Italy, that of young Saharawi students. As it happened for
some of the first Saharawi representatives, such Mariam and Hasan, today’s Polisario
Rappresentanza is recruiting young Saharawi in loco to help them build their information
campaign.
Labib E. is a Saharawi medical student who has helped the Polisario’s Rappresentanza since
his arrival in Bologna in 2003:
Ogni giorno quando per esempio, gli studenti, i professori e i medici mi chiedono ma tu di dove sei, ecco, anche mi
sento...devo spiegare tutta la mia storia, raccontare tutta la storia del mio popolo, quindi ecco che mi sento anche
rappresentate politico in un certo modo (Labib E., 2008).
[Every day, for example when students, professors and doctors ask me where do I come from, well,
I feel...I have to tell all of them my story, tell my peoples story, well it is then when I feel that in a
certain way I am a political representative.]

When asked if he was part of a Saharawi events’ organization committee he said:
No, però quando loro fanno qualcosa ci chiamano comunque noi tutti Saharawi, quando abbiamo tempo, tutti lì,
facciamo quello che possiamo tutti quanti (Labib E., 2008).
[No, but when they organize something they call us, all the Saharawi, when we have got time, we are
all there, we all do what we can.]

While Labib E. seemed confident of his informal role as a representative, Jamila D., who
has lived with an Italian family since she was ten years old, was at first resistant. In her
particular case the interview took place at the Rappresentanza’s headquarter in Rome, and
one of the senior representatives was present at the time of the interview. When asked how
she became a Saharawi political representative, Jamila D.’s first reaction was: ‘what can I
do?, I can’t consider myself a political representative’ (Jamila D., 2008). Once I explained to
her that in my view she had already been chosen by the Polisario to be an informal political
representative (since the formal Polisario representative suggested to me her name for the
interview) she agreed to continue. Despite her uncertainty, Jamila D. showed confidence in
explaining her role as a “lecturer” for the Polisario:
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Praticamente vado a fare conferenze, fatte da iniziative di associazioni pro-saharawi, iniziative pro-saharawi a livello
nazionale e sta aumentando. Quindi il ruolo è quello di divulgare la mia causa. Quello di informare chi non sa chi
sono i Saharawi della loro storia, di come siamo finiti in questa situazione insomma. [...]Parlo ultimamente di più
con gli studenti, studenti liceali. Sto facendo un progetto con la Provincia di Roma di conferenze di quattro ore a
istituto, divise in due. E qui facciamo sia proiezione dei filmati, che una mostra fotografica e spieghiamo un po’la
causa Saharawi (Jamila D., 2008).
[Technically, I do conference presentations, organized by pro-Saharawi’s associations, pro-Saharawi
initiatives organized at a national level, and it is increasing. My role, then, is to spread the word
about the cause. To inform those who do not know about Saharawi history, how did we get into this
situation. [...] Lately, I talk more with the students, high school students. I am working on a project
for the Roma Province; four hour conference for each institute, divided in two parts. Here we
screen documentaries, photo exhibitions and we talk about the Saharawi cause.]

In Italy, as in other parts of Europe, Saharawi students are commonly involved with the
Polisario movement and invited to give presentations about the situation in Western Sahara
when formal representatives cannot be present. Emma I., another Saharawi medical
student in Bologna, was invited by the Bologna Women’s Centre to discuss the Western
Sahara cause at the conference mentioned earlier (section 5.2) together with myself and an
European human rights activist. Emma was able to present at this public panel on different
aspects of women in politics, and particularly on the case of Saharawi women. Emma has
lived in Bologna for several years, and participated in other public meetings such as the one
organized by CESTAS, Il ruolo della donna nel settore socio-sanitario in Africa e nel Mediterraneo
(2003). In my view, the Polisario’s strategy to employ Saharawi men and women, young
and experienced, in the promotion of the Saharawi cause for independence, is a great
example of gender mainstreaming put into practice by political representatives abroad.
Younger Saharawi representatives such as Emma I., Labib E. and Jamila D. are not afraid
to show their disappointment when they encounter ignorance from their audience with
regard the situation in Western Sahara:
[...] Ho una sorta di rabbia, diciamo, nel momento in cui sono lì, parlando della mia causa che è sconosciuta, che
nessuno sa chi sono. Un popolo che esiste. Spesso l’indifferenza, principalmente a livello politico, permette sì che poi la
gente non è informata. Quindi, si può definire problema? Non lo so, a me sì, a me mette molto a disagio questa
situazione, perché spesso mi dicono “di dove sei?” “sono Saharawi” “e chi è, chi sono i Saharawi?”. Spesso mi viene
anche da dire sono algerina, punto, per non...non so dipende anche dalla persona che hai di fronte (Jamila D., 2008).
[ I felt some sort of rage, let’s say, when I am there, talking about my cause that’s unknown, no one
knows who I am. A living people. Often the indifference, especially at political level, allows people
to remain uninformed. Can you define this as a problem? I am not sure, to me it is, this situation
makes me feel really uncomfortable because often I get asked “where do you come from?” “I am
Saharawi” “and who are those Saharawi”. Frequently I feel like saying that I am Algerian, full stop,
but, I don’t know, it also depends on the type of person in front of you.]

All Saharawi representatives interviewed in Italy, both formal and informal, agreed that the
work carried out by Italian associations in the past ten years has helped shape today’s
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Saharawi refugee camps’ profile, and expressed satisfaction in the participation of Italians at
any initiative organized by the Polisario to inform the public:
Progetti che funzionano molto bene, le cooperative agricole delle donne ecc. La solidarietà che è molto più matura. Dei
forti legami che si sono creati senza neanche più bisogno dell’intermediario che siamo noi, no. [...] le soddisfazioni sono
queste. Quando vai negli accampamenti vedi il risultato dello sforzo di molte persone durante questi anni (Mariam B.,
2007).
[Projects that work well, like the women’s agricultural cooperatives etc. Solidarity is now much more
mature. Some strong ties have formed, even without the need for an intermediary, like us, you
know. […] This is what is satisfying. When you go to the camps you see the results of many people’s
efforts throughout these years.]

This type of insight shows how international representatives abroad not only work to
influence political parties and national governments, but how their political support is
reached passing through grassroots association and social based commitment. This
grassroots contact between Saharawi people and pro-Saharawi Italian social based
organisations, holds an appreciation of gender mainstreaming as an integral part of what
work they perform. This inclusive approach to gender encompasses the Italian associations,
the Saharawi representatives, and the projects themselves. The just cause of the Saharawi
and their commitment to a peaceful resolution of the situation is both a product off and
results in this specific integration of gender mainstreaming, without being imposed in the
movement by international organisations.

5.4

Western Sahara political representatives in Australia

The first and only Saharawi political representative in Australia arrived in late 1999.
Mohammed A., was sent by the Polisario from England to help an Australian lawyer, Jill
Vidler and other supporters, to create an active Sydney group for Western Sahara. As
Emily F. explains, Jill was involved with an application for a refugee status by a young
Saharawi who had arrived in Australia by boat. While preparing the refugee application, Jill
made contact with agencies in England, and learned about the situation of Western Sahara
(Emily F., 2008). As Mohammed A. explains, he was chosen by the Polisario to travel to
Australia because of his language skills, and his previous diplomatic experience:
[…] Because my ability to speak other languages I was chosen to play a role in the diplomatic service
of the Polisario and Sahara Republic and that’s why I have been involved in the work... in foreign
countries. And the role here in Australia as Saharawi representative, is manly to raise awareness
about the Saharawi cause; to establish links and relations with the Australian government, the
parliament, NGOs, trade unions, political parties, and work with the Media (Mohammed A., 2008).
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As previously recorded by Saharawi representatives in Italy, even Mohammed A. arrived in
Australia after experiencing diplomatic roles in other countries:
[…] In India and Iran we have a fully established embassy, diplomatic status, and that is different
from being a representative in a country where we don’t have diplomatic status, for example in
Australia. So that is different way of work, different task to do, but the general and one objective is
more or less the same which is to raise awareness about the issue and to try to obtain political
support and moral support and also assistance for the refugees, aid and for example humanitarian
aid. But, so for Saharawi representative it is different also from one place to the other. For example,
in Italy and Spain the emphasis would be different. For example they will be more work towards
“holidays in peace” the program for children, to bring children to those countries to spend time
away from the camps and they will be working more towards getting humanitarian aid, assistance,
like sending convoy of cars with aid in them to the camps. But here in Australia, because its
distance, and the lack of links with the area, Western Sahara is north Africa, cultural, political,
economic links, the job or the past is different (Mohammed A., 2008).

The original group which welcomed Mohammed A. on his first arrival to Australia was no
more than eight people. In 2000, they became incorporated as a non-profit association in
order to raise awareness and to promote action for the Saharawi cause in the Australian
community. The Sydney based association, the Australia Western Sahara Association
(AWSA), has now an established branch in Melbourne and, in the past nine years, has
organised numerous events and campaigns that were politically very significant:
[AWSA] It is just a group of Australians who want to do what they can to encourage the Australian
government to play more active role in insuring that the Saharawi people are able to exercise their
right to self determination, under the UN arrangements for that. [...] We want the Australian
government to do something about it (Jack F., 2008).

Some of these activists have also been supporters of the East Timorese Nobel Laureate,
José Ramos-Horta when he was living in Sydney as political representative (Wise, 2004:
168). Mohammed A. acknowledged that: ‘Australians have, you know, known and
contributed and got involved in this situation in East Timor, and that once they know that
it’s similar is not difficult for them to relate to and get involved’ (2008). These ties continue
today. Just as Nelson Mandela in the 1990s has showed great support for Gusmão and the
East Timorese cause, 36 in 2009 Ramos-Horta came to Australia to support the Saharawi
people (Ramos-Horta, July 22, 2009).
In 2003, under Mohammed’s supervision, AWSA organised Saharawi representative Fatima
Mahfoud’s tour to Australia and New Zealand, and invited her to talk about the Saharawi
cause from a woman’s perspective. This first encounter with an English speaking Saharawi

Mandela became a strong supporter of the East Timorese cause after he received a letter in 1994 from
Gusmào. He wanted to congratulate him for the victory against apartheid. Mandela visited Xanana in prison
in 1997 (Wise, 2004: 169).
36
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woman made a very strong impression on the AWSA’s representatives interviewed in this
study. Emily F. said that from: ‘having Fatima staying with us, I got a much, much better
understanding from her’(2008), and Jack F, concordantly said he was amazed by her
communication skills:
[...] her way of communicating [...] that was great strength of Fatima as well, she is an excellent
communicator in English and is not just because she speaks good English, she knows how to put
the argument, and to put the issue and draw you in, draw your interest in to them. And of course
she speaks, obviously speaks Italian perfectly, probably she speaks some Swedish, she speaks some
French and Spanish as well and maybe some Russian (2008).

Looking at differences between the two representatives, Emily F. suggested that
Mohammed’s role in Australia was more focused on the ‘world’s political stage’, whereas
the arrival of Fatima gave them a closer idea of the Saharawi plight and the desert life:
[...] having Fatima here, having Fatima staying with us, I got a much, much better understanding
from her - as a woman and as, you know, a very special sort of woman - of the circumstances,
because Fatima is much more versed in the day to day reality of life in the camps…and…was able to
relate that to…to our situation here (Emily F., 2008).
[...] when Fatima Mahfoud came to visit Australia [...] she stayed with us and that…her talking about
the Saharawi cause gave me a very substantial insight into what it was all about and perhaps
encouraged me to want to join the group to go to the camps. So that’s how I got involved (Jack F.,
2008):

Five years later, AWSA invited Malainin Lakhal, Secretary General of the Union of
Saharawi Journalists and Writers (UJSARIO) and human rights activist, to repeat Fatima’s
tour but focus more on human rights and Moroccan abuses in the occupied territories
(Australian Western Sahara Association, 2007).
Recently AWSA has gathered many Australian political institutions, companies, media, and
unions, to support the Saharawi cause. At the time of the interview, Jack F. said that the
association had made contact with: ‘the present prime minister, Kevin Rudd, when he was
the shadow minister for Foreign Affairs and he knows the issue and he’s on side on the
issue of a referendum’ (Jack F., 2008). On the 27 February 2009, the thirty-third
anniversary of the Saharawi Republic, AWSA organised the raising of the Western Sahara
flag at the Town Halls of Leichhardt (Sydney), Newcastle and various other cities and
towns of Australia (Melbourne, Perth, Hobart, Geelong and Darwin) as a symbolic:
‘gesture of solidarity and friendship with the Saharawi people’(Australian Western Sahara
Association, 2009).
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The physical distance from the refugee camps has made it almost impossible for AWSA to
develop a humanitarian aid service to the Saharawi refugee camps:
The problem for us in Australia, of course, is, and whilst we did send a container of sugar, and that
was organised through the Victorians, a couple of years ago, it’s extraordinarily expensive to do, to
ship it, and while the sugar was supplied for free, from one of the main sugar companies in
Australia, the costs were enormous and unsustainable in effort and, it’s one of the issues for giving
aid, how is the best way to do that. So in some ways for us the food issue was not something that
we could make a particularly useful contribution towards, so he [a Polisario representative in the
camps] outlined the difficulties, and we were aware that the UN food program was inclined to
reduce its support (Jack F., 2008).

Nonetheless, despite profound differences between Australia and North-West Africa: ‘in
terms of language, culture, history’, Mohammed was happy to mention that this Australian
association: ‘try to do whatever they can […] they try to help in different ways’:
[...] I think there is also a trend in the Australian government to look into increase of trade and links
with North Africa. There was an enquiry in parliament a couple of years ago, which I participated.
Looking into the possibility of increasing links and trade with North West Africa and there was a
delegation sent by the parliament to look into that. There are, you know, possibility of increasing
trade links with North West Africa, between Australia and for example countries in that region
including Western Sahara (Mohammed A., 2008).

Certainly, AWSA’s great achievements in the political arena for the Saharawi campaign
could not have been possible without Mohammed’s supervision: ‘without him we wouldn’t
have had a focus’ (Emily F., 2008). Concurrently, Mohammed was clear that his mandate
was to:
[…] try to keep the Australian public in general informed of what is going on in Western Sahara,
and seek assistance in terms of political pressure on Morocco to abide by the UN Resolution; to
seek humanitarian assistance and to ask NGOs and the public NGO towards alleviating the
suffering of the Saharawis in the occupied areas and to have a role in... Also put pressure in
Morocco in terms of human rights abuse in the occupied areas. So the task is huge, the targets are
big but nonetheless it has been very satisfying experience in Australia (Mohammed A., 2008).

This task could not have been possible without the help of organizations such as AWSA,
APHEDA (Union Aid Abroad – Australian People for Health, Education and
Development Abroad) 37 and AustCare. Like in Italy, the brief but effective participation of
a female Saharawi representative visiting Australia gave to local supporters a better
understanding of the social and political situation in Western Sahara, and the political
consequences of the conflict.

APHEDA was created in 1984 as the overseas aid agency of the Australian Council of Trade Unions.
Union Aid Abroad-APHEDA was established to contribute directly to countries and regions of the world
where men and women workers are disadvantaged through poverty, a lack of workplace, denial of labour and
human rights, civil conflict and war.
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5.5

Western Sahara political representatives on the
international stage

Saharawi women, both political representatives and members of grassroots associations,
have recently led the SADR government in participating at international fora; in 2008 a
delegation of Saharawi women held an official visit to the European Union
(Mujeresaharauis blogspot), and at the Ninth Congress of the Pan African Women’s
Organisation (PAWO) the National Union of Saharawi Women was elected to be their
representative at the UN (Sahara Press Service). One of the most renowned Saharawi civil
activists is also a woman: Aminatou Haidar, commonly called the Saharawi Gandhi. At the
age of twenty-one, Ms Haidar was one of seven hundred peaceful protestors arrested in AlAjoun, the occupied capital of Western Sahara, for participating in a rally in support of the
referendum for independence. Ms Haidar "disappeared" without charge or trial in 1987
with other seventeen Saharawi women. She was tortured and held in Moroccan secret
detention centres for four years. Again in 2005, at the beginning of the Saharawi Intifada
for independence, Aminatou was brutally beaten and kidnapped by the Moroccan forces
only to be released seven months later (Zunes, 2008). For her courageous campaign to
promote self-determination for Western Sahara against Moroccan forced disappearances
and abuses of political prisoners, Aminatou Haidar was awarded in 2008 with the Robert F.
Kennedy Human Rights Prize, and a year later honoured with the Civil Courage Prize in
New York. On her way home after this last award ceremony in the United States, Ms
Haidar was refused entry to Western Sahara by Moroccan authorities, and deported to the
Canary Islands. The reason for the refusal was her declaration on the immigration
document of holding Saharawi nationality, rather than Moroccan. Once in Spanish
territory, Aminatou engaged in a non-violent protest to express her right to be a Saharawi
living in the occupied Western Sahara territory, refusing to leave the airport. Her hunger
strike in Lanzarote airport drew international media attention on civil rights abuses
recurrently committed by Morocco in Western Sahara. After four weeks of hanger strike
and with Christmas approaching, the Moroccan and Spanish governments felt the
international pressure to allow Ms Haidar to return to her family. On the 11th of December,
after twenty five days of hunger strike, the U.S. Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton (2009),
spoke with the Moroccan Foreign Minister asking him to allow Ms Haidar to return home:
Her homecoming was, in her own words, a victory for ‘international law, for human rights, for
international justice’ but it was also significant in that it was the first time in the 34 year history of
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the conflict that the international community had effectively intervened in Western Sahara to
persuade Morocco to adhere to its obligations under international law. By capturing both the
attention of the media and the imagination of the public, Haidar's hunger strike gained massive
public support and succeeded in propelling the issue of Western Sahara onto the political agenda
(Simanowitz, 2010).

This example adds to the work done daily by SADR representatives abroad to inform the
international community on Moroccan abuses against the territory and the people of
Western Sahara, and to call for intervention in finding a just and peaceful solution for the
impasse. Saharawi men and women, sent overseas as political representatives, have helped
local activist to understand the origin of the Western Sahara situation and to establish
grassroots support.

5.6

Conclusions

The work done by the joint effort of SADR’s political representatives and the associations’
representatives has often been crucial in revealing the truth about stereotypes of a Muslim
“fragile” “small” state. Since Hasan C. first arrival in Italy in 1978, the role of Saharawi
political representatives abroad has experienced many changes. Representatives went from
having to deal with a new language and culture, to become fundamental in liaising refugees
and supporters abroad. Local governors and social activist have come from not knowing
anything about Western Sahara and why its people were forced to refugee status, to create a
complex social and political network in favour of a pacific solution to the stalemate.
Australia, despite its geographical distance from the conflict, has managed to welcome
various Saharawi political representatives to inform the national government and grassroots
associations about the illegal occupation of Western Sahara, the repression of Saharawi
living in the occupied territories and the harsh situation of the refugees in the desert camps.
In just more than ten years, with the help of Mohammed A., the Australian Western Sahara
Association has produced a massive informative campaign that has helped Australian
companies withdraw from economic agreements with Morocco on the extraction of
Western Sahara’s natural resources.
The Western Sahara stalemate still suffers from chronic post-colonial and post-Cold War
disbelief, and so there is much more work to be done before justice can be achieved. The
presence of natural resources in the territory and the political instability of the Maghreb
region causes a barrier to the United Nations taking serious action to resolve the impasse in
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the peace process (Zunes and Mundy, 2010). In my own view, while the Polisario has
successfully engaged in internal practices of state-building and gender mainstreaming,
greater support is needed by international powers to close this chapter of unresolved
colonialism, and to achieve this the role of political representatives abroad has proved to be
essential.
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Chapter Six: Thesis Conclusions
Saharawi refugees have come a long way to establish a strong, gender conscious,
nationalism. It was 1975 when the Saharawi liberation movement Polisario renounced its
tribal kinship to proclaim national unity, and expressed its desire for independence. After
fifteen years of war with Morocco and twenty years of negotiations, Saharawi refugees are
today governed by an Islamic Republic (SADR) working from an exiled outpost in the
Algerian desert. Thus, SADR’s nationalism came about as a unique result of the rejection
of tribal divisions and the retention of the matriarchal Bedouin culture. Scholars have
shown that SADR has effectively promoted independent state-building practices and
implemented gender mainstreaming policies at all levels of government. This study adds to
this growing literature by focusing on the role of Saharawi political representatives abroad,
and their gendered participation in building international alliances with foreign
governments, NGOs, and local activists.
As discussed in the introduction, the UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security
has required all UN members’ states to incorporate in their policies gender equality
provisions for establishing post-war democratic systems. This program requires postconflict states to implement full participation of women in prevention and resolution of
conflicts, and be aware of gender-specific human rights abuses. Evidences from historical
accounts and recent events show that the concept of gender mainstreaming worked
implicitly in the SADR government-in-exile since its inception.
Chapter Two explored the complex political structure of the SADR’s refugee camps. The
defragmentation of the political organisation in various degrees of governments, all locally
centred, has created multiple opportunities for women to be represented in the democratic
process, and therefore limited the need to introduce gender sensitive mechanisms such as
gender quotas (paragraph 3.5.1). Since the drafting of the SADR’s first constitution women
have been welcomed in all ranks of politics. Mothers, teachers, mayors, ministers, political
representatives and doctors, Saharawi women have kept their religious and traditional
identity, which has enhanced their agency in defeating illiteracy and promoting political
action within the Polisario. Saharawi women are today represented at all levels of society,
both in the refugee camps and overseas. Their participation at international fora is highly
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regarded, and often their contribution gives governments and international activists a
different viewpoint of the situation in the camps and of the whole situation.
The large number of women working in the camps is not just the result of policy; it is also
grounded in the Saharawi Islamic tradition and culture. As discussed in Chapter Three,
Saharawi people follow a traditional, moderate interpretation of Islam in which women are
encouraged to be an active and powerful part of the public sphere as demonstrated by
some of the Qu’ran’s most renowned female leaders. Their Bedouin traits made the original
Saharawi tribes a strong matriarchal society. With time though, certain taboos related to the
private sphere (for example, ‘enforced imprisonment’ of women who have become
pregnant outside of marriage) have re-emerged and strengthened, so much so that today’s
Saharawi government has not yet being able to handle them effectively. Some scholars have
also accused the Polisario of instrumentally using gender mainstreaming to gain support for
their cause from the international community, but it is a matter of fact that Saharawi
women have a great say within the SADR, and their participation in the Saharawi
government commenced well before gender mainstreaming was introduced as an
international norm. The National Union of Saharawi Women and Saharawi women
representatives abroad have been closely working with the Polisario since its beginning.
This of course does not completely solve the problem of women still feeling less able to
run a political career because of their primary calling to be wives and mothers. This is why
an analysis of gender mainstreaming in Muslim states should take into account specific
traditional and social conditions in order to fully understand the complexity of political
representation. A testimony from Jamila D., a young informal Saharawi representative in
Italy, shows perfectly that Saharawi women have entered in politics and how this cannot be
taken away from them:
La donna Saharawi è politica perché è entrata in politica per necessità. Perché era lei sola che poteva portare avanti la
politica. É importante perché non viva solo nella vita familiare e basta. É importante perché possa crescere i propri
figli con dignità, con orgoglio. È una donna che si sveglia la mattina, accudisce i propri figli, li manda a scuola e che
subito dopo può uscire per andare a fare delle riunioni o viaggiare nel mondo occidentale per portare la sua causa
(Jamila D., 2008).
[A Saharawi woman is political because she entered into politics out of necessity. Because she was
the only one who could take on politics. It is important because she does not live only for her family
and that’s all. It is important that she brings up her children with dignity, with pride. It’s a woman
that wakes up in the morning, looks after her children, sends them to school and then, straight after,
she can go out to meetings, or to travel to the Western world and talk about her cause.]

While Polisario is working to build post-conflict transitions in order for the SADR to
become the rightful government of a future independent Western Sahara, Saharawi women
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are working to improve their political participation. Both Italian and Australians NGOs’
representatives interviewed in this study where confident in the fact that this advanced
political status for Saharawi women will not fall through once the stalemate is overcome.
Their support for various international diplomatic activities has already helped the Polisario
in finding supporters for the Saharawi cause, as with the Australian representatives of the
AWSA association expressed in this study.
Chapter Five demonstrated the relevant and unique contribution made by these Saharawi
women in presenting the true Saharawi spirit and the extent of their tragedy. Depending on
their role, Saharawi women participated in the international scenario at different levels to
help foreign governments and social activists to figure out the real impact of Moroccan
occupation in the Western Sahara, the hardship suffered by Saharawi refugees, and the
urgency to find a peaceful and rapid solution to their plight. Moreover, international
relationships can help Saharawi women keep their role in Saharawi politics. The women’s
forum at EUCOCO conferences for example is a great opportunity for supporters to
interact with the Polisario about gender mainstreaming issues and refugee life. For the
Saharawi women it is a venue to meet with their Western counterparts, discuss policies on
the status of women in the SADR and in the camps and start new projects. There might be
some truth to the claim that the advancement of Saharawi women was used by the
Polisario as an instrument to gain Western support in their fight against Morocco
(paragraph 1.3), but there is no evidence to show that these women are acting as the
Polisario’s instruments. Rather Saharawi women represent a fundamental part of the
Polisario’s keen desire for self-determination in the form of an independent state for
Western Sahara, and they were practising gender mainstreaming in state-building
throughout their refugee camps and other aspects of their internal and external politics
long before it became a fashionable concept in the West.
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Appendix II
IN CONFIDENCE
Prompts for Interviews with
Non-Government Representatives Participants
Representative role
Question A1: Can you tell me about your organization and your relationship with
the Saharawi people?
Question A2: Did you participate to any international conference on Saharawi, such
as the EUCOCO or events like Sandblast in England?
Knowledge of Saharawis
Question B1: What do you know about the overall Saharawi political structure?
Question B2: What do you think are their strengths? Did you have any issue working
with Saharawi representatives?
View on Saharawi representatives
Question C1: What do you think about Saharawi political representatives?
Question C2: What do you think they should change or add to better represent their
situation in your Country?
Women in politics
Question D1: What does the sentence “women in politics” mean to you? Can you
say if you think there are “women in politics” in the Saharan Arab Democratic
Republic?
Question D2: Do you think Saharawi women have as many chances as men, and
why?
Question D3: Do you have a view about the political or policy areas in which
Saharawi women are competent?
Question D4: Was the interaction with women representatives different from the one
with men?
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IN CONFIDENCE
Prompts for interviews with Saharawi representatives participants
Becoming a representative
Question A1: Can you tell me about your journey to become a (political) representative and
what is your role?
Question A2: Can you tell me if there are differences when you exercise your role within the
Saharawi camps and the country where you currently work?
Challenges
Question B: Can you tell me what the challenges are and what fulfilments of this role?
Relationship with Western governments, particularly the Australian or Italian
Question C: Can you tell me what your relationships with the ______ government are?
Relationship with Western non-governmental organizations
Question D: Can you tell me what your relationships with the non-governmental
organizations are? Can you give some example?
Legislative system
Question E1: Can you tell me how does the Saharawi legislative system run?
Question E2: Do you think women have as many chances as men, and why? Is gender
regulated in your constitution?
Question E3: Are you aware that many post-conflict Countries have introduced gendered
quotas to favour women in parliaments? Have you considered a similar system?
Women in politics
Question F1: What does the sentence “women in politics” mean to you? Can you say if you
think there are “women in politics” in the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic?
Question F2: Do you have a view about the political or policy areas in which Saharawi
women are competent?
Question F3: What is Saharawi women’s contribution towards a solution of the conflict and
the construction of a new State?
Question F4: What do you think of women as negotiators?
Can you give me an example?
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